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V I 
INTRODUCTION 
...the study of Yeats in the coming generation 
is likely to overdo the scholarly procedure, and 
the result will be the occultation of a poetry 
which I believe is nearer the center of our main 
traditions of sensibility and thought than the 
poetry of Eliot or of Pound. Yeats's special 
qualities will instigate special studies of 
great ingenuity, but the more direct and more 
difficult problem of the poetry itself will 
probably be delayed. This is only to say that 
Yeats's romanticism will be created by his 
critics.^ 
This prophecy, made by Allen Tate in 1942, has been 
fulfilled to the letter. Although Yeats has been named 
consistently among the foremost poets of the century, 
there has been at the same time a persistent undertone of 
questioning, directed at the alleged obscurity of his 
later verse and at the relationship between his poetry and 
his beliefs. Both are familiar issues in the discussion 
of modern poetry, but Yeats's "special qualities", his 
individual style, his symbolism, his growth from the 
aestheticism of the nineties, and, particularly, his 
metaphysical allegiances which, as he was well aware, were 
undeniably esoteric and alien, even bizarre, to many 
people, combined to produce a distrust of the poems which 
1 
"Yeats's Romanticism; Notes and Suggestions", Southern 
Review, VII (l94l-2), p.600. Also in The Permanence of 
Yeats, J. Hall and M. Steinmann, eds., I96I, p.l05. 
V I X 
has resulted in deflection of critical attention to 
external, background studies. 
The nature of the problem is well illustrated by the 
comments of R,P. Blackmur on Yeats's poem, "The Second 
Coming". We receive an adequate general idea of the 
poem's meaning, Blackmur says, because most of the words 
are common, but closer examination brings uncertainty. 
There is "an air of explicitness" about such phrases as 
Spiritus Mundi, 
and the question is whether the general, the 
readily available senses of the words are 
adequate to supply the specific sense wanted by 
the poem. Put another way, can the poet's own 
arbitrary meaning be made, merely by discovering 
it, to participate in and enrich what the 
"normal" meanings of the words in their limiting 
context provide?^ 
Both Blackmur's questions are in themselves questionable, 
but their first interest is simply that they exist, that 
there is a doubt in the critic's mind that somewhere 
between the so-called "normal" meanings of the words and 
the meaning as obtained from the poem there is a gap, and 
that, in view of the poet's interests and ideas as they 
appear elsewhere (Blackmur is talking specifically about 
"magic"), that gap is likely to be a wide one for the 
general reader. Magic, Blackmur comments, unlike 
Christianity, has no objective, public, natural-seeming 
form - it is all mystery. 
Despite this doubt, Blackmur's first question implies 
that it is possible to obtain a "specific sense" which is 
1 
"The Later Poetry of ¥.B. Yeats", in The Permanence of 
Yeats , p.43. (Hereafter referred to as P.Y. ). 
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"wanted by the poem", and if this is so it seems 
unnecessary to wonder whether "readily available senses" 
are adequate, unless there is some gross difference 
between them. Similarly, his second question assumes that 
the poet does have his "own arbitrary meaning" for these 
words, and this touches the core of the problem, for it 
raises the familiar bogey of intention. Discussing the 
last two lines of stanza one of "The Second Coming" 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity 
Blackmur suggests that there is one meaning but that it is 
available from two possible sources, one from observation 
of life as it is, the other from being written at the end 
of a gyre when the subjective "have lost all faith though 
desiring it, and the... objective have no need of faith and 
may be full of 'passionate intensity' without the control 
of any faith or wisdom". The question to be asked, 
Blackmur says, is "whether the fact of this double control 
and source of meaning at a critical point defeats or 
strengthens the unity of the poem".^ 
It would seem from this statomont that Blackmur 
considers that the poem has, or should have, unity of some 
kind. But of what kind? If it can be destroyed by the 
possibility of the poem's meaning having a "second source" 
lurking in the background, can the unity be said to have 
any existence? That is to say, if the sense as obtained 
from the poem is a self-consistent whole ("unity"), how is 
it possible to destroy this sense by bringing into 
consideration an external source of information which does 
P.Y., p.45. 
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not alter the meaning? Either the poem has unity and the 
meaning can be read from the poem, or it has no unity and 
the meaning is incomplete without the background reference 
Complex though the concept of meaning may be, the 
propagation of this kind of confusion can only lead to 
worse confusion in approaching the poem, suggesting as it 
does that the external source of information is vital to 
our understanding of the poem. In this particular 
instance Blackmur appears to have allowed the background 
and its strangeness to persuade him from his stated belief 
that the meaning as obtained from the poem gives a 
satisfactory whole. But, later in the essay, he 
distinguishes between the knowledge required by the reader 
of a poem and that required by the writer, noting that 
"the poet invariably requires more machinery to secure hi s 
effects - the machinery of his whole life and thought -
than the reader requires to secure what he takes as the 
poem's effects".^ Thus, the poem can be considered to 
have a unity with respect to the reader, even though its 
relationship to the writer may be more complex or more 
esoteric. 
But to many critics there is no question of a unity 
within the poem. They assume that none exists and ask 
instead whether the meanings obtained from the external, 
background references unify the poem? That is, they 
assume, tacitly or otherwise, that the poem represents 
some kind of personal effusion relating to the poet's life 
and thought and cannot be considered as a separate entity. 
In this case, in order to understand the poems it becomes 
1 
P.Y., p.56. 
X 
necessary to know as much as possible about the poet and 
his ideas. F.A.C. Wilson, for instance, declares himself 
to be seeking "what Yeats meant when he wrote the poems",^ 
and adds that he wants "to give a fairly full 
philosophical background - even sometimes more than 
appears in the works - because if one says only what is of 
the first relevance, Yeats's basic religious ideas are 
likely to seem eccentric in being private and idio-
2 
syncratic - which they aren't". That is to say, Wilson 
considers that in the poems Yeats's ideas do appear to be 
private and idiosyncratic. 
John Unterecker suggests that "Yeats was well aware 
of the critic's problem, and he did his best to make 
things easy for the commentator" by publishing Prefaces 
and Notes, autobiography and aesthetic theory. "What 
Yeats was trying to do, of course, was to make available 
to his public everything that good criticism eventually 
uncovers. He was also doing his best to safeguard his 3 
work against inaccurate interpretation". The implication 
is that, although he wished his work to be understood, 
Yeats did not write it with that in mind, or else he 
failed in his attempt to make it comprehensible. In either 
case, the poems could not be considered to stand alone. 
Carrying this approach to its logical conclusion, 
T.R. Henn writes "All that Yeats saw and read and thought 
must one day be examined. . . [because J there is still a 
1 
Yeats's Iconography, I96O, p.l4. 
2 
Ibid., p.17. 
3 
Yeats, 1963, p.l. 
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residue of complexity and uncertainty of interpretation, 
and only through such study will the full significance of 
the poetry become apparent".^ Obviously, in order to 
carry out Henn's proposition in full,it would finally 
be necessary to become the poet, or even more, to assume 
god-like omniscience, since it demands not only a complete 
knowledge of the poet's mind but also the ability to see 
him in a period and environment, and in the context of 
various large systems of thought. 
Henn is brought to this position by his argument, that 
symbolic poetry is incapable of the clarity and precision 
demanded of it by critics who wish to understand the poem 
as a unit, because 
the 'reality' expressed by the S3nnbol is , in 
terms of an algebraic analysis, infinitely 
complex; and though the variation of meaning is 
decreased by the selective impact of one symbol 
upon another, the total effect must always be 
that of a richly cumulative but indeterminate 
complexity. 
Therefore, Henn adds, the critic "must, in the last resort, 
suggest what is no more than a personal interpretation or 
3 
response". A similar mistrust and misunderstanding of 
symbolism underlies the attitudes of many critics. M.I. 
Seiden argues that "Yeats's poems reverberate with nuances 
we can only half apprehend, the more remarkable to us 4 because the sheer wonder of them escapes definition". 
1 
The Lonely Tower, I965, p.xiii. 
2 
Henn, p.xiv. 
3 
Ibid., p.XV. 
k 
William Butler Yeats. The Poet as Mythmaker, 1962, p.5. 
X X I 
Although, this may be said of any good poem, it is not 
necessary to assume, as Seiden does, that the poems are 
therefore incomprehensible individually, but because he 
believes that no single poem can wholly contain or define 
the symbols appearing in it Seiden turns his attention 
away from the poems and examines instead the symbols, 
oft isolating them from the poems. The poems thus tend 
to become mere texts for the exposition of the symbols. 
At the most they are of no more importance than the poet's 
ideas, or sources, or even his life-history. 
Seiden suggests that "if we would truly understand 
.Yeats'sJ symbols, perhaps A Vision, our understanding of 
his poetic methods, and our intuition must guide us in all 
our analyses...".^ As he understands Yeats's poetic 
method to be the elaboration of the ideas of A Vision 
through a subtly allusive symbolism, the poet's ideas 
become his dominating interest as he searches for some 
unifying pattern, and the poems are reduced to components: 
"Yeats attempted to create in the essay A Vision a private 
religious faith, and simultaneously to write many poems -
2 
the fragments of a great myth - all based on that faith". 
(Author's italics). Other critics who show a similar 
disregard for the poems as anything but receptacles for 
the poet's symbols are Giorgio Melchiori, A.G. Stock, and 3 Louis MacNeice. In various ways the underlying patterns 
1 
Seiden, p.l63. 
2 
Ibid., p.2. 
3 
The Whole Mystery of Art, I96OJ W.B. Yeats; His Poetry 
and Thought, I96I; The Poetry of W.B. Yeats, 19^1. 
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of thought or other external elements predominate, and 
lessen the critic's grasp of the poems. 
It is frequently argued that such enquiries reveal 
more meaning in the poems, that understanding of the 
system, for instance, gives greater depth to the symbols 
related to it, but in fact there is a risk that the poem 
will have, in the end, less meaning - that its meaning 
will be unnecessarily restricted to special or individual 
concerns. In the lines discussed by Blackmur (p.viii 
above) the meaning is far more rich, general and "true" to 
human experience than in the narrower and more eccentric 
context of Yeats's system. While this latter may have 
been the means of Yeats's achieving the wider perspectives 
of the poem, this scaffolding may be almost irrelevant to 
the poem as it stands because poetry consists of words and 
makes its meaning through its use of the resources of the 
language in which it is written. It can only suspend the 
ordinary meanings of words by limiting them through their 
contexts and it cannot arbitrarily extend the meaning of a 
word without making some internal provision for the 
extension if it is to be more than an accidental or 
surrealist effusion. In the lines quoted, the "best" and 
"worst" have far wider relevance, while being at the same 
time sufficiently specified to take on concrete images, 
when understood from the reader's experience than they do 
in the recondite terminology of A Vision. 
A related approach which takes a step nearer to the 
poems by leaving aside, to a greater or lesser extent, A 
Vision and other external material, may be illustrated by 
a quotation from Daiches: 
X X V 
To appreciate the best of these poems we do not 
need any detailed study of Yeats's prose works, 
though hints here and there are often very 
helpful; but we do need to know the dominant 
motives in Yeats's poetry, for the poems echo 
each other and often enrich each other in a very 
curious way....^ 
The result of such inclusiveness is, in practice, to 
assume that it is the S3mibols, rather than the poems, 
which may be said to have some unity in that they persist 
in the poet's mind to re-appear in other poems. Thus, 
D.A. Stauffer claims that 
Fully to understand the meaning of 'gyre' in one 
of his later poems, all of its uses in earlier 
poems must ideally be in our mind - not only when 
the word itself is used, but when it is only 
half-suggested, or left as a hidden image, not 
fully developed, but controlling the movement of 
the thought.2 
The circularity of the argument is clear from this 
statement, but more important is the latitude which the 
critic consequently permits himself in his interpretations, 
with the corresponding possibility of insensitivity to the 
particular case in favour of broader generalisations. 
This objection applies also to those critics who 
quite literally, in Allen Tate's words, create Yeats's 
romanticism by attempting to restrict him to the particular 
background of the late Romantic period. Seen in this 
light, Yeats becomes as subjective a poet as he does if 
his poems are regarded as expositions of his personal 
1 
Poetry and the Modern World. 19^8, p.180. 
2 
The Golden Nightingale, 19^9, p.40. 
X V 
faith or mythology, but with the added stigma of escapism, 
of turning away from the contemporary world to a private 
dream. His dramatic masks and the concreteness of his 
symbols are taken to be counterfeit devices to conceal a 
basic inhumanity and isolation and the oratorical force of 
the poetry reduces to defiant rhetorical gesturing. The 
accusations range from romantic vagueness to excessive 
schematisation, and even to a self-indulgent adherence to 
1 2 old-fashioned verse-forms. Frank Kermode gives a 
sometimes very subtle interpretation of the poems in terms 
of particular romantic attitudes and preoccupations, which 
nevertheless suffers from the same weaknesses as other 
interpretations which apply an external discipline to the 
poems. 
Those who disapprove of methods of literary criticism 
based on close attention to the text sometimes argue, as 
3 
does G.S. Fraser, that it leads to a narrowly mechanical 
treatment of the poem, leaving out of account imaginative 
insight and background perspective. Fraser's arguments 
are not supported by the particular examples he discusses 
because, in the first place, they are not good examples of 
the application of such methods, but also, and more 
generally, because such objections are directed rather at 
the practitioner than at the method. Few readers of 
poetry, surely, would deny the vital necessity of 
1 
A. Mizener, "The Romanticism of ¥.B. Yeats", P.Y., pp.125-
145; E. Engelberg, The Vast Design, 1964, and J. Bayley, 
The Romantic Survival, I96O; D.S. Savage, P.Y., pp.173-194 
See later discussions. 
2 
Romantic Image, 1957-
3 Vision and Rhetoric, 1959-
X V I 
imaginative insight, and, while it requires some 
qualification, few would argue against the importance of 
background perspective in the broadest sense of historical 
and cultural relationship. 
Under these conditions, close textual analysis is the 
most immediate tool for accurate understanding of the work, 
which must precede critical assessment either of poem or 
of poet. Even if it should transpire that Yeats's poems 
do gain from being read in some larger context, as for 
instance in volumes of poems as published, as has often 
been suggested recently,^ all such readings must begin 
from the most complete understanding possible of the 
individual poems. Certainly, the poems cannot be said to 
be unintelligible or unsatisfactory in themselves unless 
it is demonstrated that they yield no coherent meaning to a careful 
examination. 
Many critics maintain that on the whole Yeats's poems 
do stand up to scrutiny and are comprehensible without 
unduly specialised knowledge, among them Bowra, Tate, 
Theodore Spencer, Graham Martin, John Crowe Ransom and 
2 3 Howard Baker. It is unfortunate that Vivienne Koch, 
only critic who has attempted to demonstrate this by 
1 
H. Kenner, "The Sacred Book of the Arts", Unterecker, pp. 
10-22; B. Rajan, W.B. Yeats, 1965; D. Donoghue & J.R. 
Mulryne, An Honoured Guest, 19^5• See later discussions. 
2 
The Heritage of Symbolism, 19^7; P.Y., pp.97-105; "The 
Later Poetry of W.B. Yeats", Literary Opinion in America, 
M.D. Zabel ed., pp.270-281; "The Later Poetry of W.B. 
Yeats", Pelican Guide, V.7, pp.170-195; "Yeats and his 
Symbols", P. Y. , pp.85-96; "Domes of Byzantium", Southern 
Review, VII (l94l-2), pp.639-52. 
3 
W.B. Yeats. The Tragic Phase, 1951-
XVI 1 
proposing to discuss particular poems without external 
reference, does not in fact do so in crucial instances, 
but turns instead to the miscellany of parallel passages 
from Yeats's prose which are commonly supplied as 
"explanations" of the poems by other critics. 
From the foregoing summary of critical approaches to 
Yeats's poetry it may be seen that the following questions 
remain to be answered:- If it exists, in what does the 
unity of a poem consist? It may lie in the writer's 
intended meaning, or in some structure in which the poem 
is contained or to which it is related, or in the reader's 
mental response, or in the poem itself. If the unity of a 
poem lies in its affiliation to some external structure, 
can a study of that structure or of related material 
supply meanings not available from the poem which will 
make an unsatisfactory poem satisfactory or "unify" a poem 
whose unity is not otherwise apparent? That is, what 
exactly is the status of such external knowledge with 
respect to the poem? 
If it lies in the reader's response, is there any 
limitation of response or any common ground which can be 
said to give the poem as it stands some self-consistency, 
or is criticism merely a matter of opinion or taste? Or 
if the poem itself has some unity, what is its nature, 
and how can it be ascertained or demonstrated? The 
question which immediately presents itself here is whether 
symbolism is as limitless and ineffable as some critics 
suggest. Explicitly or implicitly, this underlies many of 
their attitudes to the poetry^ and if it should prove to 
V. n ^ ^ , linvalidating _ be lalse, may go far towards u l xng their charges or 
assumptions of privacy in Yeats's later poetry. There are 
X V X I X 
thus two major aspects to the problem of the integrity of 
his poetrys the first results from Yeats's use of sjanbolism 
and from the critics' understanding of his method and of 
symbolism in general, and the second is the question of 
whether Yeats's technique is such that his poetry is 
comprehensible as it stands or whether his esoteric 
interests require special, separate investigation and 
understanding. 
II 
In this thesis I therefore adopt the following method. 
First I examine the theory of symbolism in general and in 
literature, considering its relationship to metaphor and 
poetic language, and to so-called symbolic poetry. This 
leads to the conclusion that poetry has a unity within 
itself resulting from the fact that symbol, while it has a 
theoretically infinite suggestiveness, is defined and 
limited in poetry by context. The critical approaches that 
deny the autonomy of the poem may then be seen to arise 
from misconceptions of the nature of symbol, which induce 
the critics to turn their attention away from the poetry 
in various ways. These are outlined at the beginning of 
chapter two and then discussed in detail in the works of 
particular critics. In the third chapter I examine the 
second aspect, the adequacy of Yeats's technique. I 
intex'pret a number of the later poems as far as possible 
as integral works of art, following each reading with a 
discussion of the interpretations of other critics. 
CHAPTER I 
SYMBOLISM IN THEORY AND IN LITERATURE 
I• Theory of Symbolism 
Language has become a major focus of philosophical 
questioning in this century, being treated as an 
autonomous realm of meaning standing between man and 
whatever is not man. The dominance of the question of 
meaning at the present time has been related^ to the 
intellectual conflict brought into prominence by the 
Cartesian polarity of mind and body, inner and outer 
worlds, and by the resulting extremes of idealism and 
materialism. Dualist philosophy begets a distinction of 
subject and object which finally isolates man f^om his 
environment and deprives him of any context of meaning 
within it. To represent spirit and matter as incongruous 
with one another is to deny the possibility of any 
relationship between them. Faced with the prospect of 
meaninglessness, the process of understanding and knowing, 
of how we achieve or realise meaning, becomes the most 
important question. The philosophy of symbolism emerged 
as an attempt to understand this process and to 
redefine it in such a way that the problem of dualism no 
longer applies. 
1 
See S. Langer, Philosophical Sketches, Mentor Books, 1964, 
pp.53-"^, Charles Fiedelson, Jr., Symbolism and American 
Literature , 1953, p.'^9. 
The primary postulate is that, since knowledge can 
never grasp reality itself and can never reproduce the 
true nature of things, all knowledge must necessarily be 
symbolic. The mind holds symbols which result from a 
process (characteristic of man's mental activity) of 
intensive interaction between object and inner experience. 
Language is one of the symbolic forms of knowledge, as 
also are art, science, mythology, philosophy, and as such 
is more than a mysteriously-formed copy of a given reality, 
knowable apart from language or any of the other forms, 
and prior to it or them in value. Rather it is a means by 
which we apprehend reality and is therefore not only 
representative but also constitutive of the world as we 
know it. 
Under the dualist system language is purely vehicular 
in function, serving to denote a world of real objects by 
an unknown, but direct and conventional linkage. Words 
are simply ciphers, bringing to mind "images" of the 
objects to which they refer. Literature, regarded 
objectively, becomes a simple imitation of nature; 
alternatively, it may be seen from the subjective 
viewpoint as something which produces certain effects in 
the reader. The content, meaning and truth of such 
intellectual forms as language is either to be judged by 
their reproduction of something extraneous, or, as in the 
theory of literature developed by I,A„ Richards,^ to be 
considered as possessing no propositional character, no 
truth value with respect to the outside world, but only as 
having a personal value. Literature, Richards says, is 
1 
Principles of Literary Criticism, 1959 
3 
composed of pseudo-statements " which are purely emotive 
and without cognitive reference, and its value is 
therapeutic, to balance, and so help to control, the 
emotions, 
Neither subjective nor objective viewpoint provides a 
satisfactory means of mediating between object and 
language. Nor does either provide a method of banishing 
the spectres of immateriality. Language itself resists 
the attempt to divide off subject and object into logical 
extremes. Speculations that words having immaterial 
reference originated from "literal" denotative words have 
been shown^ to be logically insupportable in the face of 
the irreducibly compound nature of man's experience of the 
world. The very discussion of the relative status of 
"literal" and "abstract" words immediately introduces 
questions of values, human relationships, and other 
psychological factors, so that the possibility of such 
discussion depends on the existence of a positive context 
of mediacy between inner and outer worlds. 
Language as symbolic form provides such a context. 
Looked at this way it is part of a reflexive activity 
between man and his environment, a system "in which man 
interposes patterns of his own creation between reception 
2 of and reaction to stimuli". The triangular "meaning" 
1 
0, Barfield, "The Meaning of the ¥ord 'Literal'", 
Metaphor and Symbol, ed. L.C. Knights and Basil Cottle, 
i960, pp.48-63. 
2 
F.W. Dillistone, "The Function of Symbols in Religious 
Experience", in Knights and Cottle, p.III. 
4 
diagram of Ogden and Richards becomes a genuine triangle 
in which all three points, subject, language and object, 
2 have an equality of function, as Philip Wheelwright 
and 
points out,^language figures as more than a somewhat 
unstable sign-convention. The ontological question of the 
existence of a knowable reality, while not cancelled or 
minimised in any way, becomes separable from the 
consideration of language as a mode of knowing. 
In transcendentalist theory, the process of knowing 
is something "given" from outside. Philosophers committed 
to traditional logic explain our way of forming concepts 
as a process of abstraction of common properties by 
3 
comparison and contrast. But, as Susanne Langer notes, 
there is a difference between our way of forming 
universals and the way we know them. Her great 
predecessor, Ernst Cassirer, argued that logic does not 
suggest how the mind determined these properties, or why 
these ideas were collected into a whole and denoted by a 
single word. His contention was that the argument of 
logic is circular; that the mind can only determine these 
properties through the formulation of linguistic notions. 
The processes of "noticing" and "naming", he held, must be 
prior to that of "denoting", and the properties must have 
been denoted by a sign before the mind could recognise 
4 
them as such. Eliseo Vivas re-states this idea with 
admirable claritys 
The Meaning of Meaning, 19^9, p.lOff. 
2 
"Semantics and Ontology", Knights and Cottle, p.3. 
3 Langer, p.67. 
4 
Language and Myth, Dover, p.32. 
5 
before a mind can make anything stand for 
something else, both the sign and the thing 
signified must be grasped by the mind for what 
they are, each must be given identity, each 
must be discriminated from other things.^ 
Vivas's more general statement is no doubt more 
defensible than Cassirer's, since the very existence of 
other symbolic forms controverts the absolute primacy of 
language as the necessary corollary of "noticing"; but the 
vital importance of language to man's discrimination of 
the world cannot be denied, and Cassirer's theory promoted 
the realisation of its status and function. 
Cassirer describes the process of symbolisation as 
the complementary, and in many ways the opposite, of 
logical conceptualisation. The discursive mode of thought, 
starting from a particular case, proceeds to distinguish 
it from others by a series of acts of comparison. 
Contrasted to this process of delimitation of the 
boundaries of the particular by setting it beside others 
is that mode of confronting the particular in which the 
mind "comes to rest in the immediate experience, the 
sensible present". There is a concentration upon the 
singular rather than an expansion over a range of 
experiential data; the particular is regarded as unique 
rather than a member of a class or species. 
The focussing of the mind upon the immediate present, 
Cassirer suggests, induces the utmost tension between 
subject and object, which finds release as the subjective 
excitement becomes objectified and confronts the mind as 
1 
D.H. Lawrence. The Failure and the Triumph of Art, "The 
Constitutive Symbol", I96I, p.276. 
symbol. Cassirer relates this Intimately to mythical 
perception in which, he says, the mind arrives at a 
conviction of the presence of a being, a "momentary god" 
or a "mana" concept, through the significance found in the 
relationship with the "other". 
One may perhaps compare with this process the young 
Joyce's Aquinian system of "epiphany" in which the object 
is first apprehended as a whole, then as a self-consistent 
symmetry of parts, and finally in its "quiddity", its 
"soul" or "radiance".^ Or again, one may compare Louis 
Martz's description of the method of meditation (he is 
quoting St. Fran(jois de Sales): 
"By the meanes of this imagination, we lock up 
our spirit as it were within the closet of the 
mysterie which we meane to meditate". The 
effect is an intense, deliberate focusing of the 
"mind and thought... either by imaginarie 
representation, if the matter may be subject to 
the sences; or by a simple proposing and conceit 
of it, if it be a matter above sence", or...some 
concrete similitude dramatizing even spiritual 
matters. 
Martz also points out that meditation was a discipline 
directed toward creating the "act of pure attention" which 
D.H. Lawrence thought essential to decision or discovery: 
the choice of "that object to concentrate upon which will 
3 
best focus your consciousness". The Wordsworth sonnet 
"With ships the sea was scattered" provides an 
1 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Cape, 19^0, p.216. 
2 
The Poetry of Meditation, 1955, p.30. 
3 
Martz, p.67. 
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outstandingly clear example of the operation of such a 
process of focussing' of attention to achieve a personal 
decision, a "direction of the personality as a whole" (to 
use the words in which L.C. Knights describes the meaning 
of a symbol^). 
The underlying idea of all these statements is the 
reaching out of the mind to grasp the object, and its 
assimilation into the needs and desires of that person's 
life. Cassirer says, "Whatever appears important for our 
wishing and willing, our hope and anxiety, for acting and 
doing: that and that only receives the stamp of verbal 
2 meaning". Whether the process begins from some such 
3 
external accident as in Usener's "momentary god" theory, 
or whether it originates from the subject's inner 
condition, the essential element in the process is the 
uniting of subject and object in a single act, which is 
the evolution of meaning. R.M. Eaton says: "symbol, 
attitude [of subject J and object are united in a whole 
which is the presentation of the object". All three terms. 
1 
"Idea and Symbol", Knights and Cottle, p.l42. Relevant 
also is the passage from Wallace Stevens's "Credences of 
Summer" quoted by Martz, p.68: 
Three times the concentred self takes hold, three 
times 
The thrice concentred self, having possessed 
The object, grips it in savage scrutiny. 
Once to make captive, once to subjugate 
Or yield to subjugation, once to proclaim 
The meaning of the capture, this hard prize, 
Fully made, fully apparent, fully found. 
2 
Cassirer, p.37. 
3 
Ibid., p.18. 
he says, are aspects of a single process of meaning. "If 
the meaning of a symbol is not an idea or thing for which 
the symbol arbitrarily stands, it is a productive activity: 
the meaning rather than the meant".^ 
Vivas comments that "when the constitutive symbol is 
achieved, there is an interanimation between it and the 
thing or process it symbolizes, a kind of permeation so 
that for us the world is a world grasped not only through 
2 
the symbol but d^ the symbol also". Two points arise 
from this. The first is that, as Cassirer says, "myth, 
art, language and science appear as symbols; not in the 
sense of mere figures which refer to some given reality by 
means of suggestion and allegorical renderings, but in the 
sense of forces each of which produces and posits a world 
3 
of its own". So, adds ¥,M. Urban, "Language... is not 
moulded on reality. It is rather the mould in which 4 
reality as significant is first given". Language is both 
the means and limitation of our view of the world, since, 
as Cassirer notes, "all symbolism harbors the curse of 
mediacy; it is bound to obscure what it seeks to reveal".^ 
The importance of this dual nature of symbolism with 
respect to literature, and to Yeats in particular, is 
obvious, and will be discussed in further detail later. 
1 
Quoted by Fiedelson, pp.52-3, from Symbolism and Truth, 
1925, p.34, and p.157. 
2 
Vivas, p.279. 
3 
Cassirer, p•6. 
4 
Language and Reality, 1951, p.375. 
5 
Cassirer, p.7-
The second point has already been suggested, that a 
different kind of meaning is involved in symbolic thought. 
Susanne Langer comments that Cassirer characterised the 
symbol as being a word, sound, mark, object or event which 
could be a si^nbol to a person "without that person's 
consciously going from it to its meaning". The symbols of 
art are symbols of a sort, but not of the sort found in 
logical discourse, because they do not "point beyond 
themselves to something thereafter known apart from the 
symbol, nor are they established by convention". Hence, 
works of art, she says, "have import, but not genuine 
„ 1 meaning", 
By "genuine meaning" she is evidently referring to 
sign-meaning, that is, the sort of meaning described by 
Ogden and Richards. Symbolisation, she comments, 
"furnishes no principle of conceptual advance, no 
2 
phenomenal means of conception". Her argument is thus 
made more complex by accepting a general notion of symbol, 
and yet arguing from another, and more restricted, 
viewpoint. The complication arises from the fact that she 
is arguing against Bergson's narrow conception of 
abstraction as unnatural, an essential falsification of 
reality. Abstraction is the perception of form, she 
maintains, and the perception of form arises from the 
process of symbolisation, so that "Any device whereby we 
make an abstraction is a symbolic element, and all 3 abstraction involves symbolisation." This is put forward 
1 
Langer, p.60. 
2 
Ibid., p.59. 
3 Ibid., p.60. 
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as a tentative definition of symbol, and is quoted here 
because, although it states what Mrs Langer set out to 
show, it leaves the connection between symbolisation and 
abstraction vague, and in fact gives no necessary 
definition of symbol at all, testifying that the way to an 
understanding of symbolisation is not through the realm of 
logical discourse. 
This is not, of course, to suggest that Mrs Langer 
does not recognise that symbols may have two properties of 
meaning (the "in" and "through" of Vivas's statement^), but 
she considers the symbols of art, those referred to in 
Cassirer's statement, to be more primitive, because 
unassigned and unconventional, than the symbols of logical 
discourse, and suggests that they be taken separately. 
But to say that the one type is more primitive is to 
suggest that it is primary, and hence her attempt to 
define symbol without considering it must be incomplete. 
Mrs Langer defines the two properties of symbols as 
"signifying" and "formuiative". Art, she says, may be 
considered to be "expressive form", indicating that it has 
no sign quality but is purely formulative. Yet she 
maintains that the symbols of logical discourse have both 
qualities, the formulative as their act of abstraction and 
the signifying as their effect. However, since literary 
symbols, at least, are expressed by means of language, 
which does have the signifying quality, and since a total 
divagation of means and ends seems unlikely, it appears 
probable that literary symbols are as compound in quality 
as any others. The difference appears rather to lie in 
1 
See above, p.8, 
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the direction of their signification, which seems to be 
towards inner values rather than external facts. This 
also will be further discussed in terms of literature 
itself. 
Before doing so, however, another view of the symbol, 
that of the psychologist, requires consideration, but the 
discussion can be brief since the question has been well 
1 2 handled by Eliseo Vivas and others. D,¥. Harding 
suggests that beliefs and evaluative attitudes may only 
exist in a pre-formulative stage, "In a sense", he says, 
"body thinks, exercising non-conscious control over our 
reactions". Emotion completes sense-perception, he 
argues, so that every perception has emotional 
significance, being in some way, however slight, welcome 
or unwelcome, CoG, Jung says. 
The symbols of the self arise in the depths of 
the body and they express its materiality every 
bit as much as the structure of the perceiving 
consciousness,oThe more archaic and "deeper", 
that is the more physiological, the symbol is, 
the more collective and universal, the more 
"material" it is. The more abstracted, 
differentiated, and specific it is, and the 
more its nature approximates to conscious 
uniqueness and individuality, the more it 
sloughs off its universal character. Having 
finally achieved full consciousness, it runs 
the risk of becoming a mere allegory which 
nowhere oversteps the bounds of conscious 
comprehension, and is then exposed to all sorts 
of attempts at rationalistic and therefore 
inadequate explanations.3 
1 
Vivas, pp,290-l, Ira Progoff, Jung's Psychology and its 
Social Meaning, 1953, p.. 270. 
2 
"The Hinterland of Thought", Experience into ¥ords, p,l84, 
also in Knights and Cottle, p d l o 
3 The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, I959, p,173 
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Finally, DoHo Lawrence says that symbols are "organic a 
units of consciousness with, life of their own, and you can 
A 
never explain them away, because their value is dynamic, 
emotional, belonging to the sense-consciousness of the 
body and the soul, and not simply mental"-^ 
The difference between this view and that discussed 
earlier has been expressed by Ira Progoffs 
Cassirer proceeds with the idea that man is 
essentially a symbol-making creature. It would 
be correct to say that Jung holds the same 
belief. The difference, however, is that 
Cassirer understands symbols as instruments 
which arise out of man's experience in his 
efforts to further his purposes in communicating 
with other men and in thinking more efficiently. 
The question of symbols has, essentially, an 
epistemological meaning to him. Jung, on the 
other hand 5 interprets symbol s in terms of the 
inner functioning of the psyche. Symbols do not 
arise out of experience as a means of 
communication in society, but symbols arise out 
of the spontaneous creativity within the psyche. 
There is thus a basic difference in the 
conception of the ways in which symbols function. 
To Cassirer they are effective as means of 
knowledge in relation to outer experience; to 
Jung they are effective in the depths of the 
personality as autonomous channelizers of psychic 
energy. Symbols operate on a more fundamental 
level for Jung. When they are understood only 
as means of communication they are on the level 
of consciousness, which is the surface of the 
psyche; but as autonomous and spontaneous 
creations carrying large sums of energy, they 
operate in the unconscious and express basic 
psychic processes.2 
1 
Selected Literary Criticism, p.l57» 
2 
Progoff, p.270. 
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As a representation of Cassirer's position this may 
not be entirely adequate, but it does give the two 
extremes clearly. Vivas comments that the two views have 
much in common also. Both distinguish between symbol as 
constitutive, embodying the object, and symbol as sign, or 
"mere intended meaning symbolised", where the object to 
which the sign refers is independent of the sign. Also, 
both accord the sjnnbol a charge of meaningfulness which is 
not totally accessible to logical explanation. Moreover, 
he adds, "the two interests, those of the psychologist and 
those of the epistemologist, are not necessarily 
incompatible with one another. In fact, the symbolic 
archetype, whatever its source, functions in literature 
and in religion as a kind of means of communication".^ 
There is also the further point that, whether they 
are regarded basically from the objective or the 
subjective point of view, symbols still represent for 
either view a process of mediation between inner and outer 
worlds. Jung traces the s)rmbolic archetype to the 
primordial experience of the human race. L.C. Knights 
suggests that a passage such as this from The Winter's 
Tale I 
...when you do dance, I wish you 
A wave o' the sea, that you might ever do 
Nothing but that; move still, still so. 
And own no other function.,o, 
which has responsiveness to great natural rhythms, conveys 
a sense of "the impersonal depths of personality". Such 
lines imply that "the conscious ego rests on, draws its 
T ~ — • 
Vivas, p,291<. 
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strength from, something greater than itself".^ The 
rhythm of the lines and our response to them belong to the 
same world, Knights says, the world of action and 
relationship and commitment in which we make and enact our 
being. Whether it is expressed as the emergence into 
conscious recognition of primordial human experience, or 
as the way in which we come to know our environment and 
our relation to it, the sjmibol can be seen as the result 
of a blending of man's spontaneity and receptivity, or, as 
Harding says, of perception and emotion. 
II. Symbolism in Literature 
The modern preoccupation with language as a field of 
meaning has given rise to the consideration of literary 
works as structures of language rather than as products of 
a particular poet's mind or as images relating to an 
external world. The literary work is regarded as a symbol, 
"autonomous", as Fiedelson says, "in the sense of being 
distinct from the personality of the author and any world 
of pure objects, creative in that it brings into existence 
2 
its own meaning"o The effect of such a view can be seen 
not only in critical theory, but also in practice in the 
many experiments with language and with literary 
structures which have been made in this period. Not least 
among them is the deliberate symbolism which is the root 
of many of the problems connected with the criticism of 
Yeats's poetry. Certain common attitudes towards 
symbolism have, I believe, contributed largely towards 
1 
Knights and Cottle, p„l4l 
2 
Fiedelson, p.49, 
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such problems as the meanings of symbols, the so-called 
the status of 
"'heresy of paraphrase", privacy of reference, and 
A 
induction from external sources by critics. 
What is the nature of the relationship between the 
theory and practice of sjmibolism in poetry and the actual 
structure of language? Logical and poetic discourse are 
often distinguished. Has the distinction any basis in 
fact? Can one assume, for instance, that one is somehow 
"pure" or basically appropriate in poetry and the other 
inappropriate? The foregoing discussion suggests that a 
distinction between that use of language in which it is 
directly referential to an external object and that in 
which it is reflexive and complex is essential to an 
understanding of the process of symbolisation, whether or 
not the distinction is in fact absolute in poetry. 
Philip Wheelwright proposes the terms "block language" 
and "fluid language" for the distinction, of which "block 
language" is such that it is denotative and prepositional, 
obeys the laws of logic, and is atomistic in structure, 
that is to say, its elements are discrete in form. "Fluid 
language", on the other hand, as its name implies, is 
language that has not become regularised in this fashion. 
Its elements are variable and miscible, and it is alogical 
in structure, involving multiple relations of a kind that 
do not obey simple logico Block language. Wheelwright 
suggests, may be considered to be a limiting possibility 
of fluid language. 
Another way of expressing the difference is to 
characterise one mode as literal, the other figurative. 
Metaphor is essentially figurative, and it is suggested 
16 
that it is the poetic equivalent of the concept,^ since it 
expresses relationship. But the manner of relationship 
will differ in that two ideas in logical relationship will 
remain discrete, but in the metaphorical relationship the 
two ideas will, if such suppositions as Wheelwright's are 
correct, tend to lose their distinctive characters, 
producing a complex meaning inaccessible to simple logic. 
Aristotle's definition of metaphor in the Poetics 
states that: 
Metaphor consists in giving a thing the 
name that belongs properly to something else, 
the transference being either (i) from genus to 
species, or (ii) from species to genus, or (iii) 
from species to species, or (iv) on grounds of 
analogy.2 
3 
Christine Brooke-Rose points out that the first two are 
really not metaphor but synecdoche and metonymy. Both 
tropes have some of the power and character of metaphor, 
but they differ in that the species element tends to stand 
as an emblem with respect to the genus element, being 
related to a specific concept or conceptual group, e.g. 
crown:king. But in any case Aristotle's definition tells 
us very little about the nature of metaphorical meaning. 
This definition can perhaps be seen behind 
Coleridges's statement that symbol is 
1 
Wheelwright, Knights and Cottle, pp.3-4, Wimsatt, "Symbol 
and Metaphor", The Verbal Icon, 1954, p.129, 
2 
XXI, 1-6 (p.36), 
3 
A Grammar of Metaphor, 1958, p.4, 
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characterised by the translucence of the special 
in the individual, or of the general in the 
especial, or of the universal in the general. 
Above all by the translucence of the eternal 
through and in the temporal. It always partakes 
of the reality which it renders intelligible; 
and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself 
as a living part in that unity, of which it is 
the representative.^ 
The great difference between these two statements may be 
due to the one's describing metaphor, the other symbol, 
but Coleridge evidently saw fit to make the comparison 
possible and reasons for comparing the two will emerge in 
the course of this discussion. The last sentence of the 
Coleridge definition adds two major ideas to Aristotle's: 
that meaning resides both in and through the symbol, and 
that it not only stands for but also is part of what it 
represents. The first has already been discussed; the 
second is allied to, but perhaps not identical with, the 
first. In this respect the nature of symbol appears to be 
akin to the synecdoche-tropes suggested by Aristotle. But 
there is another significant difference between the two 
statements, which lies in the single word "translucence". 
This word, itself metaphorical, evokes a subtlety of 
relationship not included in the word "transference". It 
is the difference between our experience and imagination 
of the effects of light, partly lighting up, partly 
shining through, a substance, and the simple, mechanical 
and non-sensual idea of transference. 
Beside these we might put Herbert Read's definition 
of metaphor as 
1 
"The Statesman's Manual", Political Tracts of Wordsworth, 
Coleridge and Shelley, ed. R.J. White, 1953, p.25, quoted 
by Knights, Knights and Cottle, p.l35. 
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the synthesis of several units of observation 
into one commanding images it is the expression 
of a complex idea, not by analysis, nor by 
abstract statement, but by a sudden perception 
of an objective relation,^ 
or ¥.B. Stanford's definition that metaphor is 
the process and result of using a term ( x ) 
normally signifying an object or concept (A) in 
such a context that it must refer to another 
object or concept (b) which is distinct enough 
in characteristics from A to ensure that in the 
composite idea formed by the synthesis of the 
concepts A and B and now symbolised in the word 
X, the factors A and B retain their conceptual 
independence even while they merge in the unity 
symbolised by X,2 
The main difference between these two definitions and 
Aristotle's, which at the same time brings them closer to 
Coleridge's definition of sjonbol, is the idea that the 
metaphor represents a synthesis of some kind. Aristotle's 
attempt to give an objective classification hints at this, 
but it is at once too general in its basic concept and too 
specific in its applications. 
Wheelwright proposes to distinguish between 
Aristotle's notion of transfer and Read's " s y n t h e s i s b y 
a sudden perception of an objective relation" by 
differentiating "epiphor" (transference) from "diaphor" (a 
"semantic movement through..„a grouping of several 
particulars"). A good metaphor, he argues, should combine 
the two, being diaphoric "to the extent that the 
1 
English Prose Style. 1952, p.23, quoted by Wheelwright, 
Knights and Cottle, p.5, 
2 
Greek Metaphor, 1936, polOl. 
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significant resemblance is that which has been induced by, 
and is emergent from, the metaphor itself".^ 
But Read's definition itself leaves us relatively 
little wiser about the nature of the process. An 
"objective relation" is very general indeed. Stanford's 
definition adds the idea that the synthesis is tensive by 
nature, the two factors being both similar and dissimilar, 
so that they can be brought together into a new meaning 
relationship while yet retaining their independence (as 
o Aristotle also noted elsewhere ), 
This would seem to suggest that Wheelwright's 
proposals were not, after all, correct since the two 
factors do retain their independence (see page 15), but the 
matter is not so straightforward since A and B both lose 
their independent characters and retain them. That is to 
say, there is both epiphor and diaphor (as Wheelwright 
says), both transference between particulars and a new 
synthesis. 
Stanford's definition describes admirably a metaphor 
such as "the ship ploughs the waves", where it is possible to 
fit the pieces into Stanford's pattern exactly; e.g. X is 
"ploughs", A is then the action of a plough moving through 
the soil, and B is the action of a ship moving through the 
sea. This would come under Aristotle's fourth category 
"on grounds of analogy" and is of the sort that Winifred 
Nowottny describes as giving a diagram or model of the 
1 
Knights and Cottle, pp,5-6, 
2 
E.g. Rhetorica, Book IIIoii.l4l2a. 
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relationship,^ in this case the hull or keel parting the 
water and throwing up bough waves on either side just as 
the plough does in the soil. 
But even this definition, admirably precise though it 
is, does not fully accord with every possibility of 
metaphor. Marvell's "the Iron gates of Life" for instance, 
does not conform readily to the pattern. The conjunctive 
term X would be "Iron gates" and the B term "Life", but 
what exactly is the A term? "Iron gates" might well be 
said to signify some elaborately-wrought formal entrance, 
but to put this into the context of "Life" produces no 
obvious unity or composite idea, and the effect is even 
more anomalous if the metaphor is put into its context in 
the poem: 
And tear our Pleasures with rough strife, 
Thorough the Iron gates of Life. 
There must therefore be other significations of "Iron 
gates" which will provide a suitable "similarity in 
dissimilarity" with "Life". "Gate" is a boundary concept, 
which may have welcoming or forbidding qualities, may be 
1 
The Language Poet's Use, I962, p.63. Hugh Kenner (The 
Poetry of Ezra Pound. 1951, p.87) takes this metaphor as 
an example to show that metaphor has four related terms; 
Donald Davie (Articulate Energy. 1955, p.'^l) claims that 
this example shows that metaphor has six terms. In fact, 
as Christine Brooke-Rose (A Grammar of Metaphor, p.206) 
points out, in this case there is a transitive verb 
metaphoric in relation to both its subject and its object, 
so it could be said to have six terms, but no general 
statement about metaphor can be based on this factor 
because it varies with the grammatical structure of the 
metaphor. 
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wide and open, or restrictive and frightening. The 
wrought-iron gates might in fact have fitted as broad and 
welcoming, promising a life of leisure and elegance, but 
"Iron" on its own signifies other things than metal 
tracery^ Even this most serviceable and prosaic of 
substances is not restricted to a single reference. Here 
it is an adjective, and its qualities of hardness and 
xioldness, and of sheer physical substantiality and 
inevitability seem to be required. Put together, the A 
concept would then be a narrow, hard and forbidding 
passage akin perhaps to the Iron Gates of the Danube. 
Thus Stanford's definition can be applied to this 
metaphor, but with qualifications. To see what these are, 
consider I.A. Richards's "tenor" and "vehicle" theory of 
metaphor.^ The tenor in this case would not be "Life" but 
a meaning produced by the interaction of the two factors 
"Iron gates" and "Life", and the two together also form 
the vehicle. The best way of describing the effect is 
Fiedelson'ss that the metaphor establishes the idea of 
life under the aspect of iron gates, and of iron gates 
2 
under the aspect of life. What Stanford's definition 
lacks, therefore, is an adequate statement of the 
reflexivity of metaphor, the way in which A is determined 
by B and B by A. That is to say, it does not allow for 
the extent to which "the significant resemblance is that 
which has been induced by, and is emergent from, the 
metaphor itself": the diaphoric element. 
1 
Philosophy of Rhetoric, 1950. 
2 
Fiedelson, p.60. 
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In a normal logical structure the parts are 
independent, but in this metaphorical structure the 
relationship of part to part involves a relationship of 
part to whole. There is a feedback element in the 
structure, so that the final pattern is composed of a 
complex of logically direct and logically circular 
relationships, "Iron gates" and "Life" mean something 
different when they are brought into contact, even though 
they retain some of their independent "signification". 
How true is it then to say that there is no simple 
reference value in a literary S3nnbol as there is in 
logical discourse, as Susanne Langer and I,A, Richards do? 
Even something so apparently simple as Iron gates has a 
range of possible meaning, as has been shown. If the 
words were set in a context of discursive language, the 
particular quality being referred to, their usefulness, 
strength, design, or some such, would be stated and 
probably discussed in comparison with other like qualities, 
They could, on the other hand, be set into a context in 
which it became clear that the meaning intended was not 
that which immediately appeared, but another,different, 
meaning from among those possible,which was left unstated. 
This would be made clear by the fact that the direct 
reference of the whole context diverged noticeably from 
our normal experience. The words might then be said to 
have a pseudo-reference and the statements to be pseudo-
statements. The direct reference of the word in the 
stated context is cancelled out, and the only real meaning 
is that implied by the clues given in the context. It 
should be noted, however, that the direct reference may 
well be part of the clues to the real or "substituted" 
meaning. 
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The latter is Owen Barfield's^ name for this usage, 
and he distinguishes a third category, "concomitant" 
meaning, in which both the primary and the secondary 
meanings are accepted. As Barfield says, the element of 
concomitance might be thought to bear some relation to the 
verisimilitude of the literal meaning, that both, for 
instance should have reference value or else both be 
without, but metaphor is more complex than this. "Iron 
gates" are denied conventional reference value, in the 
sense that we are to assume that the primary purpose of 
the context at that point is to discuss a particular 
quality of iron gates, indicated by their attribution to 
"Life". The contrast forces us to search the range of 
meaning of these words for something which has a common 
aspect, and the result is not a simple logical conclusion. 
Because of this the mind is forced into activity and the 
metaphor becomes "alive". Substituted meaning such as the 
simpler kinds of irony works logically through the 
discovery of logical discrepancy, allegory through the 
discovery of logical resemblance. In each case the 
references of the words are fixed in relation to the 
reference 1 evel concerned, whether it be primary, 
substituted or concomitant. In metaphor this is not so. 
The possibility of a single external reference is cancelled, 
and total possible reference, including both literal and 
metaphorical associations, must be considered for each 
side of the metaphor. The bounds of possibility are then 
marked out by the context of the relationship. Thus, the 
metaphor does not have simple reference value, but does 
include the denotative meaning as part of its total 
significance, 
1 
Knights and Cottle, p.48. 
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Winifred Nowottny suggests that before something can 
be used as the figurative end of a metaphor, it must have 
a sufficiently recognizable terminology associated with it 
and must not introduce irrelevant contexts. The first is 
true 5 since the wider the associational range, the greater 
the possibility of forming new associations, but the 
second statement is not strictly acceptable because all 
those contexts are relevant which are possible in the 
combination and in the total context. Those which are not 
possible are necessarily irrelevant. There is the 
possibility that the common aspects are so slender, or the 
diaphoric element so weak (as in a metaphor which is near 
to cliche), that unwanted associations are accepted in 
desperation, but in these cases the language is not really 
operating as metaphor. The power of metaphor to formulate 
meaning is very strong. A word such as "life" shows this 
most clearly since, as Norbert Wiener says, "words such as 
life, purpose, and soul are grossly inadequate to precise 
scientific thinking..<, [because they] have gained their 
significance through our recognition of a certain group of 
phenomena, and do not in fact furnish us with any adequate 
basis of this unity". There is a diffuseness of 
associational range which makes it almost necessary to 
redefine the word's meaning in each new relationship. 
Marvell's metaphor, in its context, goes far towards doing 
this . 
Because metaphorical meaning is not conventional, but 
acts out the sense of the implied term inasmuch as the 
mind is forced to make the connections at that time, and 
because it makes use of as many of the associations as 
1 
The Human Use of Human Beings, 1956, p.31. 
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possible, both literal and figurative, of the terms 
involved, metaphor provides a sense of the density and 
immediacy of experience. The element of sense-transference 
provides a means of extending the boundaries of meaning of 
a word, and hence also gives greater freedom of expression. 
At the same time considerable precision of expression is 
possible because of the complexity of the processes of 
relationship involved, and this freedom and definition can 
be applied to valuational, emotional and metaphysical 
terms because there is no specification of a literal term. 
Returning to the definitions of symbol and metaphor 
given previously, the difference between Coleridge's 
"translucence" and Aristotle's "transference" may now be 
compared to the distinction of diaphor from epiphor. The 
processes of meaning in metaphor and in symbolisation are 
similar in their complexity and circularity. But there is 
clearly a difference between symbol and metaphor, M,H. 
Abrams, among others, says the difference is that in 
symbol there is no paired term, no replacement of a 
definite, unstated "proper" term, as there is in metaphor,^ 
In poetic symbolism, Abrams says, the poet introduces a 
word or phrase signifying an object which itself has 
significance, As in the case of "Iron gates", many words 
are capable not only of referring to concrete phenomena, 
but also of relating them to some system of values so that 
the object can be described or referred to in such a way 
that the object is imbued with significance. This may be 
1 
Literary Symbolism, ed, Maurice Beebe, I96O, p,l8, also 
Christine Brooke-Rose, po288 and John Unterecker, 
A Reader's Guide to ¥.B, Yeats, 1959, p.3'^. 
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compared with Barfield's conclusion^ that words having 
immaterial reference could not have originated separately, 
but that most words must have begun as "vehicle" plus 
"tenor" and would have to achieve literalness; and with 
Cassirer's argument that significance came with 
signification. But, the argument from origins aside, it 
is clear that many words have both signification and 
significance because their meaning depends on the contexts 
in which we have experienced them. Moreover, as Winifred 
Nowottny says, we habitually read qualities such as grace, 
fury or tenderness into the world around us. Analysing 
Shakespeare's sonnet no, 73, Miss Nowottny points out the 
difference between the initial pattern of the fading of 
life's brilliance and that which develops from it, of the 
inexorability of time and the consequent necessity to 
cherish the brilliance, noting that the second pattern 
inheres in the same particulars from which the first idea 
is abstracted, "Such particulars as 'ashes' and 'death 
bed'", she comments, "are used to focus our vision at 
points where these relationships criss-cross". In fact, 
the change is not quite so sudden as this suggests, but 
"ashes" in particular become the focal point of the 
development because, as line twelve explains, although 
they were originally fuel, once burnt they become stifling 
to the fire. Thus youth itself, because it is a function 
of time, leads to death. As Miss Nowottny says, "Ashes 
refer us out of the linguistic structure to an object 
which in real life is a crisis point"; the word here is "a 
1 
Knights and Cottle, p. 55, 
2 
Nowottny, p.ll5. 
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natural symbol with all the advantages over language of 
being in itself a simultaneity of opposites".^ 
The contrast of symbol with language is perhaps 
2 
questionable, but direct reference in literature to an 
object must leave the significance of the statement to be 
drawn from experience, which must in turn be matched 
against the context in which the object is presented. 
Whereas successful metaphor gives the reader the verbal 
clues necessary to perform the complex activity of 
interrelationship and in doing so cancels out some of its 
literal reference, symbol, whether on a small or a larger 
scale, depends on patterns of experience. Symbol, as 
Coleridge says, is the medium between the literal and the 
3 me taphorical. 
Christine Brooke-Rose suggests, however, that many 
so-called metaphors are not in fact metaphors at all, but 
are what she calls "literal symbols". In The Grammar of 
Metaphor she examines the metaphors of a wide selection of 
poets from Chaucer to Eliot and Yeats, classifying them 
according to their syntactical form. The two types which 
she finds to be anomalous are both noun-metaphors, those 
1 
Nowottny, p.85. 
2 
Consider, for instance, the word "still" in "move still, 
still so". Opposites can often be resolved dialectically 
into a more general category. But language is naturally 
more limited than experience. 
3 
Beebe, p.19. 
4 
Nouns are the more unstable element of language according 
to Miss Brooke-Rose because they are bundles of attributes, 
whereas verbs are behavioural, changing their meaning 
according to the noun with which they are linked but 
precise in themselves. 
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which she calls "Simple Replacement" metaphors and some of 
the "Genitive Link" metaphors. In the "Simple Replacement" 
type, the proper term of the metaphor is absent and the 
noun can also be taken literally, as in: "What matter if 
the ditches are impure?"| "A tree there is that from its 
topmost b o u g h . . . I n "Genitive Link" metaphors, 
particularly those using the preposition "of" and genitive 
compounds, the metaphor is not necessarily linked to its 
proper term but rather to a third term, giving the form: 
"A is the B of C". The A term is usually not mentioned, 
and where the noun can also be taken literally the 
metaphor becomes similar to the "Simple Replacement" type, 
as in "Monuments of unageing intellect"; "God's holy 
fire" 
These "literal symbol" metaphors may perhaps account 
for theories that the symbol in its full literary 
3 
development is a kind of extended metaphor. In ciny case, 
they do suggest a continuity between symbol and metaphor, 
parallel to that provided for by the diaphoric element in 
metaphor, namely that they are two modes of presenting and 
inducing a similar thought-process. It was stated earlier 
that metaphor has the capacity to extend the possibilities 
of language into areas of emotional and metaphysical 
relevance. There are corresponding views of sjnnbolism 
which maintain that it is primarily (i) "an attempt by 
1 
W.B. Yeats, Collected Poems, I963 (hereafter referred to 
as C.P.), pp.266, 217. 
2 
Ibid., p.217. 
3 
E.g. Unterecker, p . ? Edmund Wilson, Axel ' s Castle , 19^7, 
pp.21-2. 
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carefully studied means ~ a complicated association of 
ideas represented by a medley of metaphors - to 
communicate unique personal feelings",^ or (ii) "the poet, 
through his use of myth and symbol, seeks to give 
expression to certain archetypal patterns of experience 
and to certain universal truths in terms of the particular 
time and place in which he finds himself", so that 
"poetry,...is concerned less with the small data of 
sensory observation or the memory of natural experience, 
than with the inner nature of life; less with individual 
vagaries of thought and feeling than with perennial 
„ 2 issues". 
Both views begin from the assumption that symbol is a 
means of expression, of transmitting ideas known to the 
poet before the poem was created to express them. Neither 
gives an adequate conception of the relation between 
personal feelings and universal truth. To repeat in 
summary what was said in section one, only if the symbol 
in literature is regarded as a way of finding meaning in 
experience, the expression itself being the means to the 
discovery, can personal and universal experience, 
emotional and transcendent truth, be brought into focus in 
the imaginative act. Thus, the symbol is not only the 
finding of meaning in experience, it is the experience of 
finding meaning. 
1 
E. Wilson, pp.21-2. 
2 
Philip Sherrard, The Marble Threshing Floor, 1956, p.242, 
quoted in J, Christopher Middleton, "Two Mountain Scenes 
in Novalis and the Question of Symbolic Style", Literary 
Symb olism, ed» Helmut Rehder, 1963, p.l03« 
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Arthur Symons distinguishes the symbolist poets from 
earlier poets by the self-consciousness of their 
symbolism.^ The artist's problem has always been the 
evolution of meaningful form, and literary style is 
symbolic in all its details as well as in the whole. But 
to use the inherent method of art consciously must tend to 
create an ambiguity of attitude. The modern writer 
deliberately exploits and experiments with language and 
his position equivocates between active formulation of 
meaning and the essential receptivity and "unknowingness" 
of the artistic process. Both were always present. 
Serious artists can rarely have been quite unconscious of 
technique, but in recent times the consciousness of writers 
has been directed at the process of meaning itself and 
therefore it tends to become both form and subject of 
their art. The dangers exist that the search for meaning, 
for pure form, will become all-absorbing or, conversely, 
that all meaning may be denied in a welter of 
particularity. 
Yet the symbolist artist has the advantage of his 
recognition of language as formative of knowledge. If 
this is so, it must be possible to find the world, both 
material and immaterial, in language. The material world 
is given, and the artist makes use of the paradoxes and 
mysteries of experience to mirror his own questions, 
deliberately increasing the reference to the external 
world by making the words of the poem capable of being 
taken literally. Metaphor allows the artist to cut loose 
from literal reality and examine the frontier between mind 
1 
The Symbolist Movement in Literature, 1899» pp.12-13-
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and experience, but its conventional verbal status 
requires the assumption of the possibility of contact, 
however ambiguous. Where meaning is at stake a more 
radical encounter with reality is necessary, and the 
nature of metaphor must be adapted to accommodate it. 
Conscious symbolism requires the assertion of physical 
existence and experience to re-build its own image and 
re-work its own process. 
Thus, in her counting of metaphors Christine Brooke-
Rose found that, although the most frequently used type of 
metaphor in general was the "Genitive Link", with 
transitive verb metaphors not far behind, Eliot uses twice 
as many "Simple Replacements", and Yeats as many "Simple 
Replacements", as "Genitive Links". Most of the other 
poets did not use "Simple Replacements" in any outstanding 
numbers. 
Finally, since the symbolic process is a dialectic of 
a kind between the author's spontaneous mental effort and 
his received perception of the world, the author's 
personality may be present in the work in a particular way, 
A work which has as its subject the symbolic process 
dramatises the author's effort; but the result is not 
merely personal to the author, because it represents a 
search for meaning which is universal. The achieved 
symbol has an autonomy in the same sense that language 
itself has autonomy, sharing the impersonality of a mode 
of knowledge. 
Ill. Criticism of Symbolism in Literature 
Christine Brooke-Rose considers the Yeats/Eliot type 
of symbolic noun to be other than metaphoric because no 
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definite, unstated object is replaced, so that there is no 
transference of meaning except through the noun's 
connotations, "The poet simply mentions something", Miss 
Brooke-Rose says, "and various connotations arise in our 
minds, as they might if we ourselves saw the same thing in 
fact; or he makes them arise in our minds by mentioning it 
in a context of other objects".^ 
No doubt Miss Brooke-Rose did not intend the second 
statement to be read as a drastic revision of the first, 
but only as an alternative. Nevertheless, the two are 
incongruous in juxtaposition since the one implies almost 
no control of meaning on the poet's part, and the other a 
considerable amount of control. In fact the sentence 
reflects accurately a common attitude towards symbolism in 
literature. The suppositions Miss Brooke-Rose puts 
forward about the effects of the "literal symbol" type of 
metaphor are highly pertinent, particularly since Yeats is 
one of the major users of this type. 
She says, in sum, that understanding of the "literal 
S3mibol" depends on (i) the reader, (ii) connotations, 
(iii) the context; that its use allows what happens in the 
poem to be taken literally, and also allows freedom of 
symbolic interpretation; and that ambiguity is its great 
strength, but that it must be readily understood or else 
it is obscure, Multivalency, ambiguity, obscurity: these 
are the characteristics which lie at the roots of most of 
those critical attitudes towards Yeats which I have 
claimed to be aberrant and confusing. 
1 
Brooke-Rose, p.35-
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Considering first the multivalency of S5rmbolic 
"reference", if the "proper term" is not given, is the 
meaning therefore unlimited? Bernard Knieger, for 
instance, examining the nursery rhyme "Humpty Dumpty" 
concludes that "it is a symbol of sinful man, the meanings 
of which cannot be exhausted",^ and he mentions the falls 
of Adam, Satan, Icarus, and Phaethon as part of its 
relevant meaning. This is an extreme example, and it is 
therefore a good one to begin from. It is extreme in its 
simplicity, which is of a kind that relates it to fable, 
ballad, and other "folk" literature. There is no doubt 
that the best of this literature possesses a resonant and 
haunting quality which is due to an authentic natural 
symbolism. The simplicity provides only the broadest 
limitations on the possible connotations of the individual 
word and on the general sense, and leaves the situation 
implied extremely vague. The poem can therefore be given 
to a child without fear that he will immediately abstract 
a single unpleasant meaning or apply it to a particular 
situation and therefore probably reject it. Instead, it 
can remain in the back of the mind, working as a guide 
line for future thought. 
But can we accept Knieger's statement so simply? A 
child would not think of Knieger's mythological list, 
presumably, and adults do not often spend time on nursery 
rhymes. Is there no possibility of discussing such 
literature in a manner which is in any sense commensurate 
with our experience of it? And if it is read, and leads 
us to think about Adam, Satan and the others, are we still 
thinking about "Humpty Dumpty"? 
_ _ __ 
Beebe , pp.57-8. 
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Several commentators begin, reasonably enough, from a 
consideration of the reader's response to symbol. "It is 
the principle of involvement, of some degree of personal 
commitment, that makes symbols", L.C» Knights says, and 2 
David Daiches agrees, though reversing the order. The 
reader's response, he says, is to say that "We are 
implicated, we are involved; this man is living in our 
world and his fate is a human fate - not just related to 
us, but related to the human condition,..". And, noting 
that understanding is achieved by an act of the reader's, 
Knights concludes that "the full meaning of the symbol -
the generative power - only exists in so far as the 3 individual's experience is affected". 
All this agrees broadly with much that has been said 
in the earlier sections about the process of symbolism. 
But then Daiches takes another step, saying that "Once 
true contact is made, once human commitment and 
implication are achieved, we are well away; the 
imagination cannot rest but echoes off into infinitely 
reverberating suggestions, reminiscences, glimpses of new 
meanings within meanings", and he quotes Yeats: 
Those images that yet 
Fresh images beget, 
That dolphin-torn, that gong-tormented sea. 
1 
Knights and Cottle, p,l4o. 
2 
"Myth, Metaphor and Poetry", Essays by Divers Hands, ed. 
Ro Church, I965, p.46. 
3 
Knights and Cottle, p.138. 
4 
Church, p.47. 
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Daiches cites as an example some lines from Hamlet 
(l.i.166-7); 
But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad, 
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill. 
The phrase "yon high eastward hill", he says, shines out 
with a mysterious emphasis to add a comment or a 
qualification or a series of suggestions that 
take us to all sorts of magic mountains, castles 
in Spain, haunts of gods and symbolic towers, so 
that the literate reader finds echoing somewhere 
in the penumbra of his consciousness lines such 
as 
Le Prince d'Aquitaine a la tour abolie 
and Where the great Vision of the guarded mount 
Looks towards Namancos and Bayona's hold 
and I declare this tower is my symbol; I declare 
This winding, gyring, spiring, treadmill of a 
stair is my ancestral stair;...^ 
Daiches has already described the lines as being a 
"symbolic image blending suggestions of hope and 
regeneration", and, though he does not, he might easily 
have pointed to their position in the scene from Hamlet. 
But is it in reading Hamlet that all these other lines 
come to mind, or is it rather when these lines are taken 
on their own, as in this example? Are these lines part of 
the meaning of Hamlet and vice versa, or it it just that 
Hamlet and the other poems may be talking about similar 
things at this point? 
As with Humpty Dumpty and his illustrious 
predecessors, it would be possible to extract a phrase to 
1 
Church, p.47. 
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explain their similarity, e.g. "suggestions of hope and 
regeneration". But then, to take just the Yeats lines, if 
in "Blood and the Moon" the tower is a symbol of hope and 
regeneration, it is a very complex one, with many 
qualifications and adjuncts. In the lines quoted by 
Daiches it is clear that ideas of effort, of human 
striving, qualities of form, and a complex view of time 
are all involved in the poem's meaning. It is therefore 
merely the idea of the tower (or hill - something that 
serves as a focus of human aspirations) as a symbol that 
is relevant to both the Hamlet and the Yeats quotations; 
and similarly for the others. 
If these other quotations were to be accepted as part 
of the work's general relevance, then there can be no 
limit to any work's possibilities. It must then be 
conceded that no interpretation of the work is possible 
since the number of possible interpretations is linked to 
the number of readers, and even to each separate occasion 
of reading. But at this stage the reading of the work is 
no longer really a process of understanding, but is 
instead merely an occasion of returning to the memory for 
purposes of private contemplation of a general kind. This 
is in fact what Daiches implied when he said that the 
reader recognises a human fate, a common bond in the human 
condition. 
But, it will be argued, the general meaning is there 
to be taken, so that this is an understanding of the work. 
This is true, and is acceptable providing it is recognised 
to be only a logical abstraction from the whole, a "block" 
meaning dissected from the whole meaning process of the 
work. And the fragments from which the general idea was 
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abstracted can be seen, in the case of the Hamlet and 
Yeats lines discussed, to bear some relation to the whole. 
It has been said that in symbol the part equals the whole, 
but it is clear that it does so only insofar as we have 
the whole in mind when considering the part. If the part 
is taken, not as a representative of the whole, but as 
part of a new context, it becomes just a fragment, a unit 
of meaning. 
"In literature". Knights says, "...the meaning of 
anything we recognise as a syrobol is determined by a 
context".^ He goes ons 
To be more exact, there are two overlapping 
contexts within which meaning takes place: there 
is the context from which the symbol emerges -
namely the work within which it occurs, and the 
yet wider context of meaning which the artist 
draws on in making his work; and there is the 
context into which it enters - namely the moving 
and developing life of the person responding. 
One may perhaps see three, not two, contexts here, but in 
any case Daiches was obviously considering the context of 
the reader's mind. Neither Daiches nor Knights makes 
clear how the different contexts are interrelated, and the 
result is that, although both are contextualist critics, 
neither comes to a firm statement resolving the paradox 
between "images that yet Fresh images beget" and their 
claims for the context of the work as the chief 
determinant of meaning. Knights, for instance, finding no 
paraphrasable meaning in symbol, but only the "direction 
of personality as a whole" previously noted, adds that 
this does not mean he has a preference for "floating and 
^ 
Knights and Cottle, p.136. 
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obscure generalities", but can only support his statement 
by affirming that 
When Coleridge spoke of ideas which may indeed 
be suggested and awakened, but cannot, like the 
images of sense and the conceptions of the 
understanding be adequately expressed by words, 
he was not turning his back on his life-long 
plea for habits of mental accuracy and verbal 
precision; he was merely reminding us that our 
habits of thought must be adequate to the 
material with which they profess to deal.1 
Yet Knights himself had previously asserted that the 
symbol is an integral part of the work as a whole: "indeed 
it is obvious that in discussions of this kind it is only 
for convenience that we can refer to 'a symbol' as a sort 
of extractable unit in any work of imaginative 
literature".^ The symbol in Blake's "The Tyger", he says, 
is not a tiger but the poem in toto , and he goes on to 
quote Marius Bewley, that "the symbolic process is not 
defined by the operation of some one overwhelming symbol 
...but is a quality of imagery and organisation in the 
texture of the prose, gradually gathering towards a 
concentration of effect that is, in fact, a symbol 
3 although it may not overtly present itself as one". 
If this is the case, then there are not two or more 
separate contexts for the symbol, since the symbol is 
inseparable from the work. Thus, what enters the reader's 
experience and affects it when he is fully responding to 
the work must be the symbol as part of the work, not some 
1 
Knights and Cottle, p.l43. 
2 
Ibid., p,136. 
3 
Ibid., p.136, and The Eccentric Design, 1959, p.l06. 
39 
block unit taken out of the work and regarded as more or 
less autonomous. The contexts Knights defines are not 
really of the same kind. Although there is a response to 
the symbol in the reader's mind which is a necessary part 
of the finding of meaning, this response must be referred 
back to the poem,and the context of the work must decide 
what is relevant in the response and what is not,by a 
process similar to that described in the case of the 
metaphor "the Iron gates of Life". A "meaning" that 
emerges for the reader from pure reverie may be very 
important to him but is not guaranteed to be connected 
with the poem. 
Thus, although each separate reader will respond to 
the work somewhat differently according to his previous 
knowledge and experience, the variation is controlled by 
the context of the work. One measure of the 
successfulness of the work may be gauged by the degree to 
which it does control our responses to achieve a satisfying 
unity. To separate a "context of the reader's mind" is to 
split off the process of meaning into subject and object. 
Once the necessary interaction is denied, the process 
loses all meaning and can no longer be limited or described. 
But the symbol is more adequately determinable. There is a 
context which is common to all readers, and that is a 
response to the work which refers at all points to the 
work. This is the only one that can be discussed with 
immediate relevance and, if it is to mediate contact with 
a reader at all, it must be sufficient at least to guide 
our thoughts and responses to the symbol, "Poetry 
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succeeds because all or most of what is said or implied is 
relevant".^ 
Taken as part of the context of the reader's mind, 
the symbol becomes a fragment which, as in Daiches's 
example, may lose much of the meaning which it actuated 
when in its context in the work. Has the "yet wider 
context of meaning which the artist draws on in making his 
work" any greater relevance? Poetry or other literature 
must be taken to be intentional if it is to be considered 
as a human expression of any kind, and if it is to be 
2 discussed meaningfully. But that intention is 
3 
indeterminable except as it appears within the work. 
Therefore to return to the wider context which the artist 
drew on in making the work or to look at the artist's mind 
or background for information about the work is bound to 
be inconclusive. No certain connection can be made between 
such external information and the text. Objects, events 
and people in literature have only those characteristics 
which the context creates; Lady Macbeth's children need 4 not be a subject for speculation. 
Although we must infer intention in the artist and 
assume that everything that is in the work is in it "by 
the poet's specific act of choice",^ it is not therefore 
1 
Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon, p.3. 
2 
John Ciardi, in Beebe, p,69. 
3 
D.¥, Harding, Experience into Words, p,l64. 
k 
L„C. Knights, "How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?", 
Explorations, Penguin, pp.13-50. 
5 
Ciardi, Beebe, p.69. 
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necessary to deny that the author's method of writing may 
not be entirely conscious, ¥e may agree, for instance, 
with D,¥, Harding's finding that Shelley "uses accidents 
of language, while partially surrendering to them, as a 
means of discovering and releasing party-formed ideas and 
attitudes"J It may also be possible that a reader will 
find connotations and associations within the work which 
the artist had not recognised, since the artist is not 
using language as a tool for expressing a logical 
development of ideas and attitudes but as a means of 
discovering and integrating meanings, Biit the only way in 
which such interpretations of a work can be shown to be 
relevant is, as before, to demonstrate their relevance to 
the whole context of the work. 
"Writers differ in the extent to which they allow the 
less defined and less well controlled meanings and 2 
associations of words to [affect] what they finally write", 
as Harding says, and symbolist poets, by their very 
approach, are more liable to exploit the connotative 
possibilities of language. Winifred Nowottny suggests 
that the aim of many symbolist poets has been to preserve 
the absolute freedom and undifferentiation of the symbolic 
object through the use of "bare", "pure" language. The 
simple vocabulary, like the simple form, permits a wide 
variation of meanings and associations, facilitating the 
production of double meanings„ Yeats•s later poetry 
affords many examples of deliberately ambiguous usages of 
this kinds 
Knights and Cottle, p,l8. Experience into Words, p,190, 
2 
Experience into Words, p.172. 
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" c a s t a . . . j e t " ( " B l o o d and t h e Moon")5 "put 
down", "put o f f " , " t r a c e " ("The S t a t u e s " ) ; " T h a t 
j u g g l i n g n a t u r e mounts" ( " S u p e r n a t u r a l S o n g s " ) ; 
"A l i v i n g man i s b l i n d and d r i n k s h i s drop" ("A 
D i a l o g u e of S e l f and S o u l " ) . 
A m b i g u i t i e s s u c h as t h e s e s u p p o r t , and a r e i n d e e d 
p a r t o f , t h e t o t a l a m b i g u i t y o f t h e s y m b o l . T h e i r 
s i m p l i c i t y i s d e c e p t i v e , b u t t h e i r q u a l i t y of d i r e c t n e s s 
and p l a i n - s p o k e n n e s s not o n l y a t t r a c t s t h e eye b u t a l s o 
c o n t r i b u t e s to an e f f e c t of s p o n t a n e o u s r e a l i s m . 
C h r i s t i n e B r o o k e - R o s e n o t e s t h i s e f f e c t i n the " l i t e r a l 
s y m b o l s " w i t h which she d e a l s b u t does n o t a l l o w i t 
s u f f i c i e n t w e i g h t i n h e r f i n a l j u d g m e n t . For i n s t a n c e , 
s u c h " S i m p l e R e p l a c e m e n t " nouns as " t h e w i n d i n g a n c i e n t 
s t a i r " , " t h e c r u m b l i n g b a t t l e m e n t " , " t h e s t a r t h a t marks 
the h i d d e n p o l e " o f "A D i a l o g u e o f S e l f and S o u l " , she 
s a y s , "may or may n o t ' s t a n d ' f o r s o m e t h i n g e l s e . And o f 
c o u r s e i t h a r d l y m a t t e r s s i n c e t h e whole p u r p o s e i s 
e v o c a t i o n o f an ' image" w i t h w h a t e v e r symbolism we may 
s u b j e c t i v e l y g l i m p s e " . ^ But t h e poem i s n o t so l o o s e l y 
d e s i g n e d a s t h i s would s u g g e s t . I f i t were o n l y b e c a u s e 
the s t a n z a i s a t t r i b u t e d t o "My S o u l " and ends w i t h t h e 
l i n e "Who can d i s t i n g u i s h d a r k n e s s from t h e s o u l ? " , a 
b r o a d e r r e f e r e n c e must be i n f e r r e d . T h i s i n d i c a t i o n i s 
n o t s u b j e c t i v e , and n e i t h e r , 1 would s u g g e s t , i s the 
p a t t e r n of t h e f o c u s s i n g o f t h e a t t e n t i o n t o a c h i e v e a 
s t a t e of m y s t i c a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n which emerges as t h e t o t a l 
e f f e c t o f t h e s t a n z a ( s e e d i s c u s s i o n , p p . 1 3 7 - 1 ^ 0 ) . 
1 
B r o o k e - R o s e , p . 6 7 . 
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Again, Miss Brooke-Rose says of the "Genitive Link" 
metaphor "monuments of unageing intellect" that the 
meaning is "clear from the general context, but not 
strictly speaking, from the relationship between the two 
terms, which is barely metaphoric and ambiguous...; 
intellect produces monuments (i.e. works of art etc.), but 
the phrase itself could just about mean real monuments of 
an unageing intellectual quality, or real buildings 
produced by intellect". Miss Brooke-Rose here admits the 
restrictions due to the comminutive effect of her 
syntactical method, but when she adds that the ambiguities 
are present "from a strictly analytical, rather than a 
common-sense point of view" she oversteps the point through 
her very exactness. In this poem Yeats is making use of 
just this ambiguity. He wants his metaphors to be both 
general and solid, and not merely for a trompe 1'oeuil 
effect, to pass his abstractions off as poetry. "Sailing 
to Byzantium" as a whole exploits precisely this 
combination of real and imaginary, literal and metaphorical. 
Miss Brooke-Rose is consistently ambivalent in her 
attitude towards the introduction of "real things" into 
poetry. For Blake's "Song of the Happy Shepherd" she 
considers it to be an advantage that it can also be taken 
literally, but in most cases she finds literalness less 
effective than metaphor because "the double meaning 2 
essential to metaphor is lost or depends on us". Hence 
the rise of the term "image", she suggests, for "something 
visualised, but for which language is not made to work 
1 
Brooke-Rose, p.151 
2 
Ibid., p.31. 
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metaphorically". "The 'image' depends more on extrinsic 
circumstances, such as the general context and other 
'images', than on the words in the sentence which express 
it".^ Miss Brooke-Rose will not accept that such 
indications can give a clear idea of the double meaning, 
and this may be partly because she does not think of the 
metaphor's meaning as being suggested or formulated rather 
than given. She insists instead that "Simple Replacements" 
have only "outside associations which give us a feeling of 
2 
symbolism", but she makes no attempt to define such 
associations, just as she brushes aside the effects of 
c ontext. 
In earlier poets "Simple Replacements" were used more 
as emblems, often in conjunction with other metaphors in a 
kind of allegory with one connection explained. The 
modern poets studied by Miss Brooke-Rose, however, tend to 
use words which are less obviously figurative and to 
employ juxtaposition as a major principle of organisation 
of meaning. Obviously, this is one method of achieving 
control by context, and Yeats, as Miss Brooke-Rose notes, 
often uses groups of "Simple Replacements" in apposition, 
Yeats, she finds, "exploits the formal possibilities of 
English syntax more than any other modern poet, going back 
to Donne, for instance, much more constructively than 
Eliot does,..."^, especially in his use of a syllogistic 
form of parallelism with a repeated or synonymous action. 
1 
Brooke-Rose, p.67. 
2 
Ibid., p. 
3 
Ibid., p.317, e.g. "Conjunctions", "Veronica's Napkin", 
c.p., pp.333, 270. 
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In conjunction with his "Simple Replacements" Yeats often 
uses a demonstrative with a further qualifying phrase as 
substitution for a stated antecedent, or he may use a 
qualifying phrase or adjective to deny the literal meaning 
of a noun.^ Yeats "avoids both Blake's ambiguities and 
Keats' excesses with the Genitive Link", Miss Brooke-
Rose comments„ "His vision is much less fragmentary and 2 confused, his use of language much purer". 
In fact, Yeats uses a great many syntactical methods 
of controlling meaning, apart from control produced by 
rhythm, rhyme, and devices such as the grouping of a 
number of short poems to form one long poem with internal 
patterns of contrast, parallelism and balance. Despite 
all this Miss Brooke-Rose claims that Yeats "relies a 
great deal on the reader to know the symbolic meaning of o 
words he uses literally", thus revealing once more that she 
regards symbolic meaning as referential, a vaguer form of 
emblem-meaning, perhaps. I would suggest that, while 
Yeats does make use of traditional symbols, neither he nor 
any poet could use such symbols purely in a traditional 
way and still write symbolic poetry, because in poetry,if 
the symbol is to be considered as such, it must be active 
within the context of the poem. J. Christopher Middleton 
1 
Brooke-Rose, p.315, e.g. "Burke that proved the State a 
tree. That this unconquerable labyrinth of the birds...", 
C.P., p.268, "Flames that no faggot feeds, nor steel has 
lit,....An Agony of flame that cannot singe a sleeve", 
C.P., p.281. 
2 
Brooke-Rose, p.317-
3 
Ibid., p.317. 
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suggests^ that "poetic symbols are active in a way that 
others are not, not even the complex traditional symbols 
in nonimaginative contexts". 
If this is so, and the theory of symbolism certainly 
supports it, the question of obscurity and ambiguity must 
be related primarily to the understanding of the context. 
Although meaning does depend on the reader, it depends 
even more on the control produced by the context, since 
most words have a range of meaning and association. 
Similarly, if the meaning of Yeats's poems depends on a 
knowledge of the body of his work, as Miss Brooke-Rose, 
2 
following many other critics, suggests, it must depend on 
it only for referential meaning. That is, meanings and 
associations of words from other poems or external sources 
such as A Vision have only the same status as the normal 
meanings which the word has for us, being part of the 
broad connotative reference of the word which must be 
defined and adjusted to the requirements of the particular 
experience of the poem in question. The process of 
definition must be determined by the limitations imposed 
within the work itself, acting within the bounds of common 
knowledge, if it is to be accepted and responded to as a 
constitutive symbol and not a referential discourse. 
The writer may base his work on a literary symbol 
evolved elsewhere, but if it is not created or re-created 
effectively within the present work for that work to 
1 
Rehder, p.l03. 
2 
Unterecker, Introduction to Yeats, Twentieth Century 
Views, pp.1-6, G.S. Fraser, Vision and Rhetoric, 1959, 
M.I. Seiden, W.B. Yeats. The Poet as Mythmaker, 1962; see 
later discussions. 
4 7 
function as a creative action of the mind, then the 
present work can only be regarded, where this symbol is 
concerned, as an extension of that in which the symbol was 
first created, and, as such, it will almost certainly have 
no satisfactory meaning. 
Allusiveness is established, Winifred Nowottny 
argues,^ if it is possible for the reader to be aware of 
it and if it can be shown to work in the poem; that is to 
say, if it has relevance for the poem and if it is part of 
the common connotative range of the word or phrase making 
the allusion. The area of relevance of allusion may be 
more complex in general than that of a word-connotation, 
being perhaps an intricate nexus of valuational and 
emotional, as well as simple reference, components, but 
the same qualifications apply: that it must be possible to 
set it in the context of the work and thereby achieve a 
deepening of the work's meaning without introducing ideas 
which point beyond the work. 
Where allusion depends on something other than 
common knowledge, it must be made clear by specific 
reference forewarning the reader of the particular 
knowledge required of him, or else it may destroy the 
poem's action. The work cannot function as a correlator 
of subject and object if it is so opaque as to be totally 
incomprehensible. The range of the comprehensible in 
the arts, however, is not what it is in logical 
discourse. Metaphor and symbol can produce highly complex 
patterns of inter-relation of ideas giving precise 
1 
Nowottny, p.201. 
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notions which are only with difficulty definable in 
logical terms because they are not the result of a simple 
logical process, and because they have a tonal quality, 
consisting of emotional as well as logical factors. But 
because such ideas are not totally amenable to paraphrase, 
they are not necessarily totally unparaphrasable. In fact, 
although mathematically the logical equivalent of a re-
circulative process may be an infinite series of 
statements, practically, the major statements within the 
area of reference of the immediate work can be made, with 
the provision that others are always possible. As Eliseo 
Vivas says, it is not a question of either/or, but always 
of more or less: 
all sorts of indications can be given the reader 
as to what he will find....But ultimately he has 
to go it alone and enter into the kind of 
transaction with it that is the aesthetic 
apprehension of the intransitive and the 
immanent grasp of its meanings.^ 
Christine Brooke-Rose's mistrust of symbolism caused 
her uncertainty as to whether the symbol's meaning is 
totally subjective or whether it is determined by the 
artist, alternatives which are not acceptable because we 
must assume meaningfulness, intention, although it cannot 
be determined except as the work itself produces meaning. 
The searching into the artist's mind, into his mental and 
physical background, and into the esoteric reaches of the 
disciplines and philosophies he espoused, also reflect 
mistrust of the symbolic process and are the result of 
looking for certainty and for simple reference meaning in 
1 
Vivas, p.286. 
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something beyond the work. Such knowledge can only deepen 
understanding of the work in so far as we are willing to 
return with it to the aesthetic "transaction" that Vivas 
proposes, and it must not be allowed to distract attention 
from that transaction if it is to succeed in the creation 
of meaning. Negative capability is one half of the "act 
of pure attention", imaginative grasp the other. 
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CHAPTER II 
CRITICISM OF YEATS'S POETRY 
I. General Introduction 
Many of the critics who have written on Yeats's 
poetry show the results of mistrusting the poems, as if 
they had a feeling of meaning from them but without being 
able to explain it or, it may be, accept it. Because they 
believe that the symbol is indefinable in subject and 
operation,and suspect with Christine Brooke-Rose that in 
symbolic poetry the poet simply mentions something and 
various connotations arise in the mind, and because they 
are unhappy about the unexpectedness and unconventionality 
of the ideas they find in the poems, they look for 
background to support the poetry, for a body of knowledge 
and tradition behind it or for explanations in Yeats's 
life or habits of thought. 
It may be convenient to list here the various courses 
of recoil from the poetry: 
(i) Looking at the poet's mind on the assumption 
that the poem is the expression of what was in his mind, 
and hence that the poem has a direct reference meaning. 
Understanding of the poet's method of composition is often 
substituted for outright intentionalism, and the subtlest 
approach of this kind looks for the meaning of a passage 
by examining the drafts of the poem to see how the poet 
modified and developed his ideas. This may provide a 
valid means of discovering important facts about the 
51 
poet's method and in some instances it could resolve a 
problem in the final version, but if it is absolutely 
necessary to turn to the draft in this way the poem is to 
that extent unsatisfactory. Yeats's style in his later 
verse is, however, generally clear-cut and precise, not 
only in diction and syntax, but also in his use of 
imagery. He is not given to precipitating images and then 
modifying them with another almost before they have had 
time to crystallise, as D.W. Harding demonstrated in 
Shelley and Shakespeare.^ Although he may have a high 
density of images within the space of a few lines, Yeats 
does not fuse them so closely as to be inseparable, and 
they are often repeated in new ways later in the poem so 
that the images inter-relate, as in a hall of mirrors, but 
do not blur into one another and lose focus. The effect 
may well be connected with his use of literal symbols, 
which have the solidity of objects rather than the 
fluidity and fleeting impressions of metaphor. 
(ii) Relating the poems to the disciplines and 
philosophies professed or adopted by the poet, implying 
that the poem has a reference connection with these ideas 
and can be interpreted by knowing them. That is to say, 
it is assumed that it is possible to go from the poetry to 
the discipline for explanation and understanding of the 
poem without re-focussing on the particular experience it 
presents. 
(iii) Extracting symbols from the poems and 
discussing them separately or comparing them with symbols 
1 
In "The Hinterland of Thought", Experience into Words and 
Knights and Cottle. (These are the main illustrations of 
the essay's thesis). 
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from elsewhere. The symbols are treated as emblems, 
traditional symbols, or archetypes. It is assumed that 
the symbol outside the poem is the same as within it: that 
its meaning is separable from its enactment in the poem. 
Since the alchemical and theosophical doctrines which 
Yeats absorbed and made use of consist largely of 
elaborate configurations of symbols and emblems, this is 
often identical with (ii) above. It is not necessary to 
deny that an artist may use a traditional symbol, say, in 
a manner which gives a similar general meaning, as with 
Daiches's echoes of towers and hills, the danger of the 
approach is that the particular embodiment in the poem 
will not receive the attention necessary to succeed as 
symbolic process and the overtones will be lost beneath 
those of other syntheses. 
(iv) Extracting symbols from the poems and comparing 
them with symbols from other works of the same author. 
This is akin to (i), the study of the working of the 
poet's mind, and it implies that the artist is using words 
in special ways which are not available to the general 
understanding, and that his ideas have block values which 
may be substituted in any context. In its extreme this 
implies that the artist is writing one great work in which 
he "expresses" or embodies all his philosophy and that 
each small work is ,incomplete in itself. This is often 
conflated with the reverse process of relating the 
individual poems to a wider pattern of development or 
experience in the poet's life, but is not the same since 
the latter need not imply a restrictive attitude towards 
the individual poems. 
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A, number of critics turn to mythology as a covering 
explanation of Yeats's poetic. The conception of 
mythology varies from critic to critic, but the most 
common assumption is that Yeats was building up a personal 
mythology, a whole of meaning towards which the poems, 
plays and other works contribute. A Vision is often taken 
to represent the basis of this mythology, and the poems 
are therefore interpreted according to its theories or the 
theories which lay behind it. A Vision on its own, 
however, is not usually satisfactory for this purpose, and 
since the poems are being viewed as reference functions of 
its meaning they are not considered as standing alone, 
leaving the critic to turn to any other available 
background material as a prop for meaning. 
The question of the nature of myth and its relation 
to literature is too complex to be considered in detail 
here, but it is clear that if myth is taken to be a 
conceptual grouping divorced from any specific artistic 
formulation as Knieger, for instance, implies when he 
considers the falls of Adam, Icarus, etc. to be existent 
for us apart from any particular literary embodiment of 
their stories, then myth falls under the same category as 
traditional symbolism (i.e. it is only relevant to a work 
of literature insofar as it can be telescoped back into 
the work without introducing new concepts and only as it 
furthers the suggestions of the original work). 
Daiches^ regards myth in this way. It is dependent 
only on content, he maintains, and is not an amalgam of 
1 , 
"Myth, Metaphor and Poetry", in Church, p.49. 
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form and content as literature is. Hence, he argues, the 
attempt to fit literary works to the pattern of recognised 
myths results in reducing the works to their paraphrasable 
meaning, as was noted with "Humpty Dumpty". What Daiches 
does not consider is that by the act of substitution both 
the literature and the myths are being treated as content 
only. Daiches sees myth as relating man to nature, 
whereas literature relates man to man and to the history 
of human experience. Both have the function of 
de-neutralising the universe by implicating man, but myth 
aims at enabling man to come to terms with the terrifyingly 
impersonal forces of nature, whereas poetry tries to 
maximise human meanings in a situation involving human 
experience. 
Analogous to this view is the confusion between myth 
as story and myth as a direct response to experience of 
the "other" which leads Harold H. Watts to contrast Yeats's 
use of "lapsed" Celtic and other mythologies unfavourably 
with the myths as spontaneous, because the modern usage has 
a symbolic function not present in the original which, he 
argues, meant what it said and not "something which one 
must grasp and partly elucidate".^ This position, unlike 
that of Cassirer, is divisive, permitting no correlation 
between myth as response and myth as story. Hence Watts's 
later statement that myth is "an unreflectively achieved 
perception of the mysterious and uncontrollablea 
perception integrated into the structure of tale and 
legend as uncalculatingly as, say, were the material 
details of food preparation... that we find in the story of 
Bricriu's feast". Clearly, Watts is here regarding the 
^Hound and Quarry, 1953, pp.178-9. 
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stories and their mythical content as separate entities, 
and yet he began by referring generally to a "corpus of 
stories about gods". The very fact that myth appeared in 
the form of tales and legends suggests that there was 
among the ancient believers a parallel usage to the 
modern, and, perhaps, as much of a desire to understand 
their experience rather than simply to respond to it. 
An exactly opposite view is presented by John 
Holloway,^ who stresses the active concept of myth held by 
anthropologists. To than, the function of myth is not to 
answer questions about the nature of the world, but to 
contribute to or sustain some reality current in society. 
The mythical consciousness suggested by Cassirer is too 
abstract a concept, Holloway believes. What is important 
about myth, he argues, is its social function, moulding, 
controlling and sustaining the way men live. Myths are 
seen "less as statements than as agents in their societies 5 
„ 2 less as offering explanations than as exercising power". 
The more myth is seen as communal action rather than 
as mental process the closer it is to literature, at least 
as drama and epic. But Holloway does not want to abandon 
reference value in myth or literature completely, and 
having ruled out simibolism he is caught with the dualist 
problem of accommodating the emotional effects of 
literature in a theory which depends on its conveying 
meaning. If literature is also taken to be a mode of 
1 
"The Concept of Myth in Literature", Knights and Cottle, 
pp.120-134. 
2 
Ibid., p.125. 
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action it can account for both extremes and for both of 
Daiches's opposites. Even as controller and sustainer of 
social bonds and mores myth must also function, as 
Holloway himself says, as manifesting certain facts of 
life in a controlled form. If it is accepted as providing 
understanding through meaningful experience rather than 
explanation of a direct aetiological kind, then both 
community action and individual mental action are 
accommodated. Poetry is then, perhaps, a less immediately 
communal and physical form of such activity, exploiting 
(and creating) the complexity and flexibility of language 
to allow subtler and more personal reactions to the 
"formidable and haunting ideas of existence" to be 
transmitted and understood. 
Through his personal symbolic experience, the poet 
shares the burden of the forces imposed on man by nature 
and by society, regarding them all as personal in the 
sense of being actions between personal agents, each 
capable of meaningful action, and hence as having human 
significance. The makers of myths presumably acted in a 
similar way but less individually, being part of a 
tradition shared, perhaps, by a greater proportion of 
society. The less immediate the community a poet has, 
the more his experience as representative man becomes 
important. Yeats was greatly influenced by and made great 
use of a tradition which is not the major tradition of 
most of his natural community. If his experience and 
vital interest were contained within the limits of this 
tradition it would perhaps be necessary to say that he was 
lost except as a translated poet to western society in 
this century. But this is not the whole truth. Yeats's 
central theme is the ancient one of the dilemma of the 
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human condition, and his handling of it shows full 
consciousness of the human side of the balance. Where, as 
in "Supernatural Songs" or "The Statues", esoteric lore or 
personal interpretations of history play some part, still 
the same basic human concerns persist; although the view 
is unfamiliar, it is not unrecognisable. 
Critics who assume or suggest that Yeats was 
attempting to create a comprehensive personal mythology 
are justified in the broad sense that he tried to see 
existence as a unified, meaningful whole, but to regard 
the "mythology" as fixed and the poetry as explanatory 
units within it is to accept the aetiological definition 
of mythology and to ignore its active communal 
functioning. Mythology in its sophisticated literary 
state cannot differ so utterly from the anthropologist's 
experience of it as to cancel all likeness. But this very 
indefiniteness of term vitiates the usefulness of 
"mythology" as a critical concept and it is -generally used 
as vaguely and ambiguously as is "symbol" itself. 
These are the major patterns of Yeats criticism. 
Individual critics introduce new problems, but so many 
follow either one or more of these paths that it should be 
possible to discuss them in these terms. Naturally, they 
will not conform to so simple a scheme, but as far as 
possible critics with similar leanings will be discussed 
in succession or conjunction. 
II. Symbols from Art, Philosophy and Magic 
One writer who is avowedly interested in the workings 
of the poet's mind is Giorgio Melchiori: "my aim is not so 
much to point out the sources of different poems and to 
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explain their meaning, as to discover and trace, as far as 
this is possible, the mental process by which they have 
come into being".^ Melchiori is aware that the symbol in 
literature is constitutive and not referential, and he 
also suggests that Yeats transformed the cult of form and 
formal arrangement of Pater and his followers into a 
conception of pattern and style as the basis of symbolism, 
but he does not put the two together to suggest that style 
and form in a work of art (i.e. context) can determine the 
symbolism of the work. Instead he concludes that 
The overall meaning of a symbol is therefore of 
itself undefinable: separate facets of it can 
perhaps be logically explored; but the symbol in 
its complex unity can be apprehended only through 
the emotion it communicates, through the feeling 
it awakens, acting on our senses. It is not so 
much the sensuous representation of a complex 
idea, as the immediate blending of sensuous 
impression, feeling and thought: it is the 
intuition of a complex idea through our physical 
senses.2 
This statement, with its heavy emphasis on intuition, 
sensing and feeling leads away from any possibility of 
approaching the symbol through its manifestation, pointing 
instead towards that undefinable content which Melchiori 
calls "invisible essence" or "spiritual essence". 
This assumption that the effect of symbolism is 
nebulously emotional and sensual and therefore ineffable 
inevitably causes Melchiori to ignore his statement that 
"separate facets of...[the symbol] can perhaps be 
logically explored", and his concentration on the 
1 , 
The Whole Mystery of Art, I960, p.l. 
2 
Ibid., p.15. 
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"spiritual flame" within the "transparent lamp"^ blinds him 
to the possibility of examining the physical fact which 
embodies and transmits the light. And because he pays no 
attention to the form of the symbols, but only to their 
content, Melchiori does not distinguish between the symbol 
in poetry and the symbol elsewhere. 
Speaking of some bookplate designs made by T. Sturge 
Moore for Yeats which were discussed in the correspondence 
between them, Melchiori comments: 
What these letters demonstrate is the instability 
of symbols even when the underlying idea is the 
same. This instability, united with the 
bewildering pluri-significance of each symbolic 
image, makes it hard to find logical consistency 
in the works of poets like Blake or Yeats.^ 
The bookplate emblems are discussed in the same way as the 
literary symbolism of the poetry. Melchiori finds the 
emblem's meaning to vary from person to person and from 
time to time and imputes the same instability to the 
poetry despite its utterly different nature. It may be 
that great art can control and determine its symbolism as 
subtly as can great literature, but the means must be so 
different as to make the comparison virtually meaningless. 
Moreover, these bookplates are a deceptive example 
because they are more nearly akin to "Humpty Dumpty" than 
to the poetry of Yeats or Blake. Even poems like "Old Tom 3 
Again", "Symbols" and "Statistics"^ produce more 
1 
Melchiori, p.2. 
2 
Ibid., p.3• 
3 
c . p . , p p . 3 0 6 , 270, 2 7 1 . 
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limitation on the possible meanings of the symbolism than 
do these bookplates. They are not allegorical emblems but 
are most like that "bare, pure language" of the symbolist 
poets which was designed to be as unrestrictive in its 
suggestions as possible. 
The inconsistency and variability of which Melchiori 
complains may be caused less by an actual lack of logic in 
the works than by looking for it in the wrong place. By 
taking the literary symbols out of context, Melchiori 
strips them of structure and precision. To ask of such 
symbols logical consistency is virtually to demand logical 
consistency of man's mind and experience. Bare sjonbols of 
this kind only achieve stability of reference when they 
are part of an enduring and significant system of human 
values or else when they have lost all but their reference 
value. 
Melchiori's thesis is based on this conception of the 
inter-relation of art and literature, and hence he is 
committed either to a reductive view of symbolism or else 
to the speculation and vagueness inherent in the 
comparison of two art forms. Melchiori's argument is that 
art is essentially order, pattern, "and the pattern 
itself is not superimposed afterwards, is not a metrical 
scheme or a technical device: it is a form of mental 
organization developed by the poet at the same time as he 
was gathering, more or less unconsciously, the materials 
from which the poem is born".^ Therefore he proposes to 
"enquire into the mental pattern upon which Yeats's poetry 
is built", and adds, "I may as well state that I suspect 
1 
Melchiori, p.113-
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that this mental pattern had, in Yeats's case, a strong 
visual basis: that it approached a geometrical scheme".^ 
The evidence which Melchiori produces to demonstrate 
this thesis must necessarily be hypothetical in the 
absence of the poet's direct commentary (and even that 
could be questioned). Melchiori admits this, but 
nevertheless he ends by drawing conclusions which, by 
implication,are not speculative, apparently on the 
assumption that a sufficient accumulation of speculative 
evidence will add up to a logically conclusive argument. 
He begins with some solid evidence for supposing that 
Yeats was interested in visual symbolism and stylised 
pattern: that he was son and brother to artists and had 
studied art himself; that he was influenced by the pre-
Raphaelites and the aesthetes; that he was deeply 
interested in Celtic myths, magic and theosophy; and that 
he was influenced by Blake. This is all fair enough, but 
when he comes to the demonstration, essential to his 
purpose, of the connection between these influences and 
Yeats's work, Melchiori's method of argument becomes less 
convincing. Repeatedly throughout the book, having 
produced the evidence to support a certain hypothesis, he 
transforms the theory without further ado into a truth. 
"It is only a hypothesis", he says at one point, 
but it seems to me worth entertaining.. It would 
prove that poetry, for Yeats at least, was the 
slow maturation of the seeds sown in his mind 
during his youthful years:,...Perhaps the 
strength and beauty of his mature poetry lies 
partly in the fact that it has such deep roots 
1 
Melchiori, p.3-
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in his own past intellectual experiences. This 
is what gives it that tone of serene though 
passionate assurance - ....^ 
Or again, proposing "a probable unconscious reminiscence" 
of Spenser's description of Leda (Faerie Queene, III, xi, 
32) behind Yeats's sonnet "Leda and the Swan", Melchiori 
says: 
Spenser's "rusht" may be responsible for the 
"white rush" of the sonnet, the bird's breast is 
as prominent, and...it is perhaps not 
unreasonable to think that Spenser's military 
metaphor ("inuade") may have confirmed Yeats in 
his idea of associating the Leda myth with war. 
Yeats's reminiscences of the swan passage 
in Spenser ran together in his mind with 
recollections of another work....^ 
But the most striking example of this advance from theory 
to certainty is Melchiori's main conclusion which 
transforms the original hypothesis to: "in the case of 
Yeats, the first impulse towards the creation of poetry is 
visual rather than intellectual - that is to say it comes 
from the senses; and only later the poet's mind erects 
round this seminal impulse an elaborate structure of 
thought" 
First, such a conclusion is totally inaccessible by 
the methods Melchiori has applied except as a statement of 
probability, and even so, the visual influences adduced by 
Melchiori are far outnumbered and outweighed by the 
literary sources he suggests. It may be that within this 
1 
Melchiori, p.1^7. 
2 
Ibid., p.113. 
3 
Ibid., p.270. 
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literary material the sensuous effects and imagery are the 
most striking, but this could not possibly prove its 
primacy in the poet's mind. 
Melchiori is fully conscious of the need to 
demonstrate that the poet saw the source material in 
question; indeed he is sometimes encouraged to include as 
source-material things which the poet certainly saw, but 
which have little or no connection with the work 
supposedly derived from them: 
It is not surprising, then, that while Yeats was 
looking for a bird S3nnbol of solitude, he should 
have remembered Alastor's swan (11.275-9): 
..,A swan was there, 
Beside a sluggish stream among the reeds. 
It rose as he approached, and with strong wings 
Scaling the upward sky, bent its bright course 
High over the immeasurable main. 
It should be noticed that in Shelley the image 
of the swan is far less powerful than in Yeats, and 
there are no close verbal similarities. Besides, 
Shelley's swan is not an emblem of solitude, but 
provides a contrast with it.^ 
However, some of the influences Melchiori suggests are 
much more probable; for instance: 
The reading of Gogarty's Offering of Swans [sic 
coming at a time when Yeats was looking for a new 
"metaphor" on which to build a poem, and by 
appealing to him with images with which he was 
already familiar (Helen, the Fall of Troy, and 
the swan symbol), suggested the possibility of 
concentrating them in a single myth: that of Leda 
and the Swan. And it suggested also the 
portentous consequences of the union of woman and 
bird.^ 
1 
Melchiori, pp.106-7. 
2 
Ibid., p.97. 
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A s Y e a t s w a s w r i t i n g the p r e f a c e a n d h e l p i n g to p r i n t 
G o g a r t y ' s b o o k o f p o e m s a t the t i m e w h e n h e w r o t e the L e d a 
s o n n e t , it is m o s t p r o b a b l e t h a t h e w a s to s o m e e x t e n t 
i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e s e p o e m s , b u t to w h a t e x t e n t ? 
M e l c h i o r i is q u i t e s u r e of the w a y i n w h i c h Y e a t s ' s 
m i n d w o r k e d , b u t i n f a c t t h e r e is n o t h i n g i n the G o g a r t y 
p o e m s q u o t e d b y M e l c h i o r i to s u g g e s t L e d a a n d the S w a n a s 
t h e d o m i n a n t m y t h , n o r a n y d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n o f the 
" p o r t e n t o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the u n i o n " , e x c e p t f o r the 
r a t h e r f l i p p a n t l i n e : " A n d the t w i n S p o r t s m e n w e r e 
b e g o t t e n " . It c e r t a i n l y s u g g e s t s t h a t Y e a t s ' s i m a g i n a t i o n 
d i d n o t p r o d u c e i m a g e s o u t o f the a i r w i t h o u t a n y 
s t i m u l a t i o n , b u t t h i s w o u l d b e f a i r l y s a f e to a s s u m e i n 
a n y c a s e . T h e g r e a t e s t s i n g l e r e s u l t o f t h i s c o m p a r i s o n 
o t h e r w i s e is to d e m o n s t r a t e c o n s p i c u o u s l y the d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n a m i n o r a n d a m a j o r p o e t . 
I f the p o e m s h a d b e e n m o r e e q u a l i n q u a l i t y a n d i d e a 
it m i g h t h a v e b e e n p o s s i b l e to m a k e a c l o s e c o m p a r i s o n 
w h i c h w o u l d h a v e b e e n m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y i l l u m i n a t i n g to 
t h e w o r k i n g s o f Y e a t s ' s m i n d , b u t M e l c h i o r i is n o t 
i n t e r e s t e d i n s u c h a n a p p r o a c h i n a n y c a s e . B e g i n n i n g 
w i t h the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t Y e a t s w a s " l o o k i n g f o r a n e w 
' m e t a p h o r ' o n w h i c h to b u i l d a p o e m " ( a n y p o e m , — a p p a r e n t l y , 
o i n c o M o l o h i o r i — — s u r e Y e a t s — d i d n o t — s t a r t — w i t h a n i d o a 
i n m i n d ) , M e l c h i o r i t h e n p r o p o s e s to t r a c e o u t the o t h e r 
i n f l u e n c e s b e a r i n g o n the p o e m : 
T h e m e n t a l p r o c e s s d i d n o t s t o p a t t h i s p o i n t . 
A n O f f e r i n g o f S w a n s w a s o n l y t h e c a t a l y s t . I t s 
m e r e p r e s e n c e s e t i n m o t i o n a w h o l e c h a i n o f 
u n c o n s c i o u s r e a c t i o n s , o f m e n t a l a s s o c i a t i o n s . 
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fusing together and bringing to light a wealth 
of literary and visual reminiscences,...^ 
amongst which are Shelley, Spenser (see above), Francesco 
Colonna's Hypnerotomachia Pholiphili, William Morris, 
D.G. Rossetti, Oscar Wilde, Madame Blavatsky, and others, 
swan images and appearances of Helen in Yeats's own 
poetry, and finally some pictures and statuary of Leda and 
her swan. 
All this material does demonstrate that certain 
attitudes and conceptions remained with Yeats and 
re-occurred to him over a long period of time, that he 
shared the interest of many of his contemporaries in 
Helen, and that she and Leda were, for him, focal points 
in Greek mythology. But most of this could have been 
discovered by looking at the poems themselves, and if we 
were to look at the actual process of making the poem we 
would need to know a great deal more even than this. How 
can we be certain, for instance, that Yeats was actually 
influenced by the material in question when writing the 
poem even if we are certain that he saw it? How do we 
know that there are not a great many other things which he 
saw or read and which might have exerted an even stronger 
influence ? 
The certainty which Mr Melchiori projects so 
confidently is entirely illusory. Finally, the only 
arbiter is the poetry itself, and the only justification 
for looking at the poet's mind, other than the 
psychological or biographical, is for its relation to the 
poetry. But this last is a dangerous proceeding; for the 
1 
Melchiori, p.98. 
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result of looking away from the poetry is, as might be 
expected, that the poems are rarely touched on for 
themselves, and when they are they are not often 
illuminated, and may even be confused, as in the following 
examples. 
The presence of the tower symbol in "Leda and the 
Swan",..., is more than a vivid metaphor for the 
invasion of the stronghold of Leda's chastity, 
"the broken wall", it is more than a reference to 
the fall of Troy, it is an imaginative re-
inforcement of the basic meaning of the poem (the 
advent of a new cycle of civilisation) while at 
the same time bringing to bear on it a whole 
series of other significances.^ 
Melchiori arrives at this by taking into consideration 
Yeats's use of tower imagery and its sources, including 
"Prince Athanase", the Chymical Marriage of Christian 
Rosencreutz, the twenty-first trump in the Tarot pack (the 
lightning-struck tower), and his wife's bookplate with 
unicorn and tower. Melchiori claims that this is all 
somehow connected with the "presence of the tower symbol 
in "Leda and the Swan", but this does not accord with the 
poem. There the tower is only one element in the lines 
which describe the fall of Troy: 
The broken wall, the burning roof and tower 
And Agamemnon dead. . . . 
The suggestion of tremendous consequences is present in 
the whole of these lines, not merely in one word. The 
word "tower" is not even particularly stressed in the 
descriptive sequence. Despite its terminal position, it 
does not excite the imagination on its own, as a separate 
1 
Melchiori, p.132. 
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S3Tnbol. It is here no stronger in imaginative suggestion 
than "broken wall" or than the contrasted immobility and 
finality of "And Agamemnon dead". 
Dealing with the same poem, Melchiori derives a 
complicated group of associations for the line "So 
mastered by the brute blood of the air" including Mme. 
Blavatsky's The Secret Doctrine, the occult system of 
Cornelius Agrippa, and William Blake's Jerusalem and The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell, then comments: 
This accounts for the line...: the Swan is both 
Air and Blood. It relates to the ancient theory 
of the correspondences between the "elements" 
and the "humours", which Yeats and Ellis quote 
directly from Cornelius Agrippa when commenting 
on Blake's visionary figure of Luvah: 
Melchiori here quotes a passage from the edition of The 
Works of William Blake: 
This correspondence of the emotional life with 
air is a part of the occult system of Cornelius 
Agrippa. The "Humours", he writes, "partake of 
the elements, for yellow choller is instead of 
fire, blood instead of air, flegme instead of 
water and black choller instead of earth", 
(italics Yeats ' s ) . 
However this may "account" for the line from the poem, it 
does not give anything akin to the meaning which arises 
naturally from the poem. There is some meaning in saying 
that the swan is both air and blood but to impute to the 
poem correspondences between the "elements" and the 
"humours" is to introduce ideas quite foreign to the main 
force of the poem, ideas which are almost at the level of 
1 
Melchiori, p.l44. 
68 
irrelevant punning. Yeats's comment (written in I893) 
might be said to indicate that such a correspondence could 
possibly have been in his mind when he wrote the poem, but, 
if so, it is thoroughly subordinated to the immediate 
experience which the poem so expertly brings to the reader. 
It is an essential falsification of the awe and sense of 
wonder at the revealing of a mystery to muddy it up with 
intricate cross-references. If they are to be made, it 
must be to the poem as part of the individual reader's 
mental reserve, and hence to the poem as reference 
material, not as part of the reading of the poem. 
The poems suffer in much the same way in the work of 
another critic who persistently looks towards the poet's 
mind and interests rather than at the poems: T.R. Henn. 
Henn begins as an apologist for Yeats the man and for his 
philosophies, allegiances and actions. The poetry appears 
largely secondary to this purpose although it is assumed 
that- it also requires defence. For instance, explaining 
Yeats's use of his tower-home as a symbol, Henn says: 
A ruined castle , . . .in Ireland, could be bought for 
thirty pounds and become a dominant symbol with 
memories of Spenser, Herbert, Thomson, Shelley: 
There, on blood-saturated ground, have stood 
Soldier, assassin, executioner, 
Whether for daily pittance or in blind fear 
Or out of abstract hatred, and shed blood... 
It is something that is easy to stigmatise as 
fantasy, escapism, self-dramatisation, snobbery, 
nostalgia, and so forth: but all such dismissals 
are too simple...1 
Clearly the poem is only quoted as another instance of the 
sort of ideas which may be connected with towers as 
1 
The Lonely Tower, I965, pp.12-13-
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symboLs, relating the tower to Ireland and to symbolic 
traditions; and it is the qualities of character which 
made Yeats buy the tower and use it in his verse that Henn 
is primarily defending. 
In his introduction to the first edition of his book, 
Henn makes clear that he believes the poetry to be 
dependent upon knowledge and understanding of the poet's 
character, life and thought: 
This poetry does demand, perhaps more than most, 
a personal response, with all the dangers and 
exaltations that a strictly impersonal 
criticism might wish to avoid. 
...even the simplest poems may demand cross-
reference to a passage in an essay or a play, or 
a parallel usage in another poem, before its 
full significance becomes apparent.^ 
Because he assumes that the poetry is private (by "a 
personal response" he evidently means a response to the 
poet's person rather than a full response of the reader as 
a person to the poem as symbol) and that it requires 
external support, Henn is lead to the logical conclusion 
that everything is relevant to the poem, and that there is 
no boundary to the reference material which must be 
searched to explain, finally, both the man and his works: 
"All that he saw and read and thought must one day be 
O 
examined ..." . By assuming the poems to be incomplete and 
incomprehensible, Henn allows their difficulties to 
remain; they are simply passed on to the poet's life where 
1 
The Lonely Tower, I965, pp.xiv, x. 
2 
Ibid., p.xiii, and see above. Introduction, pp.x-xi. 
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they are much more difficult to solve, being no longer in 
a limited context of ordered significance. Hence the 
problems tend to become as unlimited and out of control as 
a man's whole life can make them appear. 
In the introduction to his second edition Henn 
reveals the same attitudes, although his immediate concern 
is rather to defend his own critical assumptions than the 
poet. Henn withdraws at one point to the extent of saying: 
"I do not think that more than a dozen of the poems demand 
or admit, because of their complexity, widely different 
interpretations".^ But on the next page he adds: "But I 
believe it is misleading to regard every poem as a self-
2 
sufficient whole needing no ancillary comment..." because 
if we do not understand fully the esoteric basis of 
Yeats's thought, Henn argues, we would miss some 
magnificent poetic metaphors and also "meaning in depth". 
In other words, despite his disclaimer, Henn still 
believes that Yeats's work is essentially private and 
incomplete: "...for Yeats, as for Shakespeare, it is 
necessary to consider the work as parts of a whole which 
approaches an epic totality. With that in mind, the 
experience of the individual work emerges in its 
completeness, and then, (and only then) it affords the 3 
opportunity to assess its total impact". Henn's attitude 
towards symbolism explains his assumptions. Consider the 
passage quoted in my introduction: 
1 
Henn, p.xix. 
2 
Ibid., p.XX. 
3 
Ibid., p.xxi. 
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We must realize that the "reality" expressed by 
the symbol is, in terms of an algebraic analysis, 
infinitely complex; and though the variation of 
meaning is decreased by the selective impact of 
one S3anbol upon another, the total effect must 
always be that of a richly cumulative but 
indeterminate complexity.^ 
It is evident that Henn believes that symbols are 
expressive of meaning rather than constitutive and that 
symbols in literature are extractable from their contexts, 
being inter-relatable because of their reference meaning. 
For this reason Henn's treatment of the poems is commonly 
fragmentary, symbols and images from different poems 
being juxtaposed with one another, as well as with 
quotations and references from Yeats's prose and other 
sources. 
In his chapter on "Image and Symbol" Henn suggests 
that a poet "can establish his symbolism, and suggest its 
values, by one of three methods"; by relating them to a 
historical or mythological tradition; by the use of 
archetypal symbols; or through the creation of a personal 
mythology, (once again pointing to the fact that Henn 
believes that it is external reference that determines the 
symbol's meaning). As he proposes to approach Yeats's use 
of the symbol through a consideration of the "dominants", 
examining their implications "to suggest how they develop 
and fuse with the minor symbols", such a classification 
might have proved useful if the pre-suppositions behind it 
were sound. That is, if this was the major way in which a 
poet established his symbolism and suggested its values, 
it should be possible to see the "dominant" symbols in one 
1 
Henn, p.xiv, p.xi above. 
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or other of these categories. In fact, though, Henn does 
not appear to be able to give the symbols any consistent 
or convincing alignment within this scheme: the tower, the 
sword, are part traditional, part archetypal, part 
personal; the swan, the heron, are part traditional, part 
dependent "on the recognition of their cumulative 
significance in a number of poems". This atomistic 
approach not only does little to elucidate the symbols, it 
also often leaves both symbol and poem in a state of 
confusion. 
As an example, consider Henn's discussion of the 
linking of the tower and sword symbols in the poem "A 
Dialogue of Self and Soul". Although he says that "Those 
symbols are expanded in the "Dialogue" into a system 
carefully balanced with an almost intellectual precision 
to establish the inter-relations of meaning",^ Henn does 
not proceed to examine this balancing in the poem as might 
be expected, but takes the tower and the sword as separate 
symbols and refers them to the poem and to any other 
associations which he finds relevant. Noting, for instance, 
that the primary sjonbolic meaning of the sword is obvious, 
he goes on: 
But it was particularly appropriate in other 
ways. Symons writes of "Students of magic, who 
have the sharp and swift swords of the soldier". 
The scabbard-connections are emphasised by the 
royal attributes of the silk and gold upon it 
and we remember, perhaps, Byron's lyric. The 
sword is consecrated,...for the Japanese warrior 
is holy like the magician and the hermit. Its 
blade is like a looking-glass, the mirror of 
1 
Henn, p.13^. 
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objective man: it is "unspotted by the 
centuries". It is also, perhaps, a symbol of 
the will. "We possess nothing but the will and 
we must never let the children of vague desires 
breathe upon it nor the waters of sentiment rust 
the terrible mirror of its blade".^ 
Of these points, the only one which is thoroughly 
relevant to the poem is the consecrated nature of the 
sword, which suggests that human struggle and conflict may 
also have a religious value for man. Royalty, in 
particular, is not an exact description of the scabbard's 
binding, and it is not the scabbard, but the silk which is 
being emphasised: 
That flowering, silken old embroidery, torn 
From some court-lady's dress and round 
The wooden scabbard bound and wound, 
Can, tattered, still protect, faded adorn. 
About it lie 
Flowers from I know not what embroidery -
Heart's purple - . . . ^  
The gold that Henn mentions comes from another poem, 
"Syrobols" ("Gold-sewn silk on the sword-blade. Beauty and 
fool together laid".); in this poem it is the elements of 
high culture and femininity which are stressed. As Henn 
himself notes, "The embroidery is 'flowering', with a 
double value in the word, for the significance of past 3 
love is continued in the present". The silk is "torn 
1 
Henn, pp.134-5, Symons, p . ¥ a d e , Letters of W.B. Yeats 
1954, pp.434-5. 
2 
c.p. , pp.265-6. 
3 
Henn, p.135-
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from some court-lady's dress", accentuating the most 
exciting and violent aspects of life: love and war, both 
exalted by the richness of suggestion about the fullness 
of possibility of life in an aristocratic society where 
culture, freedom and intensity of emotion, physical 
vigour and beauty are the cardinal values. 
Byron's "For the sword outwears its sheath. And the 
soul wears out the breast" is the most confusing of Henn's 
allusions here, giving an almost opposite meaning to 
Yeats's. It is a clear example of the kind of wildly 
inappropriate importation of external ideas which can 
occur when the symbol is extracted from its context and 
treated as self-contained idea. And Henn's other 
suggestions in the passage quoted are equally unhelpful 
with respect to the understanding of Yeats's use of the 
sword-image in the poem. If the sword was appropriate 
because Symons had associated it with students of magic, 
it was so only with respect to Yeats himself. There is 
nothing in the poem to indicate that Yeats was a student 
of magic; the dialogue is expressed in much more 
generally understood terms (see discussion, pp.l40-l). 
Similarly, Yeats's comment on the sword as a symbol of 
will, although bearing some relation to the statement of 
the poem, provides only a very weak and generalised 
approximation to a part of it. The declaration of self-
assertion and of a willed self-forgiveness certainly 
emerges from the poem, but it is opposed to a willed 
transcendence, not to "vague desires". If it is only in 
heaven that we can lose the opposition between will and 
desire, according to the poem, yet it requires great 
concentration, a willed loss of self, to reach that state, 
More important, if the sword is a "symbol of the will" in 
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the poem, only the poem can show it to be so, and Henn's 
uncertainty about the point reflects this. The 
association of mirror and blade with "will" in one place 
carries no guarantee that mirror and blade necessarily 
have the same association in another. ("Mirror" in part 
two of the poem obviously has quite other connotations, as 
does "sword-blade" in the line from "S3anbols" quoted 
above). 
The tower is treated no less capriciously, its 
meaning in the poem being subjugated to external 
references. "The tower, like the sword-blade", says Henn, 
"is 'unspotted by the centuries'", and to prove this quotes 
from "Blood and the Moon":^ 
Seven centuries have passed and it is pure, 
The blood of innocence has left no stain. 
Yet in "Dialogue" the "broken, crumbling battlement" is 
set with deliberate paradox against "Sato's ancient blade, 
still as it was. Still razor-keen, still like a looking-
glass Unspotted by the centuries". Nevertheless, Henn 
does have a valid point. He continues, "At the outset, 
then, the two opposing symbols have an intimate connection 
in purity, independence of human repentance that "keeps 
the heart impure", which is true, although it is not 
apparent at the outset, only in the second part and 
through the paradoxical contrast of such images as the 
mirror and the fountain/ditch/blindness associations. The 
purity of the tower in "Blood and the Moon" is not 
1 
c.p., p.269. 
2 
Henn, p.135. 
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intrinsic to the tower but depends on the light of the 
moon shining on its floor. Similarly the tower in "A 
Dialogue of Self and Soul" only has value as a path of the 
imagination away from the impurities of earth, but it is 
misleading to argue that it is therefore also "unspotted 
by the centuries". To derive one's understanding of the 
tower in this poem from what is said about it in "Blood 
and the Moon" would be to invite chaos because it would 
then stand as another emblem of war and mundane power 
instead of contrasting with the sword. And this is 
precisely what Henn does, adducing so many associations 
for this "symbol" that it cannot be wondered at that he 
should consider symbolism ineffable: 
The tower is the emblem of the night of war, of 
violence, of man's aspirations to philosophy, of 
the decay of civilisation, of ancient ceremony, 
disintegrating in the face of the world - "the 
broken crumbling battlements".^ 
Thi5 example is quite typical of Henn's treatment of 
the poetry throughout the book. Because he looks away 
from the poems, taking the symbols as separable entities 
and the meaning as a direct projection of the artist's 
being, meanings are constrained and made doubtful, and 
obscurity is created where none need exist, the critic's 
own insights into the poems suffering along with the rest. 
Henn's most characteristic response to the uncertainty 
induced by his misconception of the nature of S3rmbol is to 
attempt to establish categories or underlying s3mimetries 
in Yeats's usages and development. Like Melchiori, he 
1 
Henn, p.134, 
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turns to relationships between Yeats's imagery and that of 
other works of art because 
...we are helped to perceive the unifying 
principles of Yeats' use of S3mibols. Their 
apparent arbitrariness and confusion vanishes, 
and they can be seen as clearly related to his 
six great periods of human myth and history and 
thought;...^ 
It is perhaps unnecessary to add that these relationships 
are no more satisfactorily established than are those 
purporting to relate the "kinds" of symbol. Nor is the 
"apparent arbitrariness and confusion" of the symbols 
reduced, as it could not be by even the most precise 
knowledge of sources if the poem does not fully establish 
its symbolism. It is no help to know that the imagery of 
the third stanza of "News for the Delphic Oracle" 
corresponds in many details with a Poussin painting once 
entitled "The Marriage of Peleus and Thetis" (since re-
catalogued as "Acis and Galatea"), or that the tree half 
flame and half green leaf probably came from the 
Mabinogion. If it were necessary to know such references 
the artist should have alluded to them in such a way that 
the reader would be able to find them without recondite would be 
researches, and if he did not, the poems^-a^^ to that 
extent arbitrary and unable to function naturally as 
literary symbols. 
Henn attempts to subdue his uncertainty about Yeats's 
symbolism by finding relationships to external sources and 
patterns within the poet's thought. F.A.C. Wilson is 
equally uncertain and even more directly and overtly 
1 
H e n n , p . 2 6 4 . 
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intentionalist in his approach. Wilson claims to be 
"using the technique which will show us what Yeats meant 
by his poems at the time he wrote them". His interest is 
in "what the symbols meant for the poet himself", and his 
method is to use key poems and plays to illustrate Yeats's 
"symbology".^ This brings him closer to individual poems 
than Henn, but, as Wilson himself realises, "A study of 
intentional meaning tends,..., to become a study of the 
2 
intellectual sub-structure", and he is consequently 
committed to investigations into Yeats's esoteric 
interests. Moreover, as a result of the necessary 
uncertainty of the intentionalist approach, and because he 
feels that Yeats's basic religious ideas (instead of his 
sjrmbolic usage, as Henn) require defense against charges 3 
of privacy and eccentricity, Wilson can hardly make any 
comment on the text without feeling it necessary to 
reinforce or justify his statement by reference to some 
external authority, usually in Yeats's prose, but also in 
the fields of philosophy, history and religion behind the 
poet's thought. "In case this reading is thought 
conjectural, I had better confirm it by cross-reference to 
Yeats's prose,..."; "On the Boiler contains a strong 
attack on modern egalitarian India, and this bears me out 
in enforcing on the final couplet above the interpretation 
I have done:..."; "Vivienne Koch's analysis of this verse 
stanza three of "The Statues" becomes a shambles because 
1 
Yeats's Iconography, I96O, pp.l3-l4. 
2 
Ibid., p.17. 
3 
See above. Introduction, p.x, Wilson, p . 1 7 . 
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she does not understand (though Yeats explains it in a 
letter to Edith Shackleton Heald) that these lines 
describe the importation of Greek statuary into India by 
" 1 Alexander's armies .... 
These imported materials repeatedly beguile Wilson 
away from the work he is supposedly discussing, and induce 
him to apply to the work erroneous and confusing ideas. 
The poem referred to in the quotations given above, "The 
Statues", is an excellent example. (it is also one of the 
poems discussed in this thesis in chapter three, pp.199-208), 
The second comment quoted above, for instance, refers to 
the lines: 
When gong and conch declare the hour to bless 
Grimalkin crawls to Buddha's emptiness. 
Part of Wilson's gloss of these lines is: 
...the modern Indian worshipper, who has been 
caught up in the materialist 'tide' and has 
become almost wholly objective, so that his true 
gods are the witch's cat and the dragon-monster 
of Eastern art, even today at the hour of prayer 
is ironically compelled to pay homage to 
subjective religion.2 
This is obviously fallacious with respect to the poem. 
Why is the worshipper himself referred to in the poem as 
Grimalkin if we are to think of this as his god, and what 
exactly is the dragon-monster? It is not satisfactory to 
explain the first point away as some kind of metonymy 
without a close examination of the rest of the stanza. 
1 
Wilson, pp.300, 301, 299. 
2 
Ibid., p.301. 
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when the other cat association, as well as other elements 
of the structure, discount this possibility (see my 
discussion, p.204) . The dragon-monster evidently comes 
from Wilson's investigations of Eastern religion and not 
from the poem. He further glosses this line: 
If we are connoisseurs in Eastern art we shall 
connect with his last line those illustrations 
where the material world is symbolised by 
dragonish monsters and misshapen beasts, who 
prostrate themselves before an empty space 
symbolic of the Buddha's holiness, itself too 
sacred for pictorial delineation.! 
Wilson himself calls his reading of these lines 
"enforced", and it is clearly Wilson's reading of On the 
Boiler and his knowledge of Eastern religi on that are 
responsible for this enforcing. The last passage quoted 
shows plainly Wilson's initial assumption that Yeats was 
writing for an audience of initiates, for even if Yeats 
himself was such a connoisseur as Wilson suggests, it 
would be necessary to suppose that he expected his readers 
to be so also only if the lines made no sense without 
reference to such knowledge. 
It will be useful to compare Wilson's treatment of 
this poem with that of Vivienne Koch, whom Wilson 
acknowledges as the source of some of his ideas. This 
poem, she says, has not been discussed by other critics 
bee au s e 
...it presents a uniform front of obscurity 
which must prove irritating even to admirers of 
Yeats. But, happily, it is one poem. 
1 
Wilson, p.299. 
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increasingly few among the Last Poems, which the 
relative clarity of Yeats's prose in A Vision 
and elsewhere helps to illumine.^ 
This comment is interesting in view of Miss Koch's 
declaration in her introduction that she intends, first, 
to approach the poems with "a willingness to let that 
particular poem take hold of the imagination as if it 
were - at the moment of scrutiny - the only poem in the 
world"^ second, "to let only that particular poem and no 
other source - whether in poetry or in prose - determine, 
in so far as is possible, what its meaning is". And she 
adds "This means a trust in the poem, which, if we cannot 
2 
give it, should make us suspect it as poetry". From this 
beginning it would not seem likely that there would be 
much similarity between her approach and Wilson's, but the 
purpose of her italicised passage is evident when we 
consider the above comment on "The Statues". 
Despite her statement about trust in the poem. Miss 
Koch does not appear to "suspect this poem as poetry" as 
her treatment of it would suggest. Admitting that the 
real test of the poem's alleged obscurity would be to see 
how far the poem could be understood without prose props. 
Miss Koch yet makes no attempt to apply it, explaining 
that she cannot assume a fictive innocence of the 
knowledge of the rest of Yeats's work, no matter how 
desirable it may be for independent responses. In other 
words, she allows her reading of the prose to influence 
her reading of the poem, implying that she finds the poem 
1 
W.B. Yeats. The Tragic Phase, 1951, p. 59. 
2 
Ibid., p.8. (Author's italics). 
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obscure. It may be true that she could not entirely 
ignore her knowledge of the prose, but it is possible to 
re-apply such knowledge to the poem, allowing the poem to 
produce its own meaning by suggestion and limitation in 
the same way as it must at the verbal level. In the 
result, Wilson says of her reading of the poem, "one reads 
"The Statues"J by the light of Vivienne Koch, whose 
reconstruction of the sources is perhaps her best piece of 
Yeats scholarship".^ 
There are various passages in Yeats's prose which 
bear a resemblance, sometimes quite close , to passages 
from this poem, and these are quoted again and again by 
2 
various critics. But these passages, like all the other 
external material, almost always do more to confuse than 
to clarify the poem's meaning, and for the same reasons: 
where they confirm a dubious reading they may be helpful 
although they then reflect on the poem's integrity, but 
more often they are simply substituted for the poem which 
is then stretched and twisted to include all their meaning. 
Thus, ¥ilson agrees with Miss Koch that a memory of Maud 
Gonne "gave rise to" this poem. The main source for this 
statement is a passage from the Autobiographies; 
...her face, like the face of some Greek statue, 
showed little thought, her whole body seemed a 
master-work of long labouring thought, as though 
a Scopas had measured and calculated, consorted 
with Egyptian sages, and mathematicians out of 
Babylon, that he might out-face even Artemisia's 
sepulchral image with a living norm. 
1 
Wilson, p.290. 
2 
E.g. Ellmann, Koch, MacNeice, Mulryne, Saul, Seiden, Ure, 
etc. - almost every critic who discusses the poem, in fact 
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But in that ancient civilisation 
abstract thought scarce existed, while she rose 
but partially and for a moment out of raging 
abstraction;...^ 
Wilson comments on this passage: 
Here, as well as the statue-symbolism, we have 
the suggestion of those "sepulchral" or as he 
says in "A Bronze Head" "supernatural" values 
which Yeats saw in Maud Gonne's beauty, together 
with an imagery of mensuration and computation 
that recur in "The Statues"; and also (as if to 
point the relevance of the passage) in [The Only 
Jealousy of Emer. 
Since Wilson does not say exactly what the recurrence of 
these ideas is relevant to it must be assumed that he is 
referring to the poet's habits of thought. Thus, Wilson 
asserts that although "all eventually depends" on Yeats's 
theory of sculpture in interpreting this poem, "we ought 
not to overlook the personal element in his assertion 
that the subjective artists penetrated to the Idea of 
3 
beauty itself". It was through Maud Gonne, Wilson says, 
that Yeats himself penetrated to the Idea of beauty. 
At the least, this is an over-simplification, but 
that is less important than the fact that the poem is made 
to appear private (the very point against which Wilson is 
supposed to be defending Yeats) in a manner which is quite 
unnecessary. The reasons for linking Maud Gonne with the 
poem are the associations with Greek statuary, the idea 
that measuring and calculation can produce a certain type 
1 
W.B. Yeats, Autobiographies, 1955, pp.364-5. 
2 
Wilson, p.122. 
3 
Ibid., p.295. 
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of beauty, and the relation of this idea to an ideal of 
non-abstract thought. These factors are present in the 
poem, but there is no mention, or even hint of Maud Gonne 
there: nor is it necessary to an understanding of the poem 
that she should be taken into consideration.^ Yeats shows 
in the poem how an ideal human form, the result of an 
understanding of the universe which is both formal and 
organic, can become the focus of human aspirations. It 
may be further questioned whether Maud Gonne is in fact 
relevant to the sources of the poem, should these be 
required. Despite Wilson's statement, it is doubtful 
whether she is primary to the ideas of Pythagorean 
wholeness of vision and the cyclical theory of life and 
history which underlie the poem. 
Another important "source" is found by Wilson and 
Miss Koch in the Autobiographies, in a passage in which 
Yeats describes statues of Mausolus and Artemisia in the 
British Museum as 
...private, half-animal, half-divine figures, 
all unlike the Grecian athletes and Egyptian 
kings in their near neighbourhood... images of an 
unpremeditated joyous energy, that neither I nor 
any other man, racked by doubt and inquiry, can 
achieve...a half-anonymous artistry.2 
"This passage", Miss Koch says, "must be put against the 
whole of "The Statues" which, complex though it is, 
nevertheless finds its centre in the antithesis Yeats 
makes between thoughtlessness and abstraction". 
1 
See discussion below, p.209. 
2 
P.150. 
3 
Koch, p.62. 
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At first sight this appears to be a useful and 
sensible comment on the poem, but in fact it is not quite 
accurate: the terms of this opposition require 
qualification. In the first two stanzas the ideal forms 
of the statues are said to lack character, but they are 
not "thoughtless", in so far as they are the result of 
both thought and effort. The same must be said of the 
Buddha's apparent emptiness. And finally, in the fourth 
stanza, the antithesis proposed is once again between 
abstraction and the combination of thought and instinct 
which the Irish are to achieve by returning to the springs 
of wholeness of vision which began with Pythagoras. 
Throughout the poem the effort of attaining such an ideal 
state is stressed, and the concept of unity of being that 
Wilson dissects out from Yeats's prose emerges quite 
clearly from the poem, being based there firmly on 
calculation and measurement, and on the quality of form, 
rather than being associated with "an unpremeditated 
joyous energy". 
Once again, the passage is similar to the poem in 
some ways, but there is no reason why it "must be put 
against the whole of "The Statues". Miss Koch allows it 
to over-ride the poem to the extent that she does not 
recognise the function of calculation and measurement in 
achieving the "anonymity" of the statues. "It is 
typical", she says, "of the tortuous processes of Yeats's 
thinking that he should write a poem in dispraise of 
intellect or "abstractions" and, in the end, arrive at an 
endorsement of that which he had thought to despise".^ 
1 
Koch, pp.73 -4 . 
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With such an odd opinion of Yeats's thinking, it is hardly 
surprising that Miss Koch should assume a private basis 
for this poem. She goes on: "These oddly oscillating 
loyalties wrote such a mercurial line in his work, that, 
by the time of the difficult late poems, we cannot safely 
assign any single belief even to a single poem". 
It is noticeable that Wilson is able to improve on 
Miss Koch's interpretation by relating her external 
references to the poem. Thus, where she sees a 
reminiscence of Blake's "Visions of the Daughters of 
Albion" in the lines: 
But boys and girls, pale from the imagined love 
Of solitary beds, knew what they were. 
That passion could bring character enough, 
And pressed at midnight in some public place 
Live lips upon a plummet-measured face. 
and quotes these lines for comparison: 
The moment of desire.' The moment of desire.' The 
Virgin That pines for man shall awaken her womb to enormous 
joys In the secret shadows of her chamber: the youth shut 
up from The lustful joy shall forget to generate and create 
an enormous image 
In the shadows of his curtains and in the folds of 
his silent pillow. 
Wilson notes that this quotation is matter for contrast as 
well as comparison since Blake is deploring the shutting 
away of young desire from contact with others and the 
consequent turning inward to "enormous joys". Wilson adds 
the succeeding lines to the Blake quotation: 
Are not these the places of religion, the rewards of 
continence The self-enjoyings of self-denial? 
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with the comment that Yeats's adolescents are less fallen 
than these; "imagined love" has led them beyond the sexual 
into the archetypal world and they are therefore able to 
understand the true religious significance of Pythagoras' 
statues".^ 
But Wilson adds many interpolations of his own, such 
as that already quoted on the Indian worshipper of Buddha, 
which threaten to drown out the poem. Before he approaches 
the text of the poem Wilson defends it against D.S. 
2 
Savage's attack on Yeats's "inhumanity" by arguing that in 
the last stanza Yeats is not merely being narrowly 
partisan, but is "judging transcendentally"; using as 
evidence another poem, "A Bronze Head", and, more 
reasonably but without supporting argument, the statement 
that the "ultimate intention" of the poem is to "set up 
against objective "multiplicity" a great image of "the 
3 
One". There follows a further digression (Wilson's own 
words) into Yeats's theory of sculpture, in which Wilson 
discusses Unity of Being in terms of alchemical discipline 
and then develops "Yeats' idea of the tradition of the 
subjective artist" in sculpture, comparing it with the 
theories of Spengler. After this comes the digression into 
the "personal element" in Yeats's theory of the ideal: 
Maud Gonne, including some discussion of classical 
statuary as "philosophy in action". 
1 
Wilson, p.297. 
2 
IJ^  The Permanence of Yeats, ed. J. Hall and M. Steinmann 
1950, pp.173-194. 
3 Wilson, p.292. 
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Many of the points with which Wilson deals in this 
protracted introduction to the poem are fundamental to its 
meaning, but without exception they could have been more 
profitably discussed with reference to the text rather 
than to a miscellany of Yeats's other writings. Much of 
Wilson's effort is spent in establishing the validity of 
Yeats's materials, and he is clearly more at home in this 
sort of comment than in his actual criticism of the poem, 
where his nervous habit of grasping at any reference-
meaning which seems to be relevant frustrates his natural 
percipience and common sense. 
Although my illustrations have been confined to this 
one poem, I do not think this falsifies Wilson's work 
essentially. The statements in his introduction point 
directly to the kind of approach evident here, and his 
method does not vary radically throughout his two books. 
Further examples would merely echo what is seen in his 
extended treatment of this poem. Miss Koch is in a 
different category inasmuch as her theory is 
unexceptionable, but is not borne out consistently in her 
practice, although she does contribute some valuable 
insights when theory and practice coalesce. 
So many critics have assumed the necessity of Yeats's 
prose for the interpretation of the poetry that it has 
even been justified as being "the usual critical practice".^ 
Even Richard Ellman, in the appendix to his valuable book 
on Yeats's poetic development, states that in order to 
clarify obscurities and throw light on methods of 
composition his discussions of individual poems include 
1 
Edward Engelberg, The Vast Design, 1964, p.l90. 
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not only analysis and paraphrase but also "make use of 
collateral material, published and unpublished, when this 
is of help". The list of critics who, tacitly or 
deliberately, assume the necessity of relating the poetry 
to something non-metaphorical includes Virginia Moore, 
Jeffares, Macneice, Engelberg, Saul, Unterecker, Schwartz. 
p 
Tho list is long)—and nood not—stop here. Jeffares gives 
biographical explanations of how the poems came to be 
written and factual explanations of details within the 
poetry. Virginia Moore"^ extrapolates the poetry back into 
traditional doctrinal systems, attempting to force Yeats 
into an acceptable Christian, or at least not anti-4 5 Christian, mould. Saul and Unterecker quote external 
material widely in their readings of individual poems. 
Delmore Schwartz^ questions the limits of "legitimate 
interpre tat 
ion" and follows Blackmur's suggestion for a 
system of interpretation of Yeats's poems like the four-
level interpretation of Dante, in order to allow for the 
possibility of "fruitful misinterpretation" and to 
incorporate Yeats's esoteric thought and his romanticism. 
In this way the greatness of the writing may be elucidated 
The Identity of Yeats, 195^, p.251. 
2 
A. Norman Jeffares, W.B. Yeats. Man and Poet, 19^9. 
3 
The Unicorn, 1954. 
4 
George Brandon Saul, Prolegomena to the Study of Yeats's 
Poems, 1957. 
5 
John Unterecker, A Reader's Guide to William Butler Yeats, 
1959. 
6 
"An Unwritten Book", Southern Review VII (l94l), pp.426-
441. Also in , pp.277-295. 
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"without forgetting the inferior quality of the emotions 
and attitudes embodied in the writing".^ 
Despite an earnest attempt to arrive at a view of 
poetry which could accommodate Yeats's antagonism to the 
scientific modern world, MacNeice's book is a tissue of 
contradictions. Yeats's poetry, MacNiece says, is less 
esoteric than it is often represented to be, yet A Vision 
is the "book of reference" for the later poetry. Yeats 
used his private symbolism comparatively little, yet his 
symbols are "mostly sanctioned by literature or by his own 
peculiar philosophy". Yeats as a poet is characterised by 
integrity, but he is not wholly sincere: he pretends to 
mysticism, talks nonsense, poses, suppresses, exaggerates 
and misrepresents. That Yeats was no mystic was not 
necessarily a liability, yet "Yeats's would-be mystical 
reactions to external objects cannot be compared, even as 
ingredients for poetry with the more genuine mystical 
reactions of others". "Pseudo-passions", MacNeice says, 
are not "just as good - even in poetry - as real passions". 
Yeats disguised his lack of true mystical experience by 
attempting a rigid symbolic algebra. This did not succeed: 
the symbols are always fusing and changing, but such 
imprecision need not be disadvantageous since a poem may 
be more effective because it was not perfectly understood 
by the poet. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the notion 
of the unconscious by poets causes them to cease censoring 
images whose significance they cannot define, leading to 
the introduction of private symbols into poetry and hence 
to obscurity, as in some of Yeats's later poetry. 
1 
Schwartz, p.485, P.Y., p.290. 
2 
Louis MacNeice, The Poetry of W.B. Yeats, 19^1, pp.19, 
175, 138, 230, 229, 12, 230, 183, 139, 138, 137-
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MacNeice maintains that a poem is valuable in two 
interconnected ways: in its self-coherence and in its 
correspondence to life. Poetry in itself can only be 
experienced, not analysed, he argues, and values within 
poetry do not need external validity. The latter stands 
liable to contiT'ovGrt tliG SGcond fo-ctorj "coirrGSponciGncG to 
life", but MacNeice does not reconcile the two and, 
despite his statement that the relationship of poetry to 
life cannot be defined, he assumes and uses such a 
relationship as the major criterion for both poet and 
poetry. He aims, he says, only to give the background for 
the poetry. This cannot account for the poetry, he adds, 
since the background gives merely the "conditions" and not 
the "cause" of the poetry. Evidently MacNeice would like 
to be able to find this complete external explanation or 
reference for a poem. In consequence, his attitude 
towards the poetry is entirely equivocal. His judgment of 
the poetry's self-coherence is hindered, if not prohibited, 
by his assumption of the poet's irresponsibility and 
philosophical poverty. "The thought taken from its 
context is esoteric and, indeed, unsound, but that does 
not matter for it is perfectly fused into the poetry",^ 
MacNeice says, but in fact, because he mistrusts the 
external validity of Yeats's values, he is unable to 
accept their internal validity and finds the poet insincere. 
Both beliefs and emotions in poetry he considers to be 
better if, somehow, we know they are real, if, that is to 
say, we have some external corroboration or conviction of 
their legitimacy. MacNeice argues at length for an 
internal criterion for poetry which he is unable to apply 
1 
MacNeice, p.l35. 
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in practice because he removes the possibility of 
examining the poetry itself by assuming it to be totally 
inexplicable, and looks instead for external certitude. 
Edward Engelberg begins an article on the acceptance 
and understanding of Yeats by the present generation of 
students with an attack on the New Criticism, which he 
claims is finally invalidated because the close 
examination of dark and light image clusters, archetypal 
birth and death patterns, puns and ironic ambiguities of 
structure and language in the end leaves the poetry 
unexplained and meaningless. This view of New Criticism 
as emptying literature of all but its own catchwords, 
ignoring the meanings of the poem's words, has the 
familiar result of persuading the critic that extra-
literary concerns must be re-introduced into criticism. 
Yeats in particular is less susceptible than other modern 
poets to a purely intrinsic approach, Engelberg says, and 
asks 
who can teach Yeats for very long without at 
least mentioning that: Yeats was an Irishman, 
was the son of a painter, lived and wrote well 
into early fame in the nineteenth, not the 
twentieth century, loved a lady called Maud Gonne, 
with whom he disagreed on political issues, these 
political issues having to do with Ireland's 
struggle for independence, was a senator when he 
wrote 'Among School Children', admired Byzantine 
culture, lived in a tower, believed in a pattern 
of cyclical history, valued the ethos of 
Renaissance vertu, power and sweetness, was an 
unorthodox Christian, and used the words 'moon' 
and 'gyre' in ways that had much to do with his 
conception of life and history.^ 
1 
"The New Generation and the Acceptance of Yeats", D.E.S. 
Maxwell and S.B. Bushrui, eds., ¥.B. Yeats. Centenary 
Essays, ±965, pp.90-91. 
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Although it is true that many of these things would 
probably be mentioned eventually, to mention them without 
reference to the poems from which they mostly become 
obvious would be wasted effort. Consider the list: 
Yeats's Irishness is surely obvious; his family background 
emerges from the poems to some extent, and very little 
additional information is strictly necessary for 
understanding the poetry; Yeats's part in the development 
of literature from the nineteenth to the twentieth century 
is certainly of interest, but it also requires to be based 
on evidence best gained by close examination of the poetry; 
Maud Gonne's name is totally unnecessary to an 
understanding of the poems; that Yeats disagreed with a 
woman he loved on a question of Irish (and general) 
politics becomes obvious from the poems; there is no need 
to know more about the "smiling public man" than the poem 
tells us; that the poet lived in a tower, or said he did, 
is perfectly obvious; so also is his belief in or poetical 
use of cyclical patterns in history; and his admiration of 
some Renaissance qualities; his "unorthodox Christianity" 
is dubious; his use of certain words is important where 
they occur in the poetry, and the ways in which he uses 
them emerges most relevantly from the poetry. If the 
class want to know whether Yeats had anyone special in 
mind in "No Second Troy" is it ascribable to anything more 
appropriate to a course in literature than mere human 
curiosity? The personal interest is not the critical, 
says W.K. Wimsatt,^ and although it is no doubt natura 
and proper when developed for its own sake, it can be 
1 
The Verbal Icon, p.265. 
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applied to the work of literature only in the most general 
way since it concentrates only on the subject and not on 
the achieved symbol of the work, and there is no certain 
relationship between them. 
Another critic of the New Critics is G.S. Fraser, who 
agrees with John Bayley^ that the works of the romantic 
poets do not lend themselves to techniques of close 
criticism because we respond to them before we analyse 
them. The trouble with the New Criticism, Fraser says, is 
that many critics tend to substitute a rigid method of 
analysis for what was originally intended only as an 
approach. The validity of the approach is restricted to 
testing the conclusions previously arrived at in the first 
reading of a poem, which must be made without having 
analysis in mind. Against this it may be argued that the 
primary literary judgment of a trained and receptive mind 
would surely tend to take account of more and subtler 
details in a poem than would the untrained, and in fact 
Fraser's own readings in this essay pay more attention to 
the words of the poems than do those of the "New Critics" 
he is chastising. 
Fraser applies his strictures to two essays, one by 
Walter Houghton which is concerned with the Crazy Jane 
poems and includes among them "I am of Ireland", and the 
essay by Delmore Schwartz mentioned earlier which includes 
2 a discussion of part of "Among School Children". These 
1 
G.S. Fraser, Vision and Rhetoric, 1959; John Bayley, The 
Romantic Survival, I96O. 
2 
"Yeats and Crazy Jane: The Hero in Old Age", P.Y.. 
pp.327-3^8; "An Unwritten Book", P.Y.. pp.277-295. 
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critics arrive at highly aberrant readings of the poems as 
a result of applying the "strict isolating methods of 
mathematical, logical, or grammatical analysis" of New-
Criticism, Fraser argues. Houghton, for instance, states 
that "I am of Ireland" is set in a pub somewhere outside 
of Ireland where there is a drunken orchestra, and centres 
on a theme of simple tragic contrast between the holy and 
unholy dances of charity and lust. The woman is Crazy 
Jane, the man Jack the Journeyman. Strangely, this man is 
both "stately", for which Houghton selects from the 
dictionary meanings:"showing a sense of superiority, 
repellantly dignified, not affable or approachable", and 
also coarse and vulgar: he "gives her the wink, and agrees 
that there's no time to lose: they better get going".^ 
Fraser points out that this misrepresents both the 
situation and the poem. The woman is not like Crazy Jane, 
"stately" need not imply anything repellant, and the man 
is more dignified and less vulgar than Houghton suggests. 
But such misreading can hardly be attributed to close 
attention to the poem, mechanical or otherwise. Houghton 
in fact only deals with half the poem in any detail, and 
that receives a very perfunctory reading. 
Maintaining that "Yeats's poems, impressive 
individually, are even more impressive as a coherent and 
continuous body of work: and the subject matter of many of 
them comes directly, of many more indirectly, from his own 
2 
biography", Fraser stays closer to the poem in producing 
his own reading, but also introduces details from Yeats's 
biography and fragments from his other poems to illustrate 
1 
P.Y., p.340. 2 
Fraser, p.73• 
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the poet's feelings about modern Ireland. On this basis 
he argues that the poem is about the ironic interrelations 
of the realistic and romantic attitudes, in particular 
with respect to legendary Ireland and its modern 
counterpart. 
The latter idea arises from Eraser's introduction of 
biographical material to create a suggested setting for 
the poem - although he has partially admitted earlier that 
this is unnecessary - resulting in Fraser's taking the 
protagonist of the poem to be Yeats in person, who had 
been in exile from Ireland and who loved its legendary 
past and not its actual present. But this narrows the 
poem's range and reduces its status unduly. It seems 
unlikely that Yeats would have been guilty of such a lapse 
in taste as to give a man we are to think of as himself 
such distinction amongst the crowd: 
One man, one man alone 
In that outlandish gear, 
One solitary man 
Of all that rambled there 
Had turned his stately head. 
The man may perhaps be a poet in the outlandish present 
responding,albeit reluctantly and sardonically, to the 
call to the Holy Land of Ireland, with its suggestions of 
some romantic and mystical destiny or place associated 
with art, but that is a very different thing from being 
the poet as himself. 
Similarly, in dealing with Delmore Schwartz's 
interpretation of the sixth stanza of "Among School 
Children", in which he suggests that Aristotle may be seen 
as playing with his theory of the universe (the celestial 
spheres "against the bottom of the Prime Mover") absorbed 
97 
in his own life in contempt for nature, although Fraser 
condemns Schwartz for being excessively analytical, he 
appeals for evidence against Schwartz to Yeats's precision 
of language, and to the fact that "Yeats's imagery is 
sometimes fantastic, but never merely grotesque". Once 
again, Fraser himself applies the principle of close 
attention to the poem, explaining that, although he 
dislikes paraphrase in general, it is necessary in 
correcting others and useful also for testing the "feeling 
that one understands" in "young and untrained readers". 
"There is a lazy and self-conceited way of closely 
examining a text as well as a lazy and self-conceited way 
of making a summary judgment on it",^ Fraser says, and this 
may also, I believe, be taken as a just comment on his own 
criticism of close textual examination. So intelligent a 
critic as Fraser may be justified to some extent in relying 
on subjective judgments, particularly if he is aware of 
the necessity of sensitive attention to the text. Even so, 
Fraser's own interpretation of the stanza is deflected 
somewhat by his initial judgment that Yeats is talking 
only about the philosphers' ageing selves rather than about 
their ideas and consequent attitudes towards life also. 
Ultimately, however, it is his refusal to grant the poetry 
that degree of self-determination which it must have in 
order to be seen as itself and not as a mere postscript to 
the poet's interests or philosophies or biography, and not 
simply his reliance on his own judgment, which leads 
Fraser, as with all the other critics discussed above, 
away from the poems and towards a justification of the 
poetry as part of a larger work, by implication an 
extension of the poet's life. 
_ 
Fraser, p.82. 
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III. The Poet as Mythmaker 
Peter Ure is another critic who, like T.R. Henn and 
F.A.C. Wilson, is unable to arrive at a stable position 
between defending the poet against charges of privacy and 
assuming privacy in his own treatment of the poet. As 
before, the result is that his practice follows his theory 
in being inconsistent and self-contradictory, making it 
appear that his conception of the function of criticism is 
the re-distribution of poetry among its psychological, 
historical and other elements, or the discovery of sources. 
Yet in his book. Towards A Mythology, Ure shows 
considerable insight into the nature of myth and symbol, 
only stopping short of a consistent and inter-related 
understanding of his own propositions. lire's interest is 
centred on one particular aspect of poetry and mythology, 
the presentation of personality, and this helps him to 
achieve an intensive view of one area of Yeats's poetry, 
even though his vision is less well focussed over the rest. 
Because mythology is a creation of the racial 
imagination, Ure says, the mythological figure serves as 
both individual and type. Myth is "that in which the 
passion of the individual and the abstraction of the idea 
without 1 cohere with loss to either", but this definition must be 
A 
extended to cover material which has indeed a similar 
poetic stimulus, but springs from the experience of the 
individual not the race. Two different conceptions of 
mythology are in evidence here. Ure has already proposed 
an "extended" usage of the word mythology to include both 
object and process, and he is here clearly attempting a 
1 
Towards A Mythology, 19^6, p.32. 
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definition of it as process, although he has not fully 
accepted it as such. He still regards mythology as a body 
of stories, mysteriously created by the "racial 
imagination". This is a concept comparable to the 
nineteenth century German scholarly pre-occupation with 
"folk" literature. The race is surely only a series of 
individuals, if with the common consensus behind them, 
each improving on the work of his predecessors, as with 
oral poetry. It seems unlikely that the mythological 
figure would be anything but an abstraction without the 
individual act of imagination. If lire had conceived of 
myth-making completely in the terms of his definition, as 
process, this extension of the definition to the individual 
poet would have been unnecessary. 
The effect of lire's incomplete acceptance of the 
concept of process does not stop there. He justifies his 
extension of the definition by considering Yeats's habit 
of universalising his friends' personalities. Yeats's 
poetry, he says, is essentially about people, including 
himself; and 
his system of philosophy as set forth in A Vision 
is to a great degree designed to explain and test 
character; his Autobiographies and many of his 
prose writings (the title Dramatis Personae is 
itself significant) are personal, anecdotal, much 
occupied with the lives and thoughts of the men 
and women he has known.^ 
In "The Tragic Generation", for instance, Ure says, Yeats 
creates a structure of myth to explain personalities and 
historical types, and he came to treat history as a matter 
of personality. Thus the poetry of the period which 
1 
Ure, p.25. 
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culminates in "In Memory of Major Robert Gregory" succeeds 
because the characters retain their unique individuality 
and yet become "the personal manifestation of the abstract 
idea". In the poems from "Easter I916" on, however, Ure 
finds a "weakening in the sense of personality", "...the 
indi vidual cannot become a 'hero' or absolute symbol 
because his unique humanity must also appear" Ure states.^ 
These poems show symbolist technique, Ure says, rather 
than mythological symbolism. In symbolist poetry there is 
the same pressure of abstract idea, the same 
integrity of outward form. But here it is not 
the living personality that is enhanced, but the 
symbol itself. The symbol,...brings with it an 
aura of suggestions and associations, which 
spread out in ever widening circles, whereas the 
mythological personality, like Robert Gregory's, 
tends to drop back into itself, to fill out its 
own casing and produce a richer and more complex, 
though less diffuse experience.2 
This argument shows the result of seeing symbolism as 
object rather than process. Ure does not relate the 
symbol to the context of the poems he considers, but takes 
it out and looks at it as an object. For instance, he 
says that 
In "On a Political Prisoner" it seems as if the 
poet is performing on an instrument whose notes 
pass almost beyond the range of human hearing. 
...Beyond any possible intellectual analysis of 
the final stanza stretches a whole world of 
fresh experience.... This experience takes us 
away from the political prisoner, who has 
become little but an object extruded and pushed 
away as the poem takes its upward l e a p . 3 
1 
Ure, p.32. 
2 
Ibid., p.49. 
3 Ibid., pp.49-50. 
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This is a sensitive and accurate response to the last 
stanza taken on its own. But the whole poem is concerned 
with freedom and imprisonment of mind and body, and the 
political prisoner is as much there in the final stanza as 
in the other three. 
It is true that this stanza does present the 
complexity of actual experience, but so should a 
presentation of the human personality if it is to retain 
that unique individuality which Ure so prizes. Other 
unities are possible than just the human personality. Ure 
is willing to accept the combination of abstract and 
immediate only if the idea is directly concerned with a 
particular human being, a definition which would preclude 
much primitive mythology. Moreover, when Ure discounts 
poetry which does not fit into his "extended" definition 
of mythology, he is not only artificially limiting the 
range of mythology, but is also stating that poetry is 
myth-making of this specific kind. "In 'The Statues' the 
creation of myth is indeed the pressing of live lips upon 
a plummet-measured face",^ Ure says, and Vivienne Koch 
tersely adds, "I cannot see that this hypothesis serves 
any useful purpose. Almost any poem in which the 
particular and the general unite, and this happens in many 
poems, would then be "myth". To be so generous in 
assigning myth robs this lately over-fashionable concept 
2 
of any validity it may yet confer". This is quite true, 
and underlines the pitfalls of subsuming s3nnbol to myth. 
When Ure says that myth is created when the personal and 
1 
Ure, p.27. 
2 
Koch, p.63. 
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the a b s t r a c t c o h e r e h e is s t i l l i n f a c t s e e i n g t h e t w o a s 
s e p a r a t e . H e is d e s c r i b i n g t h e r e s u l t , n o t t h e p r o c e s s o f 
s y m b o l i s a t i o n : " T h e p e r c e p t i o n o f f o r m a r i s e s f r o m t h e 
p r o c e s s o f s y m b o l i z a t i o n , a n d the p e r c e p t i o n o f f o r m is 
a b s t r a c t i o n " . U r e is r e a c h i n g t o w a r d s a c o n c e p t o f m y t h 
a n d s y m b o l a s e x p e r i e n c e , a c t i v i t y o r p r o c e s s , b u t h e 
l i m i t s h i m s e l f b y h i s o r i g i n a l p r e m i s e s a n d f a l l s b a c k o n 
t h e m o r e c o m m o n d i v i s i v e n e s s o f v i s i o n . 
U r e ' s n a r r o w p e r s p e c t i v e d e a l s o n l y w i t h t h e p e r s o n a l 
o t h e r , the o b j e c t i v e d r a m a t i c , i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n to t h e 
n o r m o f l y r i c p o e t r y , p r e c l u d i n g a l s o , it m a y b e a d d e d , 
m u c h o f the s u b s t a n c e o f A V i s i o n . T h i s l e a d s h i m to 
d e p r e c i a t e m o s t o f the m a j o r p o e t r y o f the l a t e r p e r i o d , 
i n w h i c h " t h e p o e t s u b s t i t u t e d h i s o w n p e r s o n a l i t y f o r the 
p 
m a n i f o l d a r r a y o f o t h e r m e n ' s " i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the 
" c l a s s i c a l p e r i o d " o f the R o b e r t G r e g o r y e l e g y . O n l y a t 
t h o s e m o m e n t s w h e n t h e p o e t a c h i e v e s a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f 
the o p p o s i n g e l e m e n t s i n h i s t h o u g h t t h r o u g h a n i m a g e 
w h i c h is "a s y m b o l , m y t h o l o g i c a l i n t h a t i t s p e c u l i a r 
f u n c t i o n i s the c o - i n h e r e n c e o f t h e o p p o s i n g e l e m e n t s " o f 
p a s s i o n a n d a b s t r a c t i o n , is t h e r e a n y v a l u e i n t h e s e p o e m s 
f o r U r e . H e d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r h o w m u c h v a l u e , o r e v e n 
s e n s e , t h e r e w o u l d b e i n the i m a g e o f the h a n g i n g o f 
A t t i s ' s i m a g e " b e t w e e n t h a t s t a r i n g f u r y a n d the b l i n d 
l u s h l e a f " w i t h o u t the r e s t o f " V a c i l l a t i o n " , o r i n the 
c h e s t n u t t r e e w i t h o u t the p o s i n g o f the p r o b l e m i n t e r m s 
o f a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e o f the b o d y a n d m i n d o f t h e e a r l i e r 
p a r t o f " A m o n g S c h o o l C h i l d r e n " . 
1 
L a n g e r , p . 3 9 -
2 
U r e , p . 5 0 . 
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Many of the later poems are dealt with in terms of A 
Vision, and lire's uncertain grasp of its nature affects 
his attitude towards the poetry. Despite the fact that at 
one point he says that Yeats avoided the danger of a 
private esotericism by constructing his own system rather 
than struggling to translate into verse philosophical 
concepts essentially foreign to his way of understanding, 
Ure nevertheless claims that A Vision is of first 
importance for the study of Yeats's work. The system 
provides answers to the perennial questions about reality, 
God and the soul, Ure says, however, "the method by which 
Yeats chose to answer these questions was entirely invalid 
if we suppose that he wanted to supply the answers for the 
use of others; but the answers had power to fulfil his own 
needs and those of his poetry".^ On the other hand, Ure 
states that the elements of these ideas that appear in the 
poetry must be referred to the complete system for full 
understanding, implying that these answers that Yeats 
needed for himself and for writing the poetry are also 
necessary for the reader: the reader needs these "entirely 
invalid" answers to understand the poetry fully. Ure does 
not stop to question what sort of insight into a poem can 
be gained in terms of a system which the reader finds 
himself unable to accept intellectually. 
This is in fact, of course, a false equation since A 
Vision is not of a nature to be accepted purely 
intellectually, as Yeats himself explained: 
Some will ask whether I believe in the actual 
existence of my circuits of sun and moon....To 
1 
Ure, p.64. 
2 
Ibid., p.119. 
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such a question I can but answer that if 
sometimes, overwhelmed by miracle as all men 
must be when in the midst of it, I have taken 
such periods literally, my reason has soon 
recovered; and now that the system stands out 
clearly in my imagination I regard them as 
stylistic arrangements of experience comparable 
to the cubes in the drawing of Wyndham Lewis 
and to the ovoids in the sculpture of Brancusi.^ 
But the equation is not false with respect to Ure. He is 
caught between disparaging A Vision when he considers it 
intellectually, and using it as a source of reference 
meaning for the poetry. He regards the sjonbol as 
something extrinsic to the whole, a concordance of 
abstraction and personality or passion which can therefore 
be supposed to have an external reference. And it is 
hardly surprising that those critics who cannot accept 
poetry as S3mibol, and hence the embodiment of its own 
meaning, cannot accept A Vision as something similar. 
The result is that Ure's work on the poems often 
appears very similar to that of the critics discussed 
previously. His later papers on "The Statues" and 
2 
"Supernatural Songs" are collections of "source" 
materials, and in the book his discussions of poems are 
fragmentary, and therefore, though often very sensible, 
inclined to be too general. Partly for this reason, and 
partly because the seduction of external evidence is so 
strong, Ure's readings sometimes go astray, even 
occasionally to absurdity, as in the following example. 
1 
A Vision, Macmillan, I962, pp.24-5. 
2 
"•The Statues' A Note on the Meaning of Yeats's Poem", 
Review of English Studies, XV (1949), pp.254-257; "Yeats's 
Supernatural Songs", Review of English Studies, VII New 
Series (1956), pp.38-51. 
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Speaking of the line from "Byzantium", "An agony of flame 
that cannot singe a sleeve", Ure comments: 
it is not fanciful to see in the reference to a 
sleeve that Yeats is thinking of the wide sleeves 
of a Japanese kimono: being of very light stuff 
these sleeves would catch alight the more easily 
and the fact that they do not enhances the image. 
But fanciful it certainly is with respect to the poem. It 
seems unlikely that anyone would naturally think of 
spirits as wearing kimonos, and it cannot, therefore, 
enhance the image. Ure thinks of it because he has 
related the line to a Noh play which Yeats had commented 
on. 
L 
The application of over-generalised ideas produces 
mis-readings such as the statement that "Death also is 
equated with this value [joy] in the little poem that 
begins the 'Vacillation' group", or the misunderstanding 
of the nature of Ribh's hatred implied by comparing it 
with the alleged commendation of violence and war in the 
2 
Last Poems. But it is the assumption that comprehension 
of the poems depends on A Vision and other external 
materials that is most representative of lire's later views 
and those of many other critics. "The Second Coming" is 
one of the poems that Ure regards as dependent on the 
ideas of A Vision. It must be seen, he says, as more than 
a combination of traditional sjonbolism (Christian 
references) and "pure" or "occasional" symbolism: 
As we have seen, the shape with a lion body and 
the head of a man is associated with Yeats' 
1 
2 
Ure, p.69, footnote. 
Ibid., p p . a n d 72. 
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spiritualistic experiences .... Furthermore, the 
idea of the birth of a new revelation is 
fundamental to the cyclical interpretation of 
history which finds expression in A Vision. 
And what rough beast, its hour come round 
at last, 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
is a question which loses a great deal of its 
power unless we realize that behind it lies 
more than the attraction of a foundered belief 
and a famous name. A system of mythology is 
there as well - a system which to Yeats was 
more elaborate and full of meaning than 
Christianity itself....We must add the 
mythological system to the two kinds of sjmibol-
ism, which become the less pure and the less 
traditional once they are recognised for what 
they are - images which are drawn from the 
inner landscape of the private myth, and which 
can only be fully understood by reference to 
the deserts and cities of the poet's mind.^ 
Once again, it is clear that Ure is regarding the sjrmbolism 
of the poem as something extractable from it, and as 
completely identifiable with the symbolism of A Vision. 
"The poem would have been impossible without the cyclical 
system to which its meaning is so strictly parallel",^ Ure 
says, and this may well be true but it need not mean that 
it is impossible to understand without that system. 
The poem presages the coming of a new cycle, using 
an idea which is already established as part of the 
Christian tradition. Part of its strength comes from the 
startling variation on the accepted idea of a new 
incarnation of Christ. Since most Western readers would 
surely start from this, the poem if anything introduces 
1 
Ure, pp.117-8. 
2 
Ibid, p.66. 
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the ideas of A Vision rather than relying on them for 
meaning. When, some years after writing the poem, Yeats 
mentions an image which had been present to him at an 
earlier period, "a brazen winged beast that I associated 
with laughing, ecstatic destruction", he adds a footnote 
that it was "Afterwards described in my poem 'The Second 
Coming'".^ Ure (and Melchiori) quote this as evidence 
that the system is necessary to the poem, but in fact 
there is nothing in the poem to suggest "laughing, 
ecstatic destruction", nor is the beast described in the 
way Yeats's footnote seems to suggest. In the poem it 
does not have brazen wings but a "lion body and the head 
of a man, A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun", elements 
which associate it in the reader's mind with a sphinx-like 
image, something which is familiar enough to have some 
sensual meaning to the reader and yet distant and unknown 
enough to be free of unwanted associations with philosophy 
or religion. Quoting A Vision, Ure comments: 
Against Christianity, itself become reasonable, 
arises an "antithetical dispensation... which 
obeys imminent power, is expressive, hieratical, 
multiple, masculine, surgical". (A Vision, 
p.273). In prose Yeats struggles to express 
what comes so easily and so powerfully in 
verse....^ 
If the poem is more powerful it is probably because it 
introduces fewer ideas more immediately. It does not 
mention anything about "Christianity become reasonable"; 
instead it says that "the centre cannot hold", which has 
much broader reference and is part of a powerful visual 
image which gives meaning to the lines: 
1 
Explorations, I962 , p.393-2 
Ure, p.66. 
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Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity.^ 
The poem shows the arising of a new dispensation which 
"obeys imminent power, is., masculine, surgical", but is 
it necessary or helpful to think, while reading the poem, 
that the theory also says it will be "antithetical... 
expressive, hieratical, multiple..."? The second stanza 
of the poem depends on our acceptance of the first. 
Caught in the urgency of this wonderful verse, we agree 
that the world seems to be going to pieces and are 
therefore disposed to understand the immanence of the 
Second Coming, and even to some extent its nature, although 
this requires a stern suppression of our continued optimism 
about progress. The actual vision is put in the form of a 
personal prophecy, and its tentative, symbolic character is 
emphasised by the question at the end. Even so, it is 
possible that the sphinx-like f igure is too far from our 
normal ideas to command our complete acceptance. The poem 
is deliberately stimulating ideas, and, as before, if 
anything it is the poem which might make us sufficiently 
interested to want to look further into the possibilities 
of such an idea, but it is itself speculative and 
visionary, and loses all immediacy if it is over-burdened 
with theoretical concepts. 
A Vision must be put beside the general failure to 
accept the poetry as self-consistent as one of the 
1 
C.P., p.211. 
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greatest stumbling blocks of Yeats criticism, standing as 
it does apart from and yet related to both prose and 
poetry, itself an enigma tantalizingly hung between 
philosophy and mythology, between discursive comment and 
fantasy, with the question of belief the last carrot, 
dangled provocatively by Yeats, only to be swallowed whole 
at the very last moment. And whichever way it is taken it 
has caused trouble. Where it has been dismissed as so 
much self-indulgent fantasy, Yeats may be regarded as a 
mere escapist, incapable of facing the important issues of 
contemporary life, tied to his dreams and therefore 
"inhuman".^ On the other hand, where it is taken 
seriously it has caused just as much trouble because it 
may then come to be regarded as crucial to Yeats's thought 
and so crucial to the poetry. 
Cleanth Brooks pays Yeats the compliment of regarding 
A Vision as evidence of a serious attempt by the poet to 
make a coherent formulation of the natural and 
supernatural and to establish a view of life and the 
universe as at once "logical and boundless". "If Yeats 
had merely been anxious to indulge his fancy, not caring 
whether the superstition accepted for the moment had any 
relation to the world about him - had he merely been an 
2 
escapist, no system would have been required at all". 
Brooks says firmly that the most important function of the 
system is to make possible "from the poet's standpoint" 
the richness and precision of such poems as "Sailing to 
1 
As for instance by MacNeice and by D.S. Savage, "The 
Aestheticism of W.B. Yeats", P.Y.. pp.173-194. 
2 
"Yeats: The Poet as Myth-Maker", P.Y., p.62. 
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Byzantium" and "Byzantium". His account of the 
development of the symbols of "Sailing to Byzantium" "in 
the poet's personal experience" as he notes, '"will not", he 
adds, "in itself explain the fineness of the poem, or even 
indicate its aesthetic strueture.... But it may indicate in 
part the source of the authority which dictates the tone 
of the poem".^ 
This claim appears modest enough, but it does not 
prevent Brooks from explaining the poetry in terms of the 
system and therefore coming to regard it as dependent upon 
A Vision. Analysing "Byzantium", for instance, he says 
that "we shall not understand the third stanza nor the 
fourth fully unless we understand something of Yeats's 
theory of spirits" and that the phrase "blood-begotten 
spirits" is explicable if we consider a passage from the 
chapter on Anima Mundi in A Vision in which Yeats quotes 
from Hippocrates that man's mind is nourished by a 
substance from the blood, not from the food as the grosser 
body is, and if we also recall that Yeats said that our 
animal spirits were a condensation of images from Anima 
2 
Mundi. But in fact, although the phrase may be 
explicable in this way, it is hardly made readily 
comprehensible thereby. Yet it is in itself immediately 
comprehensible as metaphor. 
Brooks goes on to note that the description of the 
spirits as flames accords with Yeats's description of "the 
condition of fire" in A Vision, while the phrase "flames 
begotten of flame" requires further reference to A Vision 
1 
"Yeats: The Poet as Myth-Maker", P.Y., pp.75-6. 
2 
Ibid., pp.79-80. 
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and also to Yeats's essay on Shelley, providing a complex 
exposition of the relationship between the living, the 
dead, and the Great Memory or Anima Mundi. The result is 
oddly ironical for Yeats since it forces the understanding 
of these spirits and flames to be drawn from Yeats's 
personal conception of the Great Memory, rather than being 
conceived by each reader separately and originally from 
his own grasp of the memory and knowledge common to us 
all - what might be called anima mundi. Although the poem 
undoubtedly appears "rich and intricate" when seen in 
terms of A Vision, it also appears unnecessarily esoteric 
and unconvincing, having lost its essential connection 
with ordinary ways of thinking through the 
particularisation of the images to one set of ideas. 
Brooks, despite his characterization of Yeats as a 
"mythmaker", treats A Vision more as a philosophy than a 
myth, and the poems as its adjuncts rather than its raison 
d'etre. M.I. Seiden^ follows the same prescription but 
develops it to much greater length and in doing so reveals 
the sort of fallacies it can lead to. Seiden takes A 
Vision to be the guiding formulation, calling it "a 
private religious faith", and the poems "fragments of a 
great myth - all based on that faith". And for Seiden 
poems, myth, and all are parts of the expression of the 
poet's beliefs. Hence Yeats becomes a didactic poet, and 
Seiden explicitly states that he found difficulty in 
discovering" a critical system which I might apply to the 
writings of a man who himself wrote, largely, to 
illustrate many kinds of dogma". It is not surprising, 
1 
William Butler Yeats. The Poet as Mythmaker, I962. 
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therefore, that Seiden is dismayed by the actual character 
of A Vision and accuses Yeats of "deliberate equivocation, 
such as the infuriating confusion of a literal with a 
metaphorical statement" when, as he says, he has "come to 
regard A Vision - or the mythology which it contains - as 
a kind of prose gloss to his collected works, both his 
earliest poems and those written long after he had in part 
rejected the book".^ 
Thus Yeats's symbols, Seiden argues, "whether 
mentioned in A Vision or not,...never fail to reflect his 
private-and-public mythology; that is to say, their very 
function in his poetry is absolutely determined by their 
explicit or implicit relation to A Vision". The method is 
"oblique": "When writing of the movements, the changes, 
and the conflicts both in human life and in the phenomenal 
universe, Yeats may invoke a symbolism which, in fact, 
describes the Great Wheel, the opposition of his imaginary 
sun and moon, the twenty-eight lunar incarnations, and the 
2 
transmigrating soul". This gives Seiden licence to apply 
A Vision to any poem, and he repeats the familiar argument 
that "we shall find it of extreme value, nevertheless, to 
approach even those of Yeats's later poems which are not 
mere versifications of a private myth as though they too 
were 'text[s] for exposition'", because "in this way we 
can better equip ourselves to understand and appreciate 3 the subtlest meanings". 
1 
William Butler Yeats. The Poet as Mythmaker, pp.1, 73, 
143. 
2 
Ibid., pp.163, 175. 
3 
Ibid., p.174. 
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In accordance with his conviction of a logical 
relationship between A Vision and the poetry Seiden 
proceeds by analysis, dividing the poems into four 
categories: psychological conflict and human types; nature 
gods, cycles and antinomies; history and historical 
processes; and the supernatural and its relation to man's 
physical life, and the syrobols into another four groups: 
antithetical, primary, cyclical flux, and resolution of 
the antinomies. This method of classifying may help to 
superimpose a broad, general order on a complex body of 
work, but, although it is well suited to deal with 
material of a logical nature, it is less appropriate for 
material which creates its own meaning rather than standing 
in necessary relationship to other particulars. The 
division of the poetry according to subject matter or 
themes, for instance, is reasonable in terms of Seiden's 
assumptions since it corresponds to the major concerns of 
A Vision, but as applied to the poems themselves it is too 
mechanical if it is related to subject matter only or else 
either too vague or too limited if it is related to theme. 
A major fault of Seiden's classification of the poems 
is that it does not make any distinction, and consequently 
he finds that "there is, of course, a good deal of obvious 
overlapping. The four major subjects of his poetry may be 
explicitly stated in a single poem". Alternatively, the 
poems appear to be mere repetitions of the same statements: 
"With few exceptions... the political poems which Yeats 
published after 19l4 are a variation, as though all of 
them were a single poem, on specific, mythological - or 
historical - themes". As this indicates, the 
1 
Seiden, pp.l64, 233. 
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classification is too reductive and the discussion too 
general to yield significant insights into the ideas 
formulated and presented in the poems. 
The S3rmbol classification involves the common 
assumption that the symbols are separable from their 
contexts and have reference meanings. The classification 
is based on A Vision and the ideas, which had some 
precision within the system, are too specific when applied 
mechanically to the poetry, with the result that Seiden's 
lists of symbols might almost be re-titled: anything of 
which Yeats approved; anything he disapproved; any image 
of change with time; any image which, in its context, 
stands at a moment of balance. Thus, the "blood of 
innocence", because "signifying noble birth", is an 
antithetical symbol, and "odour of blood", "signifying a 
painful death", is primary. This example shows clearly 
how little real help the classification gives with respect 
to the poems. There is an opposition between these two 
factors in "Blood and the Moon" but it is far more complex 
than is suggested by the mere labels antithetical and 
primary, and cannot be resolved by relating these categories 
directly to what is said about them in A Vision. 
This subjugation of the symbols to the geometrical 
schema of A Vision, which, incidentally, pays scant respect 
to the human meanings Yeats was trying to convey in it, 
leads as usual not only to carelessness in reading the 
poems but also to confusion and eventual stalemate in 
discussing the symbols. Seiden's symbols of cyclical flux, 
for example, include Malachi's stilts in "High Talk", the 
bottom rung of the ladder in "The Circus Animal's 
Desertion" and the crescent moon and the blazing sun of 
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"Lines Written in Dejection", all representing old age; 
and the bright moon in "A Man Young and Old" and spring in 
"Quarrel in Old Age" representing youth. Seiden comments, 
"Indeed whenever in poetry he correlates youth and old age 
with images borrowed from natural landscape or from 
ordinary human experience, Yeats is almost certainly 
making oblique statements about imaginary lunar phases".^ 
But these s3niibols are also either primary or antithetical, 
the cycles being related to the antinomies by the gyres, 
and therefore, Seiden argues. 
Because [Yeats J constantly writes about a 
universe in which everything is part of an 
antinomy, in which all the antinomies are 
reducible to a symbolic sun and a symbolic moon, 
and in which the sun and the moon verge on being 
each other, any one of his s)Tnbols, as he would 
have us believe, has an indefinite number of 
connotations .... Hence, all of his symbols, when 
they are approached from this complex point of 
view, ultimately mean the same thing;...^ 
Seiden is forced to admit that "Only when they are a 
portion of a given poem do Yeats's later symbols have 
somewhat limited meanings", but this does not induce him 
to consider them in their contexts and his conception of 
Yeats's symbolism, both in theory and practice, remains as 
confused as his understanding of the nature of myth. 
IV. The Poet as Symbolist 
Just as Seiden looks for logical consistency of a 
discursive kind in what he has previously designated myth, 
1 
Seiden, p.l78. 
2 
Ibid., p.159. 
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so he applies simple identifications of details from A 
Vision to symbols despite his admissions that symbols are 
finally limited in meaning only by context, and that in 
Yeats's best poetry "subject and form are one; the symbols 
are both the things which they suggest and the ideas which 
their contexts define".^ Seiden never applies this theory 
and never accepts in fact that S3Tiibols may be limited in 
meaning in poetry. Instead, he merely justifies his 
method by adding a convenient rider to his statements of 
Yeats's theory and practice of symbolism that, whether 
mentioned in A Vision or not, Yeats's most successful 
symbols "never fail to reflect his private-and-public 
2 
mythology", and continues to impose on the symbols an 
arbitrary limitation to the ideas of this external 
structure. 
Seiden asserts that Yeats's practice followed his 
theoretical statements on the nature of symbolism, and the 
many other critics who base their arguments partly on these 
statements also assume this. It is worth noting that most 
of the essays in which these statements occur were written 
in or before 1913, and the essays on symbolism and magic 
at the turn of the century, well before Yeats had 
developed his mature poetic style. Engelberg further 
points out that Yeats told AE in a letter in I903 that he 
rejected parts of the volume published that year (ideas of 
Good and Evil), saying that such essays as "Moods" and 
"The Autumn of the Body" represent only half the orange, 
1 
Seiden, pp.159-1^1. 
2 
Ibid., p.163. 
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that subtlety and mystery were necessary but that it was 
possible to have too much freedom. Yeats says in the 
letter: 
I think I mistook for a permanent phase of the 
world what was only a preparation. The close of 
the last century was full of a strange desire to 
get out of form, to get to some kind of 
disembodied beauty, and now it seems to me the 
contrary impulse has come.1 
Even so, these essays do not fully support the imputations 
of limitlessness and infinitely suggestive ineffability in 
poetic symbolism which are read from them by such critics 
as Seiden, Henn and Melchiori. 
Donald Stauffer, for instance, deduces that Yeats 
considered a poetic symbol to be "unified, meaningful, 
complex, untranslatable, inexhaustibly suggestive, moral, 
self-creating, slow-growing and often realized before 
understood, particular to the artist (or rather the artist 
will have a central group of symbols), and revelatory", 
and he later summarises this as meaning that "poetic 
symbols cannot be controlled; they cannot be limited; they 
2 
cannot be explained". On such a theory a poet could be 
little more than a mere recorder of his feelings as 
Stauffer realises, saying that in his practice Yeats was 3 
"lucky and gifted and original". But this ignores and 
controverts many of Yeats's statements about symbolism. 
Even in these early essays it is clear that he does not 
think of the poetic symbol as vague; on the contrary, he 
1 
A. Wade, ed., The Letters of W.B. Yeats, 1954, p.402, 
quoted by Engelberg, p.l07n. 
2 
The Golden Nightingale, 19^9, pp.28, 36. 
3 Ibid., p.47. 
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says more than once that it should be precise. Shelley's 
fault was, he says, that he surrendered too much to the 
unconscious and to the lure of "images" which lack the 
precision of symbols, and adds that his symbols grow in 
clarity as he comes to use them with more conscious 
purpose. 
In the essays on symbolism in painting and poetry 
Yeats defines t^ree possible limitations on the use of 
symbols in poetry. "The systematic mystic is not the 
greatest of artists", he says, "because his imagination is 
too great to be bounded by a picture or a song".^ The 
"liberation into infinite emotion" of the mystic is not 
appropriate to poetry, where the symbol is limited by 
being "mixed with the accidents of life". There is a 
systematic mystic in every artist, but in poetry symbolism 
is a matter of details, of words and their connotations, 
and it is these which define the nature of the symbol. 
Symbols may be intellectual, emotional, or a mixture 
of the two. The first are "the playthings of the 
allegorists" and have no more place in literature than do 
the symbols of the mystics. He quotes a German artist who 
said that sjnnbolism "gave dumb things voices, and bodiless 
things bodies; while ...[allegory] read a meaning - which had 
never lacked its voice or its body - into something heard 
or seen, and loved less for the meaning than for its own 
2 sake". Purely emotional symbols, on the other hand, 
1 
Essays and Introductions, I96I, p.l30 (hereafter referred 
to as E . & I.). 
2 
Ibid., p.1^7. 
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produce excitement of the emotions which we cannot explain 
or define. Emotions without ideas are either too 
unbounded for the work of art as in mysticism, or else 
they leave us "amid the accidents and destinies of the 
world", with sensation but no conceptualisation or 
understanding of the emotion to guide and hold our minds. 
The artist must clear his work of disembodied feeling 
and intellect, Yeats says. The first reduces art to "mere 
pattern or shadow", the second to mere subject matter. In 
a work of art it is necessary that the symbol should evoke 
intellectual concepts as well as emotions, although these 
concepts must not be more than "shadows thrown on the 
intellect by the emotions".^ The metaphor here leaves 
some difficulty in paraphrasing this statement, but it is 
clear that Yeats means that the emotions should come first, 
but must be attached to concepts and must call these into 
play in interdependent effect. And Yeats goes on to 
specify the mechanism of this interconnectedness: it is 
through the connotations of words which have meanings for 
both the emotions and the intellect, and through the 
combination of emotional with intellectual word-symbols. 
He gives as example words such as "white" and "purple" 
which have only vague emotional reference unless they are 
related to words having intellectual content, but can be 
made to add precision to the meaning-complex of 
emotional/intellectual symbols, such as "cross" or "crown 
of thorns". 
1 
E. & I., pp.160-1. 
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Yeats concludes that "it is the intellect that 
decides where the reader shall ponder over the procession 
of the symbols".^ The "procession" is the concrete 
history of the symbol in all its connotations and 
suggestions, all its past uses. If the symbol is both 
intellectual and emotional, Yeats says, the reader 
"becomes himself a part of pure intellect, and he is 
himself mingled with the procession". That is to say, the 
reader is involved in the formulation of the meaning given 
by the symbol by the operation of his intellect, guided by 
the symbol's context, within that area of the "Great 
Memory" to which the symbol is related. The Great Memory 
is thus the totality of the symbolic meanings which have 
been found in the world. Because of this, the symbol is 
not arbitrary simply because it is not connected with some 
particular tradition of thought, although this may ensure 
it a complex and finely determined associational range. 
2 
These "unofficial images", as John Crowe Ransom calls 
them, require skill in their handling since they must be 
given the clarity of "proper" traditional symbols (this 
was the deficiency Yeats found in Shelley), but they do 
not necessarily lack a common history. Yeats says in the 
essay "Magic" that he tried to distinguish between 
traditional and personal symbols but found that the 
distinction had little meaning. The confusion between 
"personal" and "arbitrary" as applied to Yeats's poetic 
symbols arises from the assumption that the symbols in the 
poetry derive from Yeats's personal system or thought. A 
1 
"The Symbolism of Poetry", E. & I., p.l6l. 
2 
"Yeats and his Symbols", P.Y., p.91. 
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critic making this assumption inevitably sees the symbol 
as arbitrary in the sense of having only denotative 
meaning in the poems. 
Stauffer points out that in his essay on "The 
Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry" Yeats takes symbols out of 
the poems and discusses them separately. Stauffer argues 
that this shows that the extent of a symbol's meaning is 
unlimited, and therefore 
To set one of Yeats's symbols in its place is 
simply to point our [sic] relations with other 
symbols and other thoughts; and to trace all of 
their implications, it is hardly too much to say, 
would require a close scrutiny of his entire 
work.^ 
Stauffer notes that this would be too extreme a demand, 
and attempts a compromise. Yeats's technique was to echo 
and allude to his own work, he says, and therefore it is 
necessary to know at least the main body of the poems to 
understand one: 
Fully to understand the meaning of "gyre" in one 
of his later poems, all of its uses in earlier 
poems must ideally be in our minds - not only 
when the word itself is used, but when it is 
only half-suggested, or left as a hidden image, 
not fully developed, but controlling the 
movement of the thought.^ 
This argument is logically circular because to 
understand the first poem one would need to understand all 
of them. When Yeats abstracts Shelley's syrobols from the 
poems, he does not do so in order to understand any 
1 
Stauffer, p.46. 
2 
Ibid., p.40. 
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particular poem and does not apply the meaning of the 
S3rmbol in one poem to its appearance in another. He first 
understands a meaning from each separate appearance of the 
symbol and then compares and combines them for a broader 
contemplation of the general associations of the symbol, 
and particularly its relation to Shelley's ideal of what 
he calls intellectual beauty. Stauffer's method is to 
take one occurrence of the symbol, abstract a generalised 
statement of meaning, and then apply this to another 
occurrence. This gives no weight to the individual 
symbolic process, and to that "continuous indefinable 
symbolism" which Yeats says is the substance of all style 
and from which the symbolism grows and emerges. 
Other critics besides Stauffer follow this approach. 
A.G. Stock and Unterecker argue that there are always 
other meanings latent in a symbol although each has an 
immediate meaning. Only a fragment of the total meaning 
may be in the speaker's mind at the moment, Stock says, 
and he may not even understand the rest, but the whole 
cannot be completely cut off from the image. Thus, the 
timeless immunity of the swans in "The Wild Swans at 
Coole", she argues, enters into Yeats's conception of the 
soul as a swan in "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" and adds 
an overtone to the line "The swan has leaped into the 
desolate heaven".^ But is this necessary? The swan-soul 
here is very different from the slightly sentimental 
picture of the swans in the earlier poem. If we think of 
it here as eternal, it is an eternity of a very different 
kind, not the eternity of nature with "companionable 
1 
W.B. Yeats; His Poetry and his Thought, 19^1, pp.192-3-
1 2 3 
streams" and paired lovers. The soul is solitary, and it 
must face a life of apparent absurdity in which beauty and 
all human good are exterminated by time as life itself is. 
The poem is concerned more with life than with eternity, 
and the only immunity of the soul is its utter isolation. 
Stock continues to link up Yeats's swan images, 
passing from "Leda and the Swan" to "Coole Park and 
Ballylee, 1931" because "the gods too are mirrors of the 
soul of man" and "divinity was seen mirrored in nature 
rather than shining beyond it" when Zeus reigned; and 
these thoughts re-echo in the last lines of the poem, 
"giving fuller meaning to the lament for the passing of 
romantic poetry". This is ingenious, but "divinity in 
nature", if it is an overtone of the romantic ideals as 
Yeats presents them here, is a confusing one, despite the 
presence of Homer. It is "traditional sanctity and 
loveliness", "whatever most can bless the mind of man or 
elevate a rhyme" that Yeats is celebrating here. But 
Stock passes on, via Homer, to "Vacillation" VII and VIII, 
and comments: 
...by the standards of Christian asceticism all 
that glorying in passionate experience, summed 
up in the swan, is changed into the lust of the 
flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of 
life. From Homer to Helen; and Helen's beauty 
is inseparable in his thought from Maud Gonne's, 
and thus symbol is interwoven with living 
experience. The pattern of this tapestry is 
inexhaustible. It is partly this intricacy that 
gives Yeats's later poetry its intense power: it 
fills the simple words with deep, half 
discernible meaning.^ 
1 
Stock, p.194. 
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It is true that "glorying in passionate experience" is 
part of the swan's general character as it appears in 
several poems and also has relevance to these sections of 
"Vacillation", but if there is a connection between all 
three factors, and further with Helen and Maud Gonne, it 
is concerned with the poet's habits of thought and life 
and not with these particular poems. It can be seen that 
this method of interpretation is little different, finally, 
from those discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. 
At first sight Hugh Kenner's claim^ that Yeats wrote 
books and not single poems appears to open new prospects, 
but its similarity to the theory that Yeats was writing a 
single great work might alert us to the danger inherent in 
the approach: that the book will be considered before the 
poems are fully understood and accepted as individual 
items, setting the conditions for all the misunderstandings 
described previously. This proves to be the case with 
Kenner. He maintains that a person encountering "Among 
School Children" out of context in the volume The Tower 
would find himself looking up Leda, 
and what Yeats made of her, and identifying the 
daughter of swan with Maud Gonne...and 
determining in what official capacity...the 
poet found himself doubling as a school 
inspec tor.^ 
Kenner also takes a very simple view of the poems, 
holding that The Tower volume shows a progression from 
renunciation of the body to possession of disembodied 
1 
"The Sacred Book of the Arts", J. Unterecker, ed., Yeats, 
1963, p.13. 
2 
Ibid., p.12. 
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thought (it begins with "Sailing to Byzantium" and ends 
with "All Soul's Night"). Similarly, Unterecker's 
suggestion that The Winding Stair and Other Poems should 
be seen as a counterpoise to The Tower, a return to life-
consciousness after the emphasis on the decay of both body 
and civilisation in the earlier volume, leaves out of 
account parts of either volume which contradict or negate 
the distinction, in particular the concentration on the 
nature of art, and on the conditions of being an artist as 
they relate to the conditions of life. 
It may be that, as B. Rajan suggests,^ the poems do 
form "constellations of intention", and the recent essay 
2 
by J.R. Mulryne which points out that in the Last Poems 
"the transformation of the living to the sculpted image is 
everywhere" gives this some support; but this theory must 
not be indulged at the cost of the meaning of individual 
poems if it is to be maintained that the poetic experience 
has any peculiar value beyond that of the general 
contemplation of ideas. Rajan suggests that the worth of 
Yeats's method should be measured by its potential to 
create a whole greater than the sum of its parts, but the 
problem of what this whole is or should be remains, and it 
cannot be satisfactorily answered by examining the poems 
originally as parts of a whole, but only by working from 
examinations of the poems as wholes to a broader vision. 
John Bayley says that the unspoken critical verdict 
is that in Yeats's case this is not so: the whole is not 
greater than the sum of its parts but considerably smaller. 
1 
W.B. Yeats, 19^5, p.188. 
2 
"The 'Last Poems'", Denis Donoghue and J.R. Mulryne, eds., 
An Honoured Guest, I965, pp.124-142. 
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"His vision as a whole... is not taken seriously and not 
allowed as the real measure of his greatness".^ Bayley 
attributes this failure to the fact that Yeats was a 
romantic poet, facing the dilemma of the romantic poet, of 
how to be both apart from life and engaged in it, how to 
concentrate on the romantic world of the imagination, and 
yet be an active participant in the world of men. Frank 
2 
Kermode also sees this as the central problem for Yeats, 
and central to any discussion of Yeats's conception of the 
work of art. Because the artist turns from life to 
contemplate the image, Kermode says, he is forced to pay a 
heavy price of suffering and isolation in his normal life. 
The result is that the status of the artist comes to be 
the theme of his poetry, as it is his major personal 
problem. 
G.S. Fraser admires Kermode's treatment because it 
3 
"sets Yeats in a context", relating him to the romantic 
tradition and to the French Syinbolistes; but the very 
firmness with which Kermode attaches Yeats to these 
traditions limits his perspective. In "The Symbolism of 
Poetry" Yeats says that if people were to accept the 
theory that poetry moves us because of its S3Tnbolism, it 
would be no longer possible for anyone to deny the 
importance of form, 
for although you can expound an opinion, or 
describe a thing when your words are not quite 
1 
The Romantic Survival, 19^0, p.82. 
2 
Romantic Image, 1957, pp.25-28. 
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well chosen, you cannot give a body to something 
that moves beyond the senses, unless your words 
are as subtle, as complex, as full of mysterious 
life, as the body of a flower or of a woman.^ 
Kermode maintains that this sentence "contains, in germ, 
2 
Yeats's whole aesthetic" because he bases his entire 
thesis on the assumption that the image is the "primary 
pigment" of romantic and symbolist poetry. He argues that 
the essence of S3nnbolism is the construction of such 
images as Yeats speaks of here: the body of a flower or of 
a woman, and that these images are characteristically 
romantic. But while it is true that this mannered and 
decorative metaphor does relate Yeats to the fin-de-siecle 
style, it is false to treat it as the only, or even the 
most important, element in Yeats's aesthetic, or even in 
the sentence quoted. 
Yeats's prose, particularly at this early period, has 
a tendency towards a Pater-like formality and elaborateness 
of pattern which belies at times the cogency of his 
arguments. In "The Symbolism of Poetry" Yeats relates 
poetic symbolism to the nature of language and to the 
history of the symbol, and he deals particularly with an 
aspect of the subject - the quality of words which makes 
them suitable symbolic vehicles and the sort of effects 
which can be achieved by using words in this way - which 
is suited to discursive comment. His account does not 
suggest a homogeneous or static quality in the poetic 
symbol as Kermode's "image" theory does. In the sentence 
quoted the romantic aestheticism comes out in the choice 
^E. & I, pp.163--^. 2 
Kermode, p.51« 
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of the metaphor, not in the matter of the argument, which 
is concerned with the necessity that the artist should 
find exactly the right words. It is not the image which 
Yeats sees as the primary pigment of poetry, but words. 
Kermode's argument follows from his convinction that 
Yeats worked according to the Symbolist aesthetic as 
represented by Symons. He suggests that the modern 
conception of the work of art as autonomous, non-
discursive, and coincident in form and meaning evolved 
from the Sjmibolist aesthetic by way of the link between 
the poet and the occultist. Poetry by this definition is 
inexplicable, he argues, and only an act of magic can 
effect communication.^ This is the familiar dualist 
position which results from regarding the poetic syrnbol 
as object, not process and ignoring its existence in words 
2 
It is noticeable that Yeats in this essay speaks not of 
magic but of subtlety and precision. 
Kermode picked out this sentence as characteristic 
because of its peculiar appropriateness for his thesis 
that the chief romantic image was that of the dancer, in 
whom beauty of form and movement are combined, and whose 
mind is engrossed in the formal movements of her body. 
Kermode traces the development of this image through the 
late romantics and in Yeats's prose and poetry, and in 
doing so reveals the usual effects of treating the symbol 
in isolation rather than as part of a context. Thus, in 
his discussion of "The Double Vision of Michael Robartes", 
he says that the dancer is Salome and supports this by 
1 
Kermode, pp. 113-'^. 2 
"The S5rmbolism of Poetry". 
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quoting a passage from Yeats's prose. This does indeed 
explain the link in full, but it is a purely private one. 
It is not necessary to the poem and does not appear there. 
To think of the dancer as Salome requires some negative 
effort to strip her of the "decadent" trappings which as 
Kermode notes, she acquired in Moreau and Wilde and which 
are now so firmly established. 
This poem establishes a connection between Salome and 
the system, Kermode says, and he discovers the same 
connection in "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen", part VI, in 
the lines "evil gathers head, Herodias' daughters have 
returned again" where, he says, she "again signifies a 
complete historical change of direction".^ But there is 
no suggestion in "The Double Vision of Michael Robartes" 
or in the prose that she signifies this. In both the 
dancer is associated with the "moment of revelation". In 
the later poem Herodias is linked not to a dancer but to 
the variable wind, the "host of the Sidhe". There is no 
suggestion of formal perfection and no moment of visionary 
rapture in this image. The "decadent" trappings of 
Herodias and her infamous daughter are certainly here, and 
the evil forces are out of control, haphazard and blind, 
not rapt in the creation of beauty. 
Kermode does demonstrate a consistency of imagery 
between Yeats and the late Romantics but his thesis 
depends too much on the symbol or image outside the bounds 
of art where it is too uncontrolled to provide more than 
relatively superficial connections with textual 
1 
Kermode, pp.75-6. 
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occurrences. The thesis confines Yeats to too narrow a 
relationship, resulting in some forcing of the material to 
fit the argument. Bayley also aligns Yeats closely with 
the late Romantics and, although he is less confined to a 
single theory, having in fact a divided view of Yeats, 
the result, again, tends to force the poet into a category, 
Thus, he assumes that Yeats is a romantic poet and says 
that one reason why Yeats has been distrusted or 
misunderstood is that we expect a natural vision with some 
element of romantic idealism and spontaneous overflow, 
whereas Yeats's poetry seems "equally the product of 
theory and the will".^ And this inconsistency produces 
exactly the effects Bayley mentions: Yeats appears to him 
as a posturing, abstract and unnatural Romantic. 
The theory of s5nnbol, Bayley maintains, exerts far 
less influence on the nature of Yeats's work than does the 
aesthetic background of late Romanticism, although his use 
of symbols was "perhaps the most important of Yeats's 
developments of the romantic and Symbolist tradition". He 
solved the problem of achieving a balance between the 
"indefiniteness of music" and the over-definiteness of 
allegory, Bayley says, by using emblem-type symbols 
"chosen so as not to blur the theme of the poem with a 
life of their own" and "shifting from one self-contained 
emblem to another with a conversational armature in 
2 
between". It is clear, however, that Bayley regards 
these emblems as closer to allegory than symbol. He 
1 
Bayley, p.85• 
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mentions Yeats's distinction between emotional and 
intellectual symbols, and suggests that the emblem concept 
seems discernible in the latter, ignoring Yeats's mixed 
type of symbol. More importantly, this ignores Yeats's 
clear statement that intellectual symbols evoke 
intellectual ideas only and are not appropriate to art. 
The emblem may be relatively stable and well defined as 
symbols go, but it is certainly associated with a congeries 
of ideas which originate in and centre on emotions. 
Engelberg and Parkinson agree with Bayley that Yeats's 
symbols tend to be allegorical, but we might put beside 
this charge Ransom's statement that Yeats's "unofficial 
images" - symbols which do not belong to a specific 
religious tradition in Ransom's terminology - are used with 
care "to see that the symbols are practicable and actually 
set in motion their intended imagery".^ Like Christine 
Brooke-Rose, he compares Yeats's usage to Donne's for 
clarity accompanied by significance. Richard Ellmann and 
2 
W.H. Stevenson both maintain that Yeats moved away from 
allegorical usage in his early poetry to a thoroughly 
symbolic imagery. Ellmann shows how Yeats developed from 
a static use of Theosophical imagery to a usage in which 
his symbols are active and associationally alive. 
In part, the degree to which Yeats's symbols appear 
allegorical depends on the kind of symbolism with which 
1 
P.Y., p. 
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Ellmann, The Identity of Yeats, pp.35-7; Stevenson, 
"Yeats and Blake: The Use of Symbols"; Maxwell and Bushrui, 
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they are compared. If, for instance, they are put beside 
what Symons said Mallarme aspired to - an autonomous 
image, free of discursive content, an instant evocation, 
without description, of the infinite - Yeats's concern for 
precision and comprehensibility must inevitably make his 
symbols appear systematic in comparison. Yet this is the 
kind of background which Kermode and Bayley set him 
against. And it is in attempting to point out the 
differences between Yeats and the French Symbolistes 
described by Symons that Engelberg finds Yeats's effects 
to be "not really symbolic". 
He suggests that the Symbolistes moved towards the 
symbol by developing the subject or theme until it reached 
symbolic significance, using the world to evoke the symbol, 
whereas Yeats used the symbol to evoke the world, his 
interest being, ultimately, less in the symbol than in the 
thing evoked. Baudelaire's Paris begins as the city and 
eventually becomes the City, Engelberg says, but Yeats 
takes the sword and the tower in "A Dialogue of the Self 
and Soul", for instance, as symbols, and then lets them 
work on the imagination - the sword-symbol,for example, to 
evoke love and war. These are no longer symbols, 
Engelberg argues, but "symbolic abstractions, poetic 
short-cuts, allusions".^ 
The sword in this poem is not symbolic if that word 
is reserved, as many would reserve it, for conceptions 
which point beyond this world to the supernatural, but if 
the "divine essence" is taken in Yeats's sense, when, as 
1 
Engelberg, p.III. 
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in his essay "The Symbolism of Poetry", he speaks of 
"disembodied powers, whose footsteps over our hearts we 
call emotions", the sword and its coverings, despite his 
calling it "an emblem of the day... against the tower 
Emblematical of the night", takes on emotional suggestions 
alluding not only to love, war, violence and court-ladies, 
as Engelberg says, but also to the battle which a man must 
wage if he chooses life rather than escape from life: the 
battle for self-hood and maturity, and the embroilment 
with his affections. And, just as the sword is 
consecrated, so this battle gained leads to blessedness. 
Yeats's original explanation of the emblem may be a poetic 
short-cut but it is so intimately involved in the 
structure of the poem that it becomes part of the symbolic 
development. There is no absolute boundary between 
allegory and symbolism because both reference meaning and 
intrinsic meaning may be present within the text. As 
Yeats points out, Dante used allegory to describe 
visionary things and Bunyan "by his preoccupation with 
heaven and the soul, gives his simple story a visionary 
2 strangeness and intensity". 
Bayley's divided view of symbolism and of Yeats's 
status as an artist becomes clear as it is seen that he 
not only regards Yeats's S3rmbols as allegorical, but also 
assumes that external knowledge is therefore necessary to 
explain the poetry and looks for a discursive logic in the 
poem's structure. Dealing with "A Dialogue of the Self 
and Soul" he says that the passage: 
1 
E. & I., p.157. 
2 
"Edmund Spenser", E. & I., p.368. 
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For intellect no longer knows 
Is from the Ought, or Knower from the Known -
That is to say, ascends to Heaven; 
"could hardly be explained except by reference to material 
outside the poem itself", and accuses Yeats of achieving 
his resolution by a "tremendous gesture of assent" which 
is not determined by what has gone before.^ If Bayley had 
not been thinking of Yeats's work as allegorical he would 
surely have considered the common meanings of these words 
and their relationships to what the Soul says here and 
what the Self says later. (See discussion pp.l43,l45). 
He regards Yeats's symbolism merely as an expedient for 
overcoming the problem of romantic isolation from the 
factual world. Yeats said that an acceptance of symbolism 
as the basis of poetry would bring 
a casting out of descriptions of nature for the 
sake of nature, of the moral law for the sake of 
the moral law, a casting out of all anecdotes 
and of all that brooding over scientific opinion 
that so often extinguished the central flame in 
Tennyson, and of that vehemence which would make 
us do or not do certain things.^ 
Bayley comments that "In the light of Yeats's later poetry 
this may strike us as odd" since these things are 
"precisely what distinguishes his poetic maturity". But 
symbolism has done its work and "enclosed in its super-
human, mirror-resembling dream" Yeats can brood over 
scientific opinion, tell stories, and be as vehement as he 
likes 
1 
Bayley, pp.115-6. 
2 
"The Symbolism of Poetry", E. & I.. p.l63. 
3 
Bayley, p.120. 
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Bayley appears to have ignored the second part in 
each of Yeats's clauses - "for the sake of nature" etc., 
and assumes that Yeats's anecdotes, comments on 
metaphysical or philosophical theories, and so on, are 
mainly personal, and have very little relevance for other 
people. Yeats solved the romantic poet's dilemma "by a 
series of brilliant and self-conscious experiments", 
Bayley says, of which symbolism was one, others being the 
adoption of a complex personality of masks and the 
development of the "artificial subject" of the artistic 
process. He brought Romanticism back to' earth, "but at 
the cost of making himself and his poetry the measure of 
all things". Nothing is left outside the poetry which it 
must seek to become a part of rather than to absorb into 
itself, with the result that, finally, "Yeats's 
'acceptance' of life often seems very much like a 
renunciation - where poetry is concerned - of what 
actually happens in life".^ 
These two extremes which Bayley finds in Yeats: 
matter incorporated into the poetry and therefore 
intellectual or personal, and concentration on style and 
the artistic process for its own sake, adapting the 
outside world to its own ends, are clearly associated with 
his refusal to accept the poetry as symbolic. To demand 
that poetry should transmute itself into something outside 
2 
itself is to ask that it take up the method of science. 
The fusing of self and outside world into symbol is the 
1 
Bayley, pp.90, 128. 
2 
It is interesting to note that Bayley compares Yeats 
unfavourably with Auden. 
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method of poetry. Yeats's devotion to style was not to 
style as manner, style in the nineties sense, as Mizener 
maintains. Style is more than a tool of self-expression 
because it not only reflects the development of some 
understanding within the artist's mind but is also a part 
of it, since the words themselves and all the details of 
their arrangement are the means of that understanding. 
And if the artist's experience and the relationship 
between art and life are often central to Yeats's poems as 
in many romantic poets, it is because the search to 
understand life through symbolic interaction with the 
environment is basic to man's natural response. It does 
not necessarily exile him from normal human concerns. 
Bayley himself notes Yeats's "passionate interest in 
human endeavour, sex and death", which, as he says, supplant 
Yeats's interest in magic. The themes of Yeats's later 
poetry are the universal questions of submission to 
another life or painful adjustment to the imperfections 
and ironies of this, the quality of life possible to us 
and the kind of attitudes we can afford and attempt. The 
assumption that Yeats was absorbed in an "art for art's 
sake" religion of art inevitably makes his work appear 
remote, impersonal and inhuman, just as the assumption 
that he was explaining a personal philosophy or mythology 
in a private language makes it appear recondite and 
2 
eccentric. As Allen Tate said, Yeats's critics have 
created his romanticism. 
1 
"The Romanticism of ¥.B. Yeats", P.Y., p.126. 2 
"Yeats's Romanticism: Notes and Suggestions", P.Y., p.105. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE POEMS 
This chapter consists of interpretations of a number 
of the later poems made by working directly from the texts 
of the poems and referring only to external information 
alluded to in the poems. Each interpretation is followed 
by a discussion of comments on the poem by other critics. 
A Dialogue of Self and Soul 
The title indicates that this poem has the form of an 
internal debate, a form with an extensive history. Two of 
the later examples of the form which have obvious 
similarities to this poem are Marvell's "A Dialogue 
between the Resolved Soul and Created Pleasure" and "A 
Dialogue between Soul and Body". Both express the inner 
division and stress man feels between his mortal parts and 
that in himself which he feels to be immortal. The title 
of Yeats's poem suggests a less simple division than 
between soul and body. "Self" is a more inclusive term 
suggesting at once something closer to our essential being 
and something less wholly physical. 
Soul begins the dialogue, enjoining the man to become 
wholly soul by concentrating on those things which 
appertain to it. The voice of the soul is not vehement or 
peremptory, but its solemn dignity is combined with a 
powerful coercive pressure. The words follow one another 
at a measured pace with a succession of even stresses. 
This continually repeated beat combined with the injunction 
to mental concentration has a mesmeric effect, not unlike 
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listening to one's own pulse. The soul tries to bring 
about the result it requires by the manner of its 
exhortation. The meaning, the rhythm, and even the 
structure of the stanza contribute to the hypnotic 
persuasion. 
Taking the structure first, the stanza form is a 
combination of ten and eight syllable lines in the 
following order? 10, 10, 10, 8, 10, 8, 8, 10. This 
provides significant variation of the evenly stressed 
lines which might otherwise become monotonous, but it is 
also used to more positive effect. The three lines in the 
first stanza beginning with the word "upon" are 
deliberately hypnotic, drawing the mind, which has already 
been led to the "winding, ancient stair", up "the steep 
ascent" to the battlement and thence upwards into the 
night sky, focussing at last on the pole star. The shorter 
line "Upon the breathless starlit air" is followed by a 
pause (a ten-syllable line being expected) into which the 
reader's mind opens out, following the suggestion of the 
words. The return to regular iambic pentameter in the 
fifth line is a rhythmic, ritualistic fixing of the 
attention, accompanied by the hint of something fixed or 
certain in the universe, and the imperative of the sixth 
line, to which the mind is now prepared to respond, 
repeats this stabiliz ation in a different way. The four-
beat line is more suited to the imperative voice, and the 
repetition of this rhythm gives an evenness and continuity 
of effect. It is also an easier pattern for the mind to 
follow, particularly as it is rounded off by a return to 
the longer line. 
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The nature of the S3rmbolism used also contributes to 
the summons of the soul. The winding stair is an ancient 
symbol with a peculiar fitness to the task of drawing the 
mind upwards, quite apart from any special significance it 
may have in Yeats's metaphysical scheme. Steps were 
designed for ease of ascent and the rhythmic patterning of 
the spiral form, combined with the fact that the end is 
not visible, helps the mind to concentrate upon the ascent 
rather than being distracted upwards too quickly. The 
externally unrewarding, harmoniously-patterned stairway is 
finely suggestive of the way the mind must close in upon 
itself before it can open out into infinity. This effect 
could no doubt be achieved in other ways, but the physical 
presence of the tower has allowed it to be contracted here 
into the minimum possible space, uniting the whole 
experience into this one stanza. 
The description of the stair as "ancient" and of the 
battlement as "broken, crumbling" gives an important sense 
of time to the stanza. It adds to the tone of custom and 
authority and lends the mind movement in a dimension 
conducive to meditative thought, assisting its escape from 
the binding of the senses in the present moment. Night 
also helps. The "breathless starlit air" into which the 
thoughts emerge from the enclosed stairway induces them to 
expand. The word "breathless" cancels sound and touch, 
the silence affords no distraction for the ear, the 
stillness none for the senses in general. Everything 
contributes to heighten mental awareness. But the night 
is not a mere blank. It is "starlit"s that is, it is 
invested with meaning, mystery, and a sense of infinite 
distance. The star "that marks the hidden pole" draws the 
mind from simple expansiveness and awe into one particular 
i 4 o 
area. The pole star is the guiding mark for travellers, 
but the pole it marks is hidden, physically to our senses 
and mentally to our conjectures.^ 
Despite all this coercion, self replies boldly, 
forcing the mind in the opposite direction, not inward 
into infinity, but outward to a very definite physical 
presence. The sword is consecrated to a very different 
ideas to war and human conflict. It is also ancient but, 
far from decaying, it is "Still razor-keen, still like a 
looking-glass Unspotted by the centuries". It has escaped 
the ravages of time because it has been protected by the 
scabbard, which in turn has been wrapped up in a piece of 
embroidered silk. In the stanza it is the silk which is 
emphasised, the scabbard being merely described as wooden. 
Thus in this stanza Yeats shows the paradoxical 
preservation of things which the soul would consider to be 
transient distractions from the ultimate truth. The poet 
invokes life in its most exciting aspects? love and war. 
And he does so through precise and vivid images, full of 
suggestions of light, pattern, and movement. 
This stanza entirely reverses the previous one, 
beginning with a different kind of reverence - the 
"consecrated blade". Now the body is emphasised rather 
than the mind, starting from the phrase "upon my knees" in 
the first line. The word "still" is repeated several 
1 
This may be compared with the ending of Marvell's "A 
Dialogue between the Resolved Soul and Created Pleasure" 
Chorus 
Triumph, triumph, victorious Soul; 
The World has not one Pleasure more; 
The rest does lie beyond the Pole, 
And is thine everlasting Store. 
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times, as "set...your mind upon..." was in the first 
stanza, giving the sense of permanence which before was to 
be found in negation. The other sense of "stiil" 
contributes to the presentation of the sword as an object 
of contemplation, but the contemplation is turned towards 
life. "Razor-keen" calls up ideas of violent action, and 
this action appears again in the word "torn", emphasised 
by its position as rhyme-word and line-ending, which 
projects all the violence of human love and stands in 
shocking apposition to the associations of gentle 
femininity of "flowering, silken, old embroidery". 
The strong rhymes of the two shorter linesj 
...torn 
From some court-lady's dress and round 
The wooden scabbard bound and wound, 
give them the self-containedness of a rhyming couplet, 
further compacted by the internal rh3nne in the second line 
and by the syntactical inversion which allows the meaning 
to be completed within the two lines. The effect is to 
emphasise the sense of the rhyme words. "Round", "bound", 
"wound", echo the turns of the spiral stair, but here 
enclose the object of contemplation in external human 
affairs. And, despite the effects of time and rough 
handling, the cloth is still able to lend sensuous beauty 
as well as protection to the masculine sword. It is 
"flowering" still, with the hint of natural processes of 
growth and the beauty of the earth, in total opposition to 
the colourless austerity of the soul's doctrine and of the 
crumbling tower. 
In the third stanza the soul questions why a man "long 
past his prime" should remember such things when he should 
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be concerned with his soul. Life is a punishment for 
original sin, to be borne repeatedly by those who do not 
escape from the cycle by a life given to meditation and 
renunciation, to self-immolation in the "ancestral night". 
"Ancestral" leads the mind back into the past once more, 
through past generations to those primitive men who felt 
the spirits of their ancestors to be present in the night, 
and, through an almost universal pattern of belief, back 
before the Fall to the creation of life from the primeval 
darkness when night itself was our ancestor. Thus, 
ancestral night can deliver us from error by reuniting us 
with the creative force. 
Though shaken to find the self so resolutely pitched 
against persuasion, the soul returns to the previous 
argument, but the command is much less assured. The 
repetitive form is reduced to the line "To this and that 
and t'other thing", a weak expression which is forced on 
the soul by the need to eliminate the distraction which a 
catalogue of the intellect's wanderings would induce. In 
contrast, the word "crime" in the last line is unexpectedly 
strong, and gains by its unexpectedness, shocking us into 
a new estimation of life and persuading by its very 
strength. 
Self counters immediately, as before, with specific 
recollection and description. Attention is attracted by 
the introduction of a vividly personal note and 
interesting detail. Time and, by implication, place are 
particularised and once more we see the sword and the 
embroidered cloth, now made as rich as possible in 
sensuous suggestion by the colourings "Heart's purple". 
Self sets life against its negation as day against soul's 
Ik3 
night. The sword was a reflector of light, and its 
associations are further broadened here to support the 
self's rebellion against the designation of life as a 
crime. Self makes no denial, but claims the soldier's 
right to commit the crime, implying that conflict is man's 
proper environment, death and birth its natural 
consequences. The sacred nature of the sword is not 
pressed by the self at all, although the Japanese warrior 
class were the servants of a deity. Only the ageless 
continuity and the heroic nature of man's struggle, its 
dignity and beauty, are urged. 
At the beginning of the fifth stanza the soul, having 
learnt its lesson perhaps, presents, rather than argues, 
its case. The state of contemplative rapture is 
magnificently embodied in the image of overflowing water 
(strictly unspecified, but water is the most natural 
association). The self, which is bound up with the senses, 
is forgotten because the intellect is no longer busy 
separating the self from the other or concerned to justify 
its own actions through uncertainty of its selfhood. 
Heaven is a state of total dissolution of self, allowing 
the soul to be reoccupied by the divine essence. 
But it is the "basin of the mind" which must receive 
the flux while the man lives. The emotions must be filled, 
the intellect numbed before soul can achieve its aim. 
This stanza re-enacts this process and reaches an ecstatic 
climax at "Heaven", but then the soul carries the 
implication to its logical conclusions complete 
dissolution of self is possible only with the death of the 
body, complete forgiveness for the crime. But then the 
soul will no longer have an existence in a separate mind 
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and so will no longer have a voice. If the soul in its 
meditation actually reaches heaven then its tongue is 
literally as dead as a stone. The suggestion of 
intractable solidity is equally as important here as the 
associations of absolute lifelessness. It produces a 
kinaesthetic image: the feeling of the mouth being stopped 
up with a lump, preventing speech and breath, and so 
filling the head with its gagging sensation that the mind 
is also stopped. The soul is brought to total constraint 
despite his efforts to escape into infinite freedom 
because the self is still alive and the two are 
irrevocably joined. Escape from life is necessarily 
incompatible with living. 
Therefore, as in the second part of the poem, the 
voice of the poet must be the voice of the self. And once 
again self reverses what the soul has said, deliberately 
contrasting idea and image. Self speaks, not of the dead, 
but of "A living man" and says that he is blind, but not 
through mystical insight. Instead, he is compared to the 
blind man of the Biblical story who falls into the ditch. 
In place of the overflowing fullness falling into the 
basin of the mind is the ditch-water he must actually 
drink, the overflow of the earth. For the living man 
there is no ascent to heaven, only the fall to the 
impurity of the earth, yet, strangely at this point, self 
does not seem dismayed. 
Self then reviews the life he is willing to live 
again, now showing its struggle bereft of beauty and 
heroism, and even of dignity? "ignominy" in boyhood, 
"clumsiness" in adolescence and immature manhood, ugliness 
as an adult. "How in the name of Heaven", he asks, can 
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man avoid taking on the lowest of aspirations for himself, 
the "defiling and disfigured shape" he sees mirrored In 
the attitudes towards him of other men? He must use their 
judgment of him very largely to form his opinions of 
himself. Conflict Is not confined to the physical, and 
the mlrror-llke sword of the self-confident warrior Is now 
transformed Into the harshly judging eyes the fearful, 
self-conscious man feels upon him. The repetition of the 
word "eyes", aided by the Internal rhyme and consequent 
rocking rhythm of line five. Imitates the suggested 
reflection, and the pattern Is reiterated In the 
repetition of "shape". The effect Is much harsher than 
the similar ones in stanzas one and two of the first part 
of the poem, and perhaps with reason since it produces a 
shifting effect, suggestive of the moral uncertainty and 
compromise created by man's isolation among his fellows. 
The phrase "How in the name of Heaven" is not merely 
a colloquial exclamation, although it does correspond in 
tone to the harsh realism of the stanza. The capitalization 
of the word "Heaven" calls to mind the soul's words, 
suggesting that this is an answer to the soul's demand 
that man should escape. Since he must live in the world, 
he cannot escape the brutalislng effect of conflict simply 
by yearning towards heaven. Release from the dissociation 
of "Knower" from "Known" and "Is" from "Ought" depends on 
complete self-knowledge and this is not achievable solely 
in the face of heaven. The last two lines seem to imply 
that in any case escape would be pointless if a man can 
arrive at some conception of honour, but their meaning is 
made uncertain by the ambiguous construction and the 
metaphorical usage. The words "wintry blast" do not 
relate closely to the Intricate pattern of imagery in the 
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rest of the poem, and, since this is one of Yeats's chief 
means of conveying significances in this poem and 
elsewhere, the lines must rely on their own clarity. 
There are two possible ways of interpreting "wintry blast"^ 
as a general reference to the "winter of our discontent" 
or the antagonism of other men, and as a metaphor for old 
age.^ The latter interpretation is supported by the 
chronological sequence of boyhood - adolescence - manhood 
in the stanzas preceding these lines. The ambiguity 
depends on whether the phrase "in the wintry blast" is 
related to the subject or the object of the clause, which 
thus means either that honour may come to him in the 
wintry blast of discord, or may come to him at last in old 
age. The question implies that an escape from the 
miseries of life is not a satisfactory substitute for a 
life of honour. The values of the warrior, of active 
living, are more important. 
In the following stanza self answers the earlier 
questions "What matter if the ditches are impure? What 
matter if I live it all once more?" by a re-affirmation of 
his belief in the values of life and his acceptance of its 
1 
The line has a Shakespearian ring, and if the first calls 
to mind Gloucester's opening speech in Richard III largely 
because of the associations with mirror-images and 
deformity, the second is a well-established metaphorical 
relationship frequently used by Shakespeare. This is an 
example of a Simple Replacement metaphor and shows, as 
Miss Brooke-Rose suggests, a characteristic ambiguity; but 
it seems highly probable that Yeats intended the ambiguity 
as it relates to the meaning of the poem. The concept of 
honour may come to a man in his reaction to the antagonism 
of others or in the recognition of approaching death, but 
however it comes, it is more important for the living man 
than escape. 
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struggle, but he does not now "claim as by a soldier's 
right A charter to commit the crime once more". Instead, 
he accepts all the baseness and humiliation of "A blind 
man battering blind men" in a ditch. The last four lines 
of this stanza must face the charge of inadequate 
dramatization. It is true that the relationship between 
man and woman must be responsible for much of the discord 
and folly, but the wooing of "A proud woman not kindred of 
his soul" seems at once too particular and too general to 
be considered the "most fecund ditch of all". It has the 
suggestion of a personal reference but lacks the intimacy 
which lends interest to Sato's sword, for instance. Such 
interest would be out of place in this general survey of 
life, but if this flat statement had been given the 
vividness of imagery of the rest of the poem, and this 
includes the general statements in this second section, it 
would have been easier to accept. 
Having accepted life at its worst, the labour of self-
examination can begin because the worst in the self can 
now be accepted also. If life is valued simply for itself, 
without the necessity of setting up heroic ideals against 
the desire for spiritual release, failures and shortcomings 
can be forgiven. But complete self-knowledge is necessary 
for complete forgiveness, and therefore every past action 
or thought must be analysed and appraised, accepted for 
what it is. The phrase "forgive myself the lot 2" deserves 
its exclamation mark as the culmination of this process. 
It is both surprising and yet fully prepared for. 
The last five lines grow from this new feeling of 
content to a simply-expressed, Blakean hymn of joy in life 
which stands in contrast to the ending of the soul's 
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argument in silence and obstruction. The ditch becomes a 
stream and finally a great flow of sweetness which enters 
not the mind but the breast. Self claims that forgiveness 
is possible in life, and that it comes from within rather 
than from a divine or supernatural source. With his 
escape from self-accusation self is able to reach the 
state the soul called heaven, where man is no longer 
separated from the other - "I" changes to a triumphant 
"we". The escape proposed by soul necessitated that man 
be "deaf and dumb and blind", but self's release from 
mental anxiety involves facing rather than turning away 
from the world; he looks, laughs and sings. In this state 
man himself achieves a state of sanctity, being united not 
with the infinite, but with everything that is present to 
hims 
We are blest by everything, 
Everything we look upon is blest. 
Much of the critical comment on this poem has been 
dealt with in detail in chapter two. The point made by 
Bayley and Donoghue,^ that the poem ends with a gesture 
which is not logically prepared for and the casting vote 
is delivered "before the poor soul has well begun", has 
already been discussed,and my reason for opposing this 
view emerges clearly, I think, from the interpretation of 2 
the poem. Allied to this is the claim by D.S. Savage 
that because the determinism of Yeats's system frees the 
individual from moral responsibility and from all 
uncertainties Yeats could adopt an attitude of "hard, 
1 
Bayley, p.115, Donoghue & Mulryne, p.108. 
2 
P.Y., p.186. 
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scornful acceptance" and could "go on to that celebration 
of blind, passionate, aimless life out of which some of 
his most magnificent verse arose" (Savage here quotes the 
last two stanzas of "Dialogue"). Savage applies his 
judgment of the system directly to the poem, without 
giving the poem the individual attention it requires. The 
second part of the poem can hardly be described as a 
"celebration" of this view of life at its most painful, 
nor is his acceptance "scornful" but involves the putting 
aside of ideals until they can be grounded in the hardest 
and ugliest details. 
Whitaker suggests that the salvation through self-
knowledge may itself be used by the ego as the basis for a 
new pride, but adds "But that pride is again known and 
rendered - in the consciously rhetorical phrase 'such as 
I', as in the allocation of this speech to 'My S e l f in 
opposition to 'My Soul'",^ This seems to imply a rather 
loose understanding of the poem as a whole, since the 
speech could not possibly be attributed to the soul. Yet 
Whitaker may be right in finding a new pride here. It is 
the pride necessary to the ideal of honour, and is achieved 
through the utmost humility. If the poem did not 
2 
demonstrate this conception of honour, L.C. Knights would 
be justified in saying that this poem and "Vacillation" 
(discussed below) show a "^recognition of the need for 
integration rather than the achieved wholeness". Taking 
these two poems together, one might say that they show a 
1 
Whitaker, p.l6l. 
2 
"W.B. Yeats; The Assertion of Values", Southern Review 
VII (19^1), p.^0. 
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recognition of the continued need for re-examination of 
the claims of the soul and of the opposing aims and 
attitudes of the personality. 
Parkinson^ claims that poems such as "Dialogue" and 
"Vacillation" are partly "pre-poetic" because the poem is 
a step towards the condition in which the contemplative 
act is possible. The exaltation shown in the poems can be 
questioned, Parkinson says, since, "if this is the poem's 
substance, why is it not the very texture of the whole?" 
But in "Dialogue" the exaltation is in a sense a gift 
which comes unasked when the poet fully accepts life as 
conflict. The poem is "about" conflict, and this the 
very texture of the whole. But there may be some 
justification in the complaint that this poem lacks 
"exaltation". Although the second section does enact the 
process it describes, dragging the reader down into the 
ditches and fighting its way out through the moral 
confusion, its generality, compared with the particularity 
of the sword and tower images in the first section, does 
produce some reduction of vividness and of concentration. 
Blood and the Moon 
The first section does not function as a complete 
poem but introduces the major themes. These are the 
concentration upon place and people, and upon the specific 
emblem of the tower and the nature of the people who built 
it; and the opposition between the poet's declared satiric 
intention and his benediction of the place and of the 
tower and its associations. The element of contrast 
1 
Parkinson, pp.50-51. 
151 
appears first in the third line with the change from 
benediction to "A bloody, arrogant power", and is repeated 
in the unexpected word "Uttering" in line five. The main 
meanings of this word are "speaking or saying", or perhaps 
"producing", and "spreading out, broadcasting". The 
antecedent of the pronoun at the end of the line could 
possibly be either the tower or the race, but the nearness 
of race, the presence of the semi-colon, and the parallel 
construction of the phrases beginning "Rose..." which 
compare the domination of this power to the domination of 
the storm-beaten cottages by the tower suggest that the 
antecedent is "race". The particular use of "uttering" is 
not further explained at this point, but the explicitness 
of the statement "I have set A powerful emblem up, And 
sing it rhyme upon rhyme" brings to mind this word and 
hints at a parallel. 
The short, two-beat lines, rhyming in quatrains, and 
the rocking rhythm assisted by the repeated phrase "In 
mockery..." combine to give a song-like quality to the 
stanza, which begins as a simple hymn and ends as a 
satirical ballad. 
The second section opens out abruptly into a long, 
discursive line and conversational tone quite different 
from the tone of the first section. In that section the 
emblem might have been the tower or it might have been the 
poem about it ("sing it rhyme upon rhyme"), or both. It 
was compared to the tower by implication, from the 
structure of the stanza and from the phrase "set up", 
suggesting the raising of the tower, and contrasting with 
the opposite use of the word "uttering". In the second 
section the emblem is clearly the tower, but it remains at 
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first the emblem of certain civilisations. Alexandria's 
beacon suggests a light of learning as well as the power 
of empire. Babylon's ziggurats were, as we are told, 
microcosms of the universe, from which the astrologer-
priests consulted the gods. 
Now, within the same stanza, the association swings 
back to the implications of "uttering" and "singing". Not 
only civilisations have tower emblems: poets, too, may use 
them as Yeats is using this one, and with similar 
associations of intellectual power. The next stanza, and 
the rest of section two develop this link between writers 
and the powers of the intellect and of civilisations. The 
place mentioned in the first section is now seen to be 
Ireland, and dominant among the "bloody, arrogant power" 
who gave a tongue, and hence a positive existence, to the 
race are four famous eighteenth century Anglo-Irishmen? 
Goldsmith, Swift, Berkeley and Burke, These men Yeats 
claims for his ancestors, who have climbed before him the 
winding stair of his symbolic Irish tower. 
The arduous effort of climbing this stair is 
emphasised by the rhythm and reiteration of meaning in 
"winding, gyring, spiring" and by the associations of the 
word "treadmill". The various strengths which enabled 
them to "travel there" are described in the following 
stanzass Swift, driven to fury by entrapment in the 
physical state of man, hating the corruption of the ideal 
by the body; Goldsmith, with the wit and worldly wisdom of 
"The Bee", aware of man's ordinary social state; Burke, 
who saw man as part of an organic community, denying the 
abstract theories of^equality of man and asserting the 
aristocratic virtues of strength and magnanimity; and 
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Berkeley, whose power of mind could burn away the 
necessities of the physical universe and convert it into 
the thought of God. 
These discursive stanzas are enlivened by internal 
contrasts: the sudden violence of the passage on Swift 
against the calm of that on Goldsmith, the "blood-sodden 
breast" against the "honey-pot" of the mind; the deliberate 
pace and elaborate metaphor reflecting the measured 
cadences of Burke's dignified prose and also his 
autocratic philosophy against the witty treatment of 
Berkeley's transformation of substance to mind and spirit, 
the haughty birds of the great-minded against the "pig of a 
world". The four contrasting minds extend over the range 
of man's existence, treating his emotional, social, moral 
and metaphysical conditions. These are the men of his 
blood, arrogant in many ways, but with the "strength that 
gives our blood and state magnanimity of its own desire". 
The words "blood and state" echo a mutability poem by 
James Shirley^ which places final value in "the actions of 
the just". Although these words have already acquired a 
complex of associations within the poem and the reminder 
of death introduces an odd note at this point, the 
significance of this echo may appear later. 
The description of the mastering power as "bloody" 
remains unexplained except for the association with 
Swift's "blood-sodden breast", but section three 
introduces new associations for the word. Contrasting 
again with the long, uneven lines of section two and its 
1 
"The glories of our blood and state", Song from The 
Contention of AJax and Ulysses. 
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general expansiveness, this section consists of a single 
stanza of decasyllabic lines. The lyrical quality of the 
first lines contrast also with the energetic, though 
ceremonious, language of section two's climax, as with the 
final image of "intellectual fire". But the calm of the 
first line, "The purity of the unclouded moon", is shaken 
already in the second by the implication that the pure 
whiteness of the moon's light is a challenge of some kind, 
"flung" upon the tower floor. This purity is untouchable 
by time, unmarked by the blood of men. 
This seems at first to be actual, physical blood, 
shed by violent men for the meanest motives, men whose 
brutality is emphasised by the fact that they simply 
"stood...and shed blood". But this is disputed by the 
repeated assertion that this blood was unable to stain the 
moonlit floor. The word "jet" operates in two ways, at 
leasts as a jet of liquid (i.e. blood) and as 
a black stone or mark. The phrase "cast a...jet" has 
several meanings, among which the following may be 
relevant in this context; ostentatious display, parade or 
boast; an impulse or effort of mind; an idea, device or 
contrivance. The first suggestion which emerges from this 
is that they were unable to meet or oppose the challenge 
of the moon's purity. There is too much emphasis on the 
action of these men for the phrase "blood of innocence" 
to be interpreted merely as meaning that their victims 
were innocent. In any case it seems unlikely that Yeats 
would present so simple a view of human affairs. The 
innocence, the incapacity for harm, is theirs also when 
compared with whatever is represented by the moon. The 
blood they shed has no existence in that context. 
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Although the tower-room floor is unmarked, there is 
"Odour of blood on the ancestral stair". The poet and his 
ancestors who have climbed the stair may not have shed any 
blood, but they are drunk with the smell of it, and it is 
clearly these men who feel the challenge of purity, as if 
they were the murderers. Their guilt thus apparently lies 
in their consciousness of their human impurity, despite 
their attempted ascent to wisdom. There may possibly be 
an association here with another meaning of "cast a jet"; 
in contrast to the murderers who were unable to make an 
effort of mind, those who gather on the stair have been 
able to conceive of the ideal and are maddened by the 
taint of their blood. 
The final section turns again to the tower. Peacock 
and tortoiseshell butterflies "cling" to the windows, 
which have the dust of the earth, the glitter of the moon, 
being the media which let the beauty and purity of the 
moonlight through to the tower-inhabitants. The 
butterflies are earth creatures, yet seem part of the 
skies. They are the beauty which has been created on 
earth, but they are now apparently lifeless, or at least 
unmoving. The only living things are a couple of dun-
coloured moths. The suggestions of these lines are 
confirmed when the poet repeats the mocking statement of 
the first section, this time as a question? "Is every 
modern nation like the tower, Half dead at the top?" 
The change from statement to question is important, 
because now the poet withdraws his mockery, "For wisdom is 
the property of the dead, A something incompatible with 
life". ¥isdom is beyond man's reach as it is beyond his 
power, and his best creations are mere butterflies, pretty 
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creatures but not sublime, and still part of the earth, 
with only a seeming connection with the source of the 
light of the imagination. Thus, if the nation half 
dead at the top, it could hardly be otherwise if it seeks 
for wisdom. But this alone would be a very unsatisfactory 
resolution, and Yeats does not leave it there. Because 
the division between life and death, power and wisdom is 
absolute, it does not prevent their interaction. The moon 
is immaculate and unattainable, but it does appear to man. 
Man, in his efforts to reach it, is still subject to the 
rule of death, but if he were not he would have to forfeit 
power along with blood. And the combination of power and 
striving, intellectual strength and will, is what makes 
man great and gives him the power to express himself and 
so to live most fully. This perhaps explains the allusion 
to Shirley's poem, which also states that all man's 
glories must fade 
but 
Onely the actions of the just 
Smell sweet, and blossom in their dust. 
Those who ascend the stair must die before they can reach 
up beyond the tower into the moonlight, but their efforts 
remain as emblems for those who live after them. 
Recognition of the allusion to the Shirley poem is 
not necessary to an understanding of the poem, any more 
than it is necessary to consult all of Shelley's references 
to towers to understand the point Yeats is making about 
them. At the most, the latter case assumes some knowledge 
of Shelley's attitudes and of his poetry, but even this is 
not strictly necessary since Yeats explains his reference, 
and the bare necessity is to know that Shelley was a poet. 
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The poem by Shirley acts as a counterpoint to Yeats's poem 
if" it is knowni if not, the immediate poem is enough. 
This kind of allusion is justified because it leaves 
the poem intact, unlike the interpretations made by Seiden, 
for instance, which depend on knowledge of Yeats's prosej 
He recalls in "Blood and the Moon" that centuries 
ago a murder was committed on the winding stair 
at Thoor Ballylee. But, he observes, time has 
washed away the stains of blood; and he hopefully 
adds that the gyres of history must wash away, 
also, the violence in our twentieth century 
world.1 
The poem does not mention a murder on the stair, nor is 
there any suggestion that time has anything to do with the 
spotlessness of the moonlit floor or that the violence 
associated with the power appropriate to blood must be 
eradicated. Similarly unjustified is Seiden's statement 
that the conclusion to the poem is a "dramatic avowal" 
that "human culture originates in - and is pre-determined 
2 
by - Anima Mundi". The poem is concerned with the 
products of great men and great civilisations, which may 
be inherited by later generations, but it contains no 
suggestion of a concept such as Anima Mundi. This, like 
Seiden's curious interpretations of the "blood of 
innocence" and "odour of blood" mentioned previously (page 
Ilk above), is an unwarranted introduction of the special 
theories described in Yeats's prose. 
The close organisation of section three in particular 
has contributed largely towards the varying interpretations 
1 
Seiden, p.2^9. 
2 
Ibid., p.2^5. 
158 
of this poem. John Unterecker sees the moon itself, and 
not the desire to reach its purity, as the cause of the 
"drunken frenzy"s 
...the "pure moon is made the ultimate agent of 
corruption, the cause for the "blood-saturated 
ground" at the foot of the tower. Though for 
the seven centuries that the tower has stood the 
moon has washed its foundations in innocent 
blood, the "arrowy" murderous "shaft" of moonlight 
has itself remained pure.1 
This implies that the moon has incited the slaughterers to 
violence also, but there is no suggestion that the motive 
for their killing is an attempt to defile the immaculate 
moonlight. Their motives are clearly stated to be 
otherwise: simple consequences of the unenhanced condition 
of blood. 
It is questionable also whether the slaughterers 
stand at the foot of the tower, since the antecedent of 
the word "there" in the fifth line of section three appears 
to be "floor" in line two. This seemingly trivial point 
has some importance in the interpretation of the poem by 
2 
T.R. Whitaker, who sees in the poem only a personal 
advance in self-knowledge for the poet, rather than the 
more general statement I have suggested. Whitaker 
considers the reversal of the final stanza to be a denial 
of the positive values attributed to Swift, Goldsmith, 
Berkeley and Burke in section two, brought about by the 
poet's realisation that "Spirit and blood no longer meet 
and interpenetrate in the miracle of various life". At 
1 
A Reader's Guide to ¥.B. Yeats, p.20?. 
2 
Whitaker, pp.211-215-
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the end, the poet is left "half-dead, barred from full 
life or death", but with the improvement over "Swift's 
middle state" that "As the victim of his historical moment, 
he has at least the wisdom appropriate to his condition? 
...he knows himself". 
Three main points contribute to this interpretation. 
The first is related to the relationship between "soldier, 
assassin, executioner" and the "we" of line eleven in 
section three. Whitaker, like Unterecker, does not find 
any contrast between the place where the blood is shed and 
the place where its odour lingers. He says the blood is 
on the stair. Whitaker prints "here" for "there" in line 
eleven,^ and if one read it in this way it would certainly 
reduce the element of contrast which I have suggested. 
But if line ten does not point to a contrast it does not 
have much meaning except as a "poetical" exclamation. 
Probably because of this reading, Whitaker interprets "we" 
as "men of the present time", not as "those who ascend the 
stair", and this in turn may explain why he thinks of the 
speaker as "now barred from physical power" and the stair 
as "no longer the gyre of life but a deathly limbo between 
2 blood and the moon". 
The second point then arises naturally from this 
interpretation. Whitaker evidently refers the words "No 
matter what I said" to all of the poem, commenting that 
the "abrupt and arrogant reversal is tinged, he knows, 
3 with 'drunken frenzy' and bitter mockery". But this 
1 
The Variorum Edition of the poems gives only "there". 
2 
Whitaker, p.2l4. 
3 Ibid., p.215. 
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"bitter mockery" is expressed in a surprisingly light tone 
and there hardly seems to be any "drunken frenzy" in the 
first few lines of this last stanza. The tone relates 
this statement to the immediately preceding lines and to 
the mockery of section one. It does not seem likely that 
the statement refers to the description of the 
significance of the tower because this is less a part of 
the "argument" of the poem than a definition of its terms. 
The "argument" refuted by this statement surely lies in 
the opposition of blood and moon. The present state of 
the tower is recognised to be less important than the 
realisation that, although success in attaining wisdom is 
impossible, the attempt is everything. 
Whitaker calls the first lines of the final stanza 
"a half-mocking perception of beauty in death" and goes on 
to speak of the poet's "deathly yearnings", but once again 
the tone is wrong. The mockery lies in the perception of 
the dullness of the living things - the night-moths - and 
the concern is for the living rather than the dead - "Is 
every modern nation like the tower, Half dead at the top?" 
The moment the speaker realises that the desire for the 
absolute of those who climb the tower can only be fulfilled 
in death he retracts his mockery. And the tone of the 
concluding lines is not one of "bittery mockery" and 
disillusioned recognition of impotence. The effect of 
making the moon an active agent in the last lines is to 
cause the reader to imagine the action of the moon's 
appearance, inducing an upsurge of the spirit as the mind 
moves up into the clear moonlight. The assurance and the 
final serenity of the conclusion is clearly opposed to the 
rather hysterical resolution Whitaker suggests. The 
blessing on the tower is not withdrawn. The "powerful 
I6l 
emblem" stands and the best in man combines its virtues 
and its necessities. 
The compression of section three, created in part by 
the multiple use of the tower symbol,undoubtedly 
contributes to such interpretations as Unterecker's and 
Whitaker's, to which may be added those of MacNeice and 
Seiden. The "real" historical tower plays against the 
theme of perfection and power, and unless such factors as 
the reason for giving the motivations of the killers are 
considered, the relationships may well be obscured. It is 
not sufficient to dismiss this as "almost hysterical 
rhetoric",^ as it is not sufficient to sum up the 
aspirations of the people of the tower as a "deathly 
yearning". Yeats's method demands continuous attention to 
every detail of implication and association because he 
uses all the resources of the method for interrelating 
sense-data and mental response. As stated previously, he 
delights in precise, but complex, patterns and the 
structure of these longer, compound poems is peculiarly 
suited to such an approach. 
Vacillation 
Like the sun man runs his course between extremities; 
day and night, birth and death, joy and misery, and many 
others. The title indicates that the poem is concerned 
with the attempt to reconcile or accept these antitheses. 
The flaming sword of the angel at the gate of Eden and the 
fires of purgatory and hell are the retribution for 
Original sin and sin in life. Our consciousness of sin 
1 
B.L. Reid, William Butler Yeats. The Lyric of Tragedy, 
1961, p.203. 
162 
makes these realities to us and kills our joy in life. 
Death, recurring in the heart's remorse and coming at last 
to the body, makes all life futile and meaningless, 
especially, since it decides the quality of our lives, 
that metaphorical life of the heart. This life is perhaps 
at its peak in the state known as joy, but what value has 
joy if we should be occupied with repentance? The short 
last line leaves a silence in which the question poses 
itself forcefully. 
In the second section the antinomies are given vivid 
form in the two-sided tree, each side of which is only 
half of the whole "and yet is all the scene": taking the 
metaphor literally, is all that can be seen from either 
side, perhaps; each is a complete stage setting, a 
complete view of life or setting for action. The second 
paradox of this image of opposites is more difficult. The 
link between the "brand, or flaming breath" and remorse 
and death in the first section and the "glittering flame" 
and "staring fury" of this section suggests that the flames 
that burn away our remorse are also our consciousness of 
sin and therefore renew remorse. Similarly, our delight 
in the world and in life also feeds on itself. Each side 
persists eternally. 
The cult of Attis involved the hanging of masks in 
pine or fruit trees and was an ecstatic cult like that of 
Dionysus with whom Attis came to be identified. The 
hanging of the image here suggests the artist who, in a 
state of imaginative exaltation stands between the two 
possible ways of life, the life of passionate involvement 
in the senses, blind to eternity, and that which is 
committed to a wider vision. In this state the artist may 
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have to rely on what is given to him in his inspiration 
but he is not subject to grief, which may perhaps come 
from either side, from loss or from remorse. This may be 
joy but it is not certain since this is only a negative 
affirmation. 
The third section presents a solution which divides 
life into two halves, corresponding to the two halves of 
the tree. The blind, lush leaf of youth should be enjoyed 
as fully as possible, although there are still opposing 
demands to fulfil and perfection and complete satisfaction 
are not possible. Youth having been consumed, death must 
be no longer forgotten and must be taken as the measure of 
life. Joy is to be found not in life but in death or in 
an attitude to death. Men should come "proud, open-eyed 
and laughing to the tomb". 
But the poet seems to have ignored the warning. 
Although part of his mind may urge him to think only of 
eternity, he is a poet still. At past fifty he is seen 
sitting in "a crowded London shop" - in the midst of the 
world he should have put behind him. He is not wholly, 
involved in that world, however. He gazes out at it, but 
he has been reading and somewhere between what he has read 
and what he sees his contemplation reaches a heightened 
state in which he knows what surely must be joy, 
blessedness. This is by no means the eternal beatitude of 
the saint at which the ascetic aims but it shares the 
happiness and the potency of the saint. 
Now another aspect of the antinomies appears, and 
another vacillation of mood. In section five the gold and 
silver of part three become the sun and the moon, and the 
"abounding foliage", no longer representing the vitality 
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of youth, is transmuted into "cloudy leafage of the sky". 
The first four lines pass naturally from simple 
description of summer sky and moonlit field to their 
suggestions of contemplation of spiritual bliss and of the 
earth's more disturbed beauty by means of the opposition 
of sky and field and by the almost kinetic effect of 
making the mind turn upwards to imagine the leaves of a 
tree above the head seen against the sky and then upwards 
again to turn the leaves into clouds, followed by the 
descending effect from "wintry moonlight" through the word 
"sink" to the field and the imagined effect of dark cloud 
shapes breaking up its open surface. The speaker says that 
he can neither look up towards heaven nor down at the 
earth's multiplicity although each is beautiful because he 
cannot free himself from his burden of conscience. Far 
from turning his mind away from earthly vanities to 
thoughts of his eternal soul, his feeling of guilt is so 
great that it occupies him wholly and he can find no relief 
in either. His sense of responsibility for his actual or 
possible deeds and thoughts deadens his heart to beauty and 
goads either spiritual conscience or earthly vanity. 
Section six presents three apparent rejections of the 
world from men in some state of power. The great lord of 
Chou surveys his dominions from the heights. The land is 
rich and everything is fresh and beautiful? the look of 
the meadows, the smell of the new-mown hay, the touch of 
the mountain snow. The conqueror, fresh from victory, has 
the greatest earthly power and wealth of his age within 
his grasp. Man has the power of creating that part of his 
experience which his imagination lights. From his dual 
nature, his heart which is both "blood-sodden" and the 
seat of his emotions, come the antinomies of day and night 
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as they relate to him. The word "gaudy" here is 
surprising enough in this context to bring vividly to mind 
the brightness and glitter, at the same time suggesting 
something which is artificial, and perhaps also the 
connotation of joy from the Latin root of the word and the 
physical resemblance to the bright bead, the Middle 
English "gaud". 
Now the meaning of the line "Let all things pass away" 
becomes clear. All song means this, Yeats says. The 
artist, like the seigneur and the victor, at the point of 
completion and fulfilment wishes never to have to return 
to a lesser state. It is equivalent to Keats's wish "That 
I might drink and leave the world unseen" in the "Ode to a 
Nightingale" but without the sentimentality of the mere 
desire for escape from the pains of this world which 
accompanies the ecstasy and is specifically rejected in the 
Keats poem. 
This aspiration to eternal ecstasy and the experience 
of blessedness of part four are clearly parallel to the 
yearning of the religious ascetic, or the voice of the 
soul, now named directly. Remorse and responsibility, 
which the soul would say are morally right, are the death 
of the heart. And, as they kill the heart from which 
springs those conflicts which man feels within himself and 
which promote the use of his imagination, they deny the 
singer his theme. The fire brings purification and 
salvation and unity with the divine, but the heart is by 
nature heterogeneous and sinful. "Original" takes both 
its senses in this context, indicating both the Fall which 
brought death to man and the sins which set in motion the 
Trojan war, for instance, and inspired the first great 
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singer. Conflict, between man and his god, man and man, 
man and the conditions of his life, is the theme of poetry. 
The tone changes in the final section now that the 
doubt of the first section has been resolved through 
contrasting positions into an explicit and defined 
opposition. Although at first still reluctant to come to 
a final rejection of the soul's position, the increased 
confidence in the status and necessity of the artist's 
experience of joy results in a final affirmation of the 
role of the heart. The structure of the verse-form has 
also been modified through the condensed, allusive 
dialogue of part seven to a longer line more suited to a 
conversational tone, although the rhyme scheme is still 
regular, more so, in fact, than in some other parts of the 
poem, and there is a strong S3mtactical stylisation, both 
of which contribute towards preventing any feeling of 
looseness or casualness that could reduce the carefully 
balanced humour of this section to mere frivolity. The 
use of the conversational figure and the slightly dry 
speaking voice with its precise qualifying remarks are 
strongly reminiscent of T.S. Eliot, and the situation is 
to some he portrays, 
noticeably similar particularly in the combination of A 
intellectuality and a regretful parting. The other figure 
is a real man here, but that is not vitally important 
since his views, as they bear on the poem, are made quite 
clear in the context. Both "Accept the miracles of the 
saints and honour sanctity" but the speaker cannot become 
a Christian because he feels he is "a singer born" and 
therefore cannot accept that life is important only as a 
preparation for the tomb. 
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There is another important difference, however. The 
poet accepts that St. Teresa's body is undecayed and gives 
off sweet, healing odours, but he follows this by 
speculating that she was preserved by the same process, 
and even by the same hands as were the Pharaohs. The first 
seems to suggest that he takes a very prosaic view of 
miracle and the second that he is also prepared to accept 
far more than Christianity would allow: reincarnation, 
perhaps, and a much broader, integrating conception of 
religion. Unsupported, this might appear whimsical and 
confused, but this stanza is as intricately patterned as 
the rest of the poem with a mosaic of word and image 
associations. In the tenth and eleventh lines the poet 
repeats the reference to Homer and then uses Holy 
Scripture against his opposition, quoting Samson's riddle 
of the lion and the honeycomb. "Out of the strong came 
forth sweetness" suggests a link with St. Teresa the 
ascetic, strong in faith, from whose tomb come sweet 
odours. These, and her healing powers as a saint seem 
"most welcome" in her tomb, and they are accepted in 
exactly the same way as were the curative properties of 
the Pharaoh's mummified remains in earlier periods, 
because their divinity had given them a resistance to 
bodily decay. 
The paradox of physical eternity is peculiarly 
poignant in the case of St. Teresa,^ who brought new 
1 
Sections four and six of this poem are directly 
comparable to St. Teresa's descriptions of the fourth and 
third stages of prayer. The Life of St. Teresa of Avila, 
translated by David Lewis, chs. 16-20; see especially 
pp.123-^ and 108-9-
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stringency to the religious life and whose writings 
concentrate on the progress of the soul towards perfect 
union with god. And this paradox plays against that other, 
reiterated in the last line, that the artist, despite his 
irredeemable worldliness, may also achieve a state of 
beatitude. The ironic parting with Von Hiigel (and Eliot) 
is accomplished with the utmost lightness of tone, but the 
whole weight of the poem is behind this assertion that 
delight in life need not preclude the gift of blessedness 
or unity with the divine. 
Like most of the other poems discussed here, 
"Vacillation" has proved attractive for source-hunting, 
and direct application of source material to the poem is 
frequent. Saul, for instance, explains who the Lord of 
Chou was, but does not explain his appearance in the poem.^ 
Seiden notes that the tree is the Kabbalistic Tree of Life 
whose roots are in the earth and whose branches are in 
2 
heaven, but omits to add that in the poem the roots are 
said to be in man's heart, not in earth, and that the tree 
has specific meanings there which are not suggested by the 
description "Kabbalistic". As the discussion of the poem 
shows, no reference to Kabbalism is necessary, and in fact 
Seiden makes no further use of this reference. Arguing 
from the original draft, Saul suggests that the opposites 
wedded in the tree are ignorance and knowledge, but this, 
again, is only helpful if the particular kinds of 
ignorance and knowledge specified by the various sections 
of the poem are distinguished. 
1 
Saul, p.l44. 
2 
Seiden, p.295-
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Application to the poem of A Vision and Yeats's 
letters and prose is common and sheds little enlightenment, 
occasionally even producing hopeless confusion, as in 
Seiden's comment that 
...Yeats writes with a deliberate, often 
exaggerated, ambiguity about all or almost all 
of his mixed attitudes towards the supernatural. 
Since he is a man in whom the antithetical and 
primary tinctures are balanced, we are told in 
each of the poems [of "Vacillation"], he can and 
he cannot communicate with Anima Mundi through 
an exultation in nature; and so, he is and he is 
not capable of a mystical or visionary 
experience.^ 
Unterecker claims that the essay "Per Amica Silentia 
Lunae", which explains the two realities: the terrestrial 
and the condition of fire, is "the primary vast footnote 
2 that should be appended to 'Vacillation'", but as Graham 
3 
Hough says, the language of the essay is obscure, and it 
is unnecessary to force it on to the poem, certainly as 
part of the primary understanding of the poem. Hough's 
own explanation of "Vacillation" IV is subtler, but still 
too bound to the ideas of A Vision to share the 
intelligibility in general terms which Yeats achieves in 
the poem. "Soul, having completed itself by assuming the 
mask, its complement, is liberated, and momentarily at 
least is out of the wheel", Hough explains. This is 
reasonable enough in its own terms but it leaves many 
specific suggestions of the poem out of account and so 
1 
Seiden, p.290. 
2 
A Reader's Guide to W.B. Yeats, p.221. 
3 
The Last Romantics, I96I, p.253. 
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tends to obscure the internal relationships which give the 
whole poem its meaning. Thus, Hough goes on to suggest 
that "At this time Yeats is disposed to interpret the 
liberation in something very like Christian terms", which 
is quite untrue, as section eight shows. 
This scruple may seem unfair to Hough, but his later 
discussion gives no clear indication of the position Yeats 
arrives at in this poem and his reasons for doing so, and 
this reluctance to admit Yeats's avowed agnosticism, 
shared by many critics, is associated with the most common 
misreadings of the poem. Yeats's recognition of those who 
"come Proud, open-eyed and laughing to the tomb" as a 
possible answer to the question of part one is emphasised 
and the final rejection of "What seems most welcome in the 
tomb" or the alternate joy obtainable through the artist's 
attitude towards life are understated or forgotten. 
Virginia Moore and V.K.N. Menon^ say that Von Hiigel is 
dismissed only because "he threw away the key of 
reincarnation". "Vacillation" III praises primary joy, 
Virginia Moore says, and the reference to the lion and the 
honeycomb means "out of the antithetical comes the 
primary". Even Homer is not anti-Christian because his 
theme is original sin; 
All that joyous heroism, what does it point up 
but man's fall from perfection and fight to 
regain it; the interest, ultimately, being for 
the sake of the perfection. So far, then, the 
poem...has said obliquely, 'The antithetical is, 
or serves, the primary, and directly or ^ 
obliquely has praised primary joy. [in part III J . 
(Author's italics) 
1 
Moore, pp.3'^3 and 4o6, Menon, p.69. 
2 
Moore, p.403. 
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Few critics bend so far backwards as Virginia Moore 
to rescue Yeats from his consciously individual stand, but 
suggestion can go far to make him seem less unconventional. 
Thus A.G. Stock says that "At the end Yeats bids farewell 
to saintliness to live in the pride of his finite strength; 
but he never denies that beatitude is in surrender to the 
infinite, which can only be through humility".^ If there 
is humility in the hanging of Attis's image, it is surely 
not of the Christian kind, and in part six the preliminary 
to "surrender to the infinite" is something more like 
pride; the sense of fulfilment after great effort. Even 
Richard Ellmann says that the poem "bows politely to 
orthodoxy - Von Hugel and annihilation", but section six 
is not only not orthodox, but, like the quotation from 
Judges xiv, uses orthodox religious writing to suggest an 
entirely different idea. St. Teresa's concrete, image-
filled prose, to which many of Yeats's own images are 
allied, is particularly apt for Yeats's purpose of 
maintaining his own religion of life against the orthodoxy 
of death. St. Teresa herself became a poet in the third 
state of prayer because 
The soul in this state would have all men behold 
it, and know of its bliss, to the praise of God, 
and help it to praise him. It would have them be 
partakers of its joy| for its joy is greater than 
it can bear....The admirable spirit of David, the 
royal prophet, must have felt in the same way, so 
it seems to me, when he played on the harp, 
singing the praises of God.2 
1 
Stock, p.206. 
2 
St, Teresa, p.l09. 
172 
As Ellmann himself laboriously shows through quotations of 
similar passages in "Per Arnica Silentia Lunae" and a 
letter, "the experience was physical as well as spiritual, 
a mixture characteristic of Yeats's brand of sanctity".^ 
Such experiences are undoubtedly religious in nature, but 
to align them with Christianity is to deny Yeats's 
questioning of that religion and so also the point of the 
2 poem. 
Perhaps because their major points seem obvious, 
sections six and eight receive very little detailed 
attention. Like Ellman, Parkinson assumes that section 
six is a rejection of the world, and asserts that the poem 
is "a deliberate denial of the ecstatic role" in which the 
symbols of the tree and Attis are "in effect lampooned by 
3 
the total poem".-^ Denis Donoghue says of the final 
section in relation to the whole poem: 
...one lives with miracle, if a miracle comes; if 
not, one still lives. Joy is available if the 
attributes of Self can swell and overflow... and 
fill up all the hollows left by Soul; or if Soul, 
in loneliness, 'descends' into the mire of 
humanity.^ 
This muddle results partly from a casual attitude towards 
"Vacillation" and partly from an attempt to read The 
Winding Stair volume as a structure controlling the 
1 
Ellman, Identity, p.270. 
2 
T.R. ¥hitaker agrees that Yeats's attitude is not a 
matter of sentimental reverence "as some critics' comments 
on 'Vacillation' imply", p.l6l. 
3 
Parkinson, The Later Poetry, pp.120-1. 4 
Donoghue and Mulryne, p.ll4. 
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meanings of the individual poems, producing here an 
incongruous coalition of "Dialogue" and "Vacillation". 
Equally vague is Donoghue's statement that section six 
presents an answer to mutability adopted "because this is 
a dignified stance". Ellmann, Stauffer and Kleinstiick 
all describe section six as exemplifying a "weariness" with 
the world, and the latter, arguing that a cyclical view of 
the universe may lead to the feeling that everything is 
worthless and meaningless, compares this section to some 
lines from Macbeth (V.v.49~50), "I 'gin to be a-weary of 
the sun, And wish the'estate o'the world were now undone". 
Ellmann is more discerning than this, but nevertheless the 
word "weariness" suggests a denial of the world rather 
than the exultation the world and in worldly power 
leading to a transcendence of the earthly state suggested 
by the context. The third stanza of this section is 
particularly hard to fit to this explanation, and would 
have to be interpreted as meaning that song is a weariness, 
a very ninetyish conception. Unterecker suggests that 
since the tree is rooted in man's heart, "song is as mortal 
as its maker, who must finally assert: Let all things, even 
2 
song itself, pass away". This is ingenious but does not 
explain why "Let all things pass away" is said to be the 
"meaning" of all song, and is equally false to the tone of 
these stanzas. Acceptance of such interpretations leaves 
the conclusion without sustained imaginative support in the 
rest of the poem and this, more than any intellectual 
reason, probably explains the lack of conviction these 
critics feel in Yeats's rejection of Christianity. 
1 
Ellmann, p.S?'^, Stauffer, p. 90, Maxwell and Bushrui , p. 13 
2 
Unterecker, pp.221-2. 
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Supernatural Sonffs 
This group of twelve poems is the most outstanding 
example of Yeats's method of controlling meaning by the 
use of a multitude of echoes, parallelisms and contrasts 
of idea and image forming an intricate mosaic. Some of 
the themes or image-patterns which appear in the poem are;-
light and darkness or blindness, knowledge and ignorance, 
speech and sound, illusion and reality, consummation and 
disjunction, unity and multiplicity, hatred and desire, 
love and war, body and soul, ascetic and lover, repetition, 
opposition and circularity. The method is therefore not 
simply a tour-de-force, but arises from and complements 
the thematic structure. 
The first poem of the group opens with the strikingly 
odd situation of the very old man, evidently a monk or a 
hermit, apparently reading in the dark. The poet makes 
use of this to bring the reader into the action of the 
poem by beginning with Ribh's comment on the reader's 
supposed surprise and going on to propose that he should 
be the bearer of Ribh's "tale" to others. Ribh is 
humorously aware of his own seeming absurdity but his 
manner in telling his tale is dignified and ceremonious 
and by the end of the first stanza it is clear that he 
does not regard his teaching lightly. 
The tale begins with Baile and Aillinn who, it is 
gradually revealed, suffered for their love and died, 
becoming angels who now come together again on the 
anniversary of their death. Enough is given of the story 
for the reader to understand their importance to this poem. 
Although the tale is the subject of an early poem by Yeats, 
the differences between the two poems are as illuminating 
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as the extra information gained about Baile and Aillinn by 
following this allusion. In the earlier poem the lovers 
were turned into swans, but the figure is not developed 
and their eternal love is told in terms of other images 
which by implication eventually return them to human form. 
Here there is no such vague and airy paradise. They are 
"transfigured to pure substance" but retain their human 
form and are conjoined above their grave. Their 
representative trees, separate in the earlier poem, now 
grow together over their grave, forming a symbol of their 
love much more forcible and natural than the tablets of 
yew and apple wood on which their story was written in the 
earlier version. The change is given credence by being 
assumed: "All know their tale,...What juncture of the 
apple and the yew, Surmount their bones". This, together 
with the ensuing explanation of the story makes the 
earlier poem virtually unnecessary as an allusion. The 
tale is re-created here, altered where necessary, so that 
this poem is not dependent on the other. At this point it 
would hardly matter if Baile and Aillinn had been invented 
for the poem, but the fact that they are a part of Irish 
folklore adds an overtone to the themes of reality and 
illusion and the nature of knowledge which develop in the 
poem. 
Apple and yew suggest Eve's apple from the tree of 
knowledge and death, respectively, and are appropriately 
female and male in suggestion; as also, perhaps, are leaf 
and twig - foliage and support - but these do more to 
create the particularity of the setting. "Junction" and 
"surmount" are noticeable for their precise, formal 
quality. In the context, "surmount" may mean that the 
earthly part of the lovers, their bones, are overcome by 
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the Fall and death. But there is a positive aspect 
relating to the paradox of "The miracle that gave them 
such a death", which suggests that the flourishing of the 
united trees on the grave is a victory over death. 
These lovers have been given what all lovers desire, 
complete interfusion of substance. The association of 
angels and light provides a common basis for the image and 
there seems no necessity to associate it with Swedenborg,^ 
despite the novelty of the image, since it is thoroughly 
consonant with its setting. It is appropriate that, 
rather than the mechanical pressures and tensions of 
physical love, this meeting of "pure substances" should be 
a reaction of subtler forces, burning and giving off light 
like a chemical or electrical reaction. This disarming 
practicality is repeated in the last lines, where the 
light "Though somewhat broken by the leaves,...Lies in a 
circle on the grass" like a reading lamp. But there is a 
purpose in this seeming pedantry. The particularity makes 
the scene convincingly ordinary and realistic, the humour 
makes the fantasy more acceptable, and the details 
contribute to the pattern of sjrmbol and metaphor. The 
leaves which break the angelic light are things of the 
earth, suggesting that Ribh's reception of the light, and 
hence his ability to read and understand his holy book, 
are impeded by the fact that he is on earth. The circle 
of light on the grass is reminiscent of an enchanted or 
magic circle from which contact was made with the spirit 
world. 
1 
The continuity between earthly and heavenly love is 
established in the poem and it is the similarity that calls 
up the reminiscences of Swedenborg, who serves as a 
precedent. 
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The witty contrast between matter of fact and the 
supernatural appears again in the irony that "Those 
l o v e r s . H u r r y into each other's arms" while Ribh studies 
in their light. In heaven they enjoy the sexual 
intercourse usually thought of as peculiarly physical, 
while he, on earth, must live ascetically and pray. But 
there is a parallel within the contrast. Their suffering 
on earth gave them spiritual bliss, as Ribh's austerity 
and hardship fits him for spiritual knowledge on earth. 
The second section seems at first a complete change 
of subject, but it soon appears that the theme is 
continuous. Supernatural stories, like that of Baile and 
Aillinn's spiritual consummation, demand a sexual union of 
male and female elements, not an unnatural "abstraction" 
like the male Christian Trinity. (The presence of Patrick 
in the title seems to be simply a continuation of the 
fiction of reality of Ribh as a presumably Irish monk or 
hermit). Ribh has learnt from his holy book that "things 
below are copies" and that "Natural and supernatural with 
the self-same ring are wed", and we recall that Baile and 
Aillinn are wed in their ring of light. Ribh, it seems, 
is a Hermetist or Gnostic of some kind, but once again, it 
is far less important to take the "Great Smaragdine 
Tablet" as an allusion to the teachings of Hermes 
Trismegistus than to understand what the poem says about 
them. The reference to the Hermetic tradition sets Ribh's 
remarks in a context but that part of the tradition which 
is relevant to the poem appears in it. The tablet's 
doctrine is similar enough to the Platonic doctrine of 
forms to make it familiar, and the disagreement about the 
nature of the Trinity, also part of the Gnostic tradition, 
is given imaginative force by the illustration provided by 
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section one. The allusion is in any case too broad to be 
taken as more than an indication of the background and 
nature of Ribh's discourse. The "Great Smaragdine Tablet" 
need only be recognised as the God-given law tablet of an 
ancient religion, the old word for emerald adding the 
richness and impressiveness of the exotic to the 
suggestion of supernatural authority. 
Man, beast and Godhead, like Baile and Aillinn, "all 
must copy copies, all increase their kind", but in lower 
natures the conflagration is "damped by the body or the 
mind", and even angels, apparently, are only fused 
momentarily. The next phrase is trebly ambiguous. 
"Juggling" may be a substantive object^ "nature" may be 
the totality of the "natural" or a mode of being or a 
characteristic or mood; and "mounts" may mean "climbs on 
top of" or "increases, rises to a higher level of power or 
intensity" or "mounts sexually". The following phrase, 
"her coil in their embraces twined" makes it clear that 
nature is here thought of as a snake, but this does not 
necessarily limit the suggestions to the physical. The 
previous phrase may mean; (i) nature mounts that juggling^ 
(ii) that guileful nature mounts - joins in their 
consummation; (iii) that subtle, equivocating mode of being 
increases. The word "mounts" also calls to mind the trees 
which "surmount" Baile and Aillinn's bones. This 
multivalency is clearly no accident since the next stanza 
says that "The mirror-scaled serpent is multiplicity". 
The mirror scales of the serpent reflect the light of 
human consummation in many directions, and the image of 
the lovers which the scales give is fragmentary. Failure 
of love, the stanza explains, means that they can only 
imperfectly and partially reproduce themselves. 
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The numerical legerdemain of the final stanza has an 
important application to the concept of a Trinity, as has 
its counterpart in the Hermetic mystery religion. The 
"magic" represents the central mystery. Ribh does not 
deny the Trinity, but insists only that spiritual and 
material love and reproduction are not entirely dissimilar, 
as Christianity suggests, but are essentially the same. 
This is reiterated in the third section. The Godhead is 
at once male and female. It contains the opposites and 
unites them. The first lines of this poem also make 
explicit that this act ^ a mystery. Despite the fact 
that Ribh wants his tale carried aborad, it does not 
matter that the hearer did not understand him when he took 
part in the mystery. In his ecstasy he spoke in broken 
sentences, being an imperfect instrument of transmission 
for the mystery, just as his reception of the light was 
imperfect. But Ribh was, after all, able to share the 
ecstasy of Baile and Aillinn. His soul has been joined in 
spiritual union with its own cause or ground, and it is 
implied that the soul, in union, is the female principle 
of the Godhead. 
"Some shadow fell" may imply either that something 
resulted from the consummation, or that something came 
between Ribh and the light, or both: that something 
resulted from the union that was not spiritual. The 
analogy with the leaves of section one suggests that the 
shadow is connected with his soul, or its new birth, being 
resumed into his body. His soul forgets the creative 
passion and returns from the circle of unearthly light 
to the "common round of day". The contrast of "amorous 
cries" and "quiet" calls attention again to the 
combination of asceticism and sexuality: the cries come 
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out of the quiet night and out of meditation and "solitary 
prayer". 
The four images of the next poem, "There", each 
represent some kind of unity, the active verbs presenting 
the achieving of unity as an image. The barrel hoops are 
brought into place, sealing the separate staves into a 
single form. The serpents bite their tails, each forming 
a closed ring, suggesting the act of self-completion. The 
serpent with its tail in its mouth is an ancient symbol of 
wisdom, representing the mind ultimately understanding 
itself. In the context it also suggests the serpent of 
multiplicity achieving a state of unity. The third image 
says that There all the cycles, spirals and circling of 
the universe converge, like the coils of the serpent of 
nature coming together into a single circle. The 
culminating image shows the reduction of motion to 
stability and diversity to unity as the planets "drop" 
into the sun under gravity as the circling movement 
ceases. The Sun, capitalised, is the last word of the 
stanza and the climax of the series of images, and 
suggests Plato's equation of the sun with the final good, 
and the perfection of wisdom of the Godhead. Yeats's use 
of the word "There" parallels Plotinus's but the reference 
need not be noticed since its meaning is perfectly clear 
in the poem. 
"Ribh considers Christian Love insufficient" once 
again presents a seeming reversal which is gradually 
revealed to be in essential agreement with earlier 
statements. Ribh appears to reject love, which he has 
previously posited as the fundamental creative force, and 
claims instead to study hatred. But the title gives the 
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clue to the nature of his rejection. Christian love is 
insufficient, Ribh suggests, for two reasons. Love "is of 
God and passes human wit" and therefore man cannot 
reproduce God's love as Christianity urges. Secondly, 
Christianity, like other religious systems, is a way of 
understanding the supernatural which has been developed by 
man, and in order to achieve union with the Godhead the 
soul must reject all human thought and concentrate only on 
God. Ribh dissented from the Christian Trinity because it 
was an abstraction, not representing the truth symbolically 
apparent in nature. Now he is more radical, rejecting all 
human thought as a mere covering, superficially bright, of 
the truth. The soul as bride must approach God in 
nakedness before consummation can occur. 
Hatred, Ribh says, is "a light my jealous soul has 
sent", a "darker knowledge" in contrast to the light from 
direct apprehension of supernatural love. The soul can 
only learn from experience of intercourse with the 
supernatural, and this, the last line implies, is the true 
birth of the soul, the rebirth into spiritual knowledge. 
But the "dark night of the soul" must come before union 
can occur. Hatred is a sweeping clean, a catharsis of the 
soul as it turns away from every human construct. Terror 
and deception, it is suggested, are associated with human 
thought, being ways in which man may react to his 
condition of life. Only when it is free from them can the 
soul discover the crippling impurities within itself and 
return to its unfallen state. ("Walks" here introduces a 
poignant reminiscence of God walking the earth among the 
trees). Only then is the soul fit to "turn away from 
every thought of God mankind has had". Ribh's rejection 
of Christianity is therefore no superficial disagreement. 
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After the ecstatic climax of section five, section 
six presents another striking change, not a reversal 
although it may appear so, but a development of previous 
ideas. The feminine moon, like the soul, approaches the 
sun, from which she gains her light by reflection. But 
she cannot stay with him because "His light had struck me 
blind Dared I stop". The soul, it is implied, cannot 
remain long in union with God, and does not desire it. 
She rejoices in her own individuality; "The greater grows 
my light The further that I fly", despite the fact that 
she must return to the source. The living soul does not 
walk in purity to God but "sidles up" fearfully and "trips" 
away with evident relief. And the result is a cyclic 
movement toward and away from God, like the moon's 
movements with respect to the earth and sun. 
The clarity, purity and simplicity of the soul's song 
"I am I, am 1", reminiscent of the music of the spheres or 
Plato's whorls on the spindle of necessity, is exquisitely 
appropriate to the moon's clear self-statement against the 
night sky. "All creation shivers With that sweet cry" is 
ambiguous,like the soul's attitude towards God. "Shivers" 
can suggest either fear or ecstasy; but it may also mean 
"shivers to pieces", and this calls to mind the mirror-
scaled serpent. Nature's, or creation's, mirror of the 
world above is shattered into fragments by the soul's love 
for its own human life. 
In section seven Ribh returns from his ecstasy to his 
physical being. He attempts to retain his feminine 
experience as soul, in an effort to keep his sense of 
having given birth to his renewed soul or his new 
understanding, but the very effort of restraining his will 
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from disturbing the precious vision, all but bringing 
about his own death, forces him back into sensual 
awareness and thus into his own body. The foliage (as in 
section one) again enters to obscure his vision, and as 
his sight adjusts to the earth he sees his body. At the 
same time he becomes conscious of the feel of his body, 
which is as if it were being caressed with smooth, 
sensuous muscularity by an animal's tongue. He feels the 
luxurious physicality of fulfilment, and as he does so the 
garden foliage thickens to a forest, his physical body 
growing denser around his soul. His pulse sounds in his 
ears like a primitive drum-beat emerging from the forest 
of his body. The reborn man is "baptized" into animal 
life by the beast, marking the child as the offspring not 
only of the soul's spiritual union but also of physical 
nature. This flat paraphrase does not convey the real 
suggestion of primordial magic in the poem. The 
unanswered questions echo the mysteries of sections two 
and three and the impersonal viewpoint allows the 
enactment of the state of combined femininity and 
masculinity, presenting this most difficult conception 
immediately as a suggestive enigma which draws the mind 
into active relationship. 
The next poem develops the statement of section six 
that man as an individual, far from gaining knowledge and 
seeing the "show" in union with God, is struck blind in 
his presence. Human beings partake of eternity in their 
passion, their copying of the act of love in their desire 
for self-completion fusing them with the Godhead. At that 
time they are no longer individuals with free will, being 
taken over by some force beyond them in whose hands they 
are' like characters in a play - the Master is making the 
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show. Just as Ribh could not control what he said while 
in ecstasy, "A passion-driven exultant man sings out 
Sentences that he has never thought". The lovers have 
knowledge of the soul's union but as men and women they 
have no understanding of the experience. 
The capital on "Flagellant" suggests not only that he 
is one of the Flagellant Brotherhood but also that he is 
one of the Dramatis Personae. Although he is the reverse 
of the lover in his attempt to subjugate the body entirely 
in his desire for spiritual purity, the very act of 
lashing brings him to an ecstasy of pain. All union is 
sexual, even the extreme ascetic comes to a sexual union, 
his "submissive loins" female to the lash. He also is 
driven to his consummation without his conscious 
understanding, the necessary opposing force arising in his 
own body as it acts under the control of the bisexual 
principle in the Godhead. And this control extends over 
all of human life, from the single person to whole empires. 
"The hand and lash that beat down frigid Rome" suggests 
the flogging of Roman women at the feast of the Lupercalia, 
one of many ancient magical rites involving flogging, 
which was intended to make them fertile. Since this is 
paralleled with the example of the Flagellant the process 
is by implication the same. The last two lines modify the 
area of reference suggested by "frigid Rome". The early 
Christian church rejected world and body, but it too was 
"raped" by the unadmitted need for its opposite. 
Another "literal symbol", the significance of the 
reference to "world-transforming Charlemagne" must also be 
determined from the context. He was "world-transforming" 
in several ways. He united an area of Europe larger, 
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Alcuin said, than the first Roman empire; he encouraged 
learning in the middle of the dark ages and ensured its 
continuation; and, although no ascetic, he was a devout 
Christian who supported the church and fought and 
conquered in the name of Christianity. Eventually he was 
crowned by the Pope as emperor, creating the idea of the 
Holy Roman Empire. Charlemagne was "God's second sword", 
the fighting arm, so to speak, of the church. 
The significance of Charlemagne's relationship to the 
world and to Christianity appears in the following poems. 
"The Four Ages of Man" takes up the theme of war and shows 
how all of human life is a struggle of some kind. In 
childhood the body takes all the strength in control and 
growth. Here, in contrast to section five, the body walks 
upright, implying that it is as pure as was the unfallen 
soul. The young man's discovery of the needs of the self 
and of the body for others, the discovery of love, 
destroys the innocence and peace of the child. After 
heart has had its dominance the battle shifts to the mind, 
and finally man must face death and the loss of his 
individuality. The "stroke of midnight" is applicable to 
both transitory and final death, but the final death of 
the body is suggested more strongly here by the title and 
the progression of the couplets. "Conjunctions" repeats 
this double implication in the connotations of Saturn of 
both wisdom and old age. The first couplet suggests that 
if the wisdom of old age is joined to strength and power a 
miraculous harvest of human creativeness will result. 
Also, that if man can unite body and mind he may achieve a 
renewed fertility. The second repeats the assertions of 
section eight and of the first sections of the poem in a 
miracle of compression made possible by the parallel with 
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the astrological associations of the first couplet and the 
title. Mars and Venus are held in balance with Christian 
love and militancy. The sword in reverse is a cross. 
Christ died on the cross for the love of man in the battle 
against death and sin. The cross is a sacred burden of 
duty as were Charlemagne's wars. The austerity of the 
first line is set against the sensual suggestiveness of 
the second, which shows the pagan god of war and goddess 
of love united. War is thus related to each kind of love, 
spiritual and bodily, Christian and pagan. And the 
combination of these two couplets summarises the situation 
of Ribh, the wise old man, presenting his knowledge of the 
unity in polarity of natural and supernatural. 
Poem eleven, "A Needle's Eye", also refocusses earlier 
ideas. In many ways the opposite of the fourth poem, 
"There", it shows the life cycle in motion. "Roaring" 
suggests both the hurly-burly of the life of the senses and 
the vast size of the stream. The contrast with the minute 
source of the stream stresses the paradox that everything 
comes from nothing and repeats the antithesis of 
multiplicity and unity. It is also another use of 
practical fact to support with familiarity the 
insubstantial and less familiar images the narrow birth-
place acts like a constriction in a tube, increasing the 
pressure on the stream and forcing it forward. The 
ceaseless stream of life is "goaded" on like a noisy drove 
of animals by its own inevitability since it is part of a 
cycle in which the dead things must return. The soul 
cannot remain long with God. 
But man is not merely an animal herded forward by the 
pattern of life and death. "Meru" shows him to be driven 
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by his own mind, a mad animal "Ravening, raging, and 
uprooting" in his desperate search for the truth about his 
own existence. Like his moments of spiritual unity, man's 
efforts to live in harmony are destroyed by the 
necessities of his nature. Civilisation is a seeming 
unity, held together by representations of the truth which 
must collapse before the onslaught of thought because they 
can never the truth. Man cannot escape the terror and 
deception of life simply by abandoning himself to God, 
just as he cannot escape sexuality in passion by attempting 
to deny the body, because thought is his nature, not his 
garment. 
Knowledge, the goal of thought, is nakedness, darkness 
and suffering, not light and ecstasy. The hermits on the 
sacred mountain who reach as near to heaven as earth will 
allow are either "caverned in night under the drifted snow, 
Or where that snow and winter's dreadful blast Beat down 
upon their naked bodies". When free they are exposed and 
defenceless before the fierce elements, when secure they 
are imprisoned. Understanding brings either 
dissatisfaction with accepted ideas or uncertainty before 
all ideas. The only certain knowledge is the certainty of 
defeat. The poem has showed that the momentary bliss of 
union is possible, when man without his conscious 
knowledge shares eternity. God can love only and retain 
his unity, but man's nature is fragmentary, he is 
disunited in all his parts, and desire and hatred, love and 
war, are equal partners in his make-up. His desire for 
unity creates noble structures but his individual 
consciousness tears them down again. Knowledge of God is 
eternity, but knowledge of life is perpetual flux. 
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Among the major poems of the late period, 
"Supernatural Songs" has received probably the least 
satisfactory treatment. Much of the critical comment is 
devoted to providing sources and explanations from 
external references. Jeffares is only more explicit than 
the norm when he states that the meaning of "Conjunctions" 
must be sought from the correspondence, "when an apparently 
meaningless poem becomes clear".^ In fact, the poem 
becomes anything but clear when it is seen as the two sets 
of qualities Yeats hoped to find in his children; the 
daughter democratic, Christian and objective in 
temperament, represented by Mars and Venus, and the son 
aristocratic, pagan and subjective, represented by Jupiter 
and Saturn. These associations of the symbols may be 
appropriate in Yeats's private correspondence but they do 
not accord with the poem in its context. Similarly, "The 
Four Ages of Man" is not illuminated by Yeats's comments 
in a letter linking it with the four elements and four 
periods of history as Jeffares, Saul, Unterecker and 
2 
Ellmann imply. In the poetry the associations are 
limited by being placed in a consistent whole of meaning, 
and in general Yeats makes use of only the most well-known 
and obvious associations there. The elements do not 
appear as part of the poem's imagery, and, although the 
movement of history is paralleled to the life of man in 
the total poem, in section ten there is no suggestion of 
1 
Jeffares, p.284. 
Jeffares, p.283, Saul, p.159, Unterecker, Reader's Guide, 
pp.250-1, Ellmann, pp.35-6. 
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the elaborate detail given in the letter, as Whitaker^ 
recognises when he relegates the reference to his Notes. 
Whitaker's interpretation certainly looks for a 
consistent meaning in the poem but his concentration on 
Yeats's "dialogue with history" and his reliance on 
external sources to confirm or explain many of his points 
leads him to alter the poem to fit his own conception. 
Noting that Ribh reverses the ancient symbol of escape 
from "the lunar wheel of history into the sun itself", 
Whitaker argues that he does so because, although as saint 
Ribh imaginatively transcends life, as poet "his home is 
in the serpent's mouth". To demonstrate this, Whitaker 
deals with the latter parts of the poem before parts four 
and five, and concludes with part seven. In this, Ribh 
...becomes the vehicle of "primordial Motherhood" 
...through a willing suspension of desire, an 
acceptance of limitation and a consequent opening 
to the forces beyond.^ 
But in the poem the child is already present when "He holds 
him from desire, all but stops his breathing", and this 
gives the clue to the nature of the physical and mental 
state recorded there, which Whitaker apparently does not 
recognise. Although it is true that Ribh has had to 
practise austerity and acquire much learning to achieve 
this union and rebirth into knowledge, this is not the 
final statement of the poem and it is not, as Whitaker 
implies, the only reason why Ribh reverses the process of 
escape from the wheel. In "Vacillation" the rejection of 
1 
Whitaker, pp.ll6 and 3l4. 
2 
Ibid., p.119. 
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Christianity is made personal to the poet and yet the poem 
has more conviction than a mere personal statement because 
it has imaginative validity and coherence. The personal 
element contributes to these effects both in particularity 
and through the representativeness of the poet. Ribh 
stands in a similar relationship to this poem. He 
focusses and demonstrates the poem's meaning but his 
achievement of gnosis is not the whole. The poem ends 
with the stark statement of "Meru", which is not, surely, 
seen as a place of escape from life, despite anything 
Yeats may have said elsewhere, but a place from which 
life is observed. The nature and conditions of man's 
knowledge and his life is the substance of Ribh's wisdom, 
and this, not the mere fact of his creativeness, is the 
poem's culmination. 
Most critics do take the group of poems as a 
connected series, if only because of Ribh's explicit 
presence in four of them, but their readings show the 
familiar lack of acceptance of the notion of a completed 
meaning and this prevents them from seeing the symbols in 
their full contexts. Where the poems are taken separately, 
as in Henn's examination of the first poem and Ure's 
2 
treatment of the first four, the poems are found to be 
unsatisfactory, Henn finding the first too rich in 
suggestion for the meaning it gives and Ure seeing the 
series of four as an ornamental structure lacking in 
1 
One could "find some cavern upon Meru, and so pass out of 
all life", E. & I., p.469, quoted by Whitaker, p.ll6. 
2 
Henn, p.317, Ure, "Yeats's Supernatural Songs", Review of 
English Studies, n.s. VII (1936), pp.38-51. 
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humanity, thus supporting the proposition that these 
group-poems are integrated into broad patterns of meaning 
and gain from being treated as wholes. 
The Gyres 
The cry of "The Gyres!" in the first line is 
explained gradually as the poem progresses, but the first 
stanza makes it clear that it refers to the mutability of 
everything on earth. Beauty, thought and value are not 
permanent but contain within them their own dissolution, 
just as human beings, as they live, are also moving 
towards death. The phrase "ancient lineaments" has several 
possible associationss ancestral features| markings on the 
face of the earth - towns, roads, mountains etc.; ancient 
ideas or cultures. All of these are probably appropriates 
human characteristics, ideals and actualities, the whole 
"face" of human life, change with time. The cyclic 
movement of the gyres is linked with the theory of 
perpetual alternation of concord and discord of Empedocles. 
The world passes from a state of complete aggregation to 
the opposite state of complete disintegration as either 
love or strife predominates. Discord he compares to a 
vortex in which everything is wildly hurled about. The 
poem implies, therefore, that discord is now prevailing. 
The word "unfashionable" in the last line of the poem also 
makes it clear that this is a new phenomenon, the reversal 
of the previous age. 
The invocation of the first line is addressed to "Old 
Rocky Face". The term has the tone of awed disrespect of 
a nickname, resulting from man's natural reaction of 
mockery at his own fear. "Rocky Face" suggests a face cut 
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in rock or that appears to be made of rock, with strong-
lines and a hard aspect, a face inscrutable and changeless, 
without the pliancy of expression of human faces. Thus 
two principles are opposed in the first line, the gyres of 
constant change and the timeless face, inhuman and yet 
with human configuration. But "Rocky Face" is called upon 
to "look forth", implying that he has withdrawn from among 
men in the past age but that his appearance is in accord 
with the period now coming. Allusions may be present to a 
sphinx or other rock-cut face, or to the Delphic oracle, 
or to the reference to Dante in "Ego Dominus Tuus", who is 
associated with a stony face, but these suggestions are not 
confirmed by the first stanza. 
The hint of defiant laughter in the name appears again 
at the end of the stanza following the line which makes the 
fall of Troy and of her greatest hero symbols of the 
present havoc. Taken together, these lines suggest 
another relevance for Troy. In art we can contemplate the 
inevitability of destruction without being involved in the 
suffering. ¥e look on unmoved, but with a sense of 
exultation in the surge of life under affliction and the 
courage of man's response. The speaker, like the 
spectator of art and "Rocky Face", is an impassive witness 
of tragedy. 
His impassivity is not easily achieved, though. 
Repeatedly the images of nightmare, pain and loss arise, 
and each time he restates his indifference forcefully 
until he receives an affirmation from the rock. This 
voice from a mouth-like cavern seems appropriate to "Rocky 
Face", but it is just possible that the two are not 
connected. This hints more strongly at something like the 
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Delphic oracle but, again, the idea of an oracle seems 
more important than the particular reference. That this 
stanza does represent a process of self-conviction is 
supported by the repetition of points from the first 
stanza and by the personal nature of the comment. The 
chaos and pain of the first two lines is much more 
immediate, physically and visually, than the equivalent 
statement in the first stanza. Here it is the body, not 
the earth, which is defiled by the upheaval of man and 
earth, and the idea of feeling is emphasised by the 
contrast of "numb nightmare" and "sensitive body". The 
mind is appalled by the apocalyptic vision, made more 
vivid by the recollection of Medieval pictures of death 
riding triumphant, but the senses are sharpened by disgust. 
The general statements about civilisations and values are 
here particularised and made personal in the "painted 
forms or boxes of make-up In ancient tombs" whose loss the 
speaker has lamented, tantalising glimpses of the "ancient 
lineaments" of "A greater, a more gracious time". All 
this must be accepted in every detail before the speaker 
can obey the command to "Rejoice!" 
This struggle for personal conviction introduces the 
possibility that "Rocky Face" may be some desired 
characteristic of the speaker himself, but the association 
with art and the nature of the first address argue against 
this as a total reading, although it is almost certainly 
one facet of the whole. The parallel with Dante who 
"fashioned from his opposite An image that might have been 
a stony face"^ is clear and suggests that the image the 
C.P., p.181 
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speaker calls upon here may be an image of art, but it is 
an image grander in conception than the "dissipation and 
dream" of the earlier poem, one matched there only by 
Dante's chisel "set...to the hardest stone". 
The third stanza plunges us once more into the full 
painful 8 ense of the age, now shown as the degraded 
opposite of tragic heroism and civilisation. It is 
revealed that "Rocky Face" has been called upon because 
his standards are those which complement the irrational 
violence of the age. Those he holds dear are "Lovers of 
horses and of women" like the Trojans, and under his gaze 
these men 5 the speaker prophesies, will resurrect the ideas 
and values of the ancient civilisations. They will 
"disinter" the workman, noble and saint either by taking 
their inspiration from the sculptures and "painted forms" 
of the tombs, or the ideas may come from some unknown and 
mysterious source. The "dark betwixt the polecat and the 
owl" suggests the night inhabited by violent, fear-
inspiring and superstition-breeding creatures, but also, as 
the owl is particularly associated with wisdom and the 
polecat with fierceness and cruelty, suggests that the new 
conceptions will spring from the tension between the two. 
Finally, "Or any rich, dark nothing" suggests a possible 
source in the contemplation of death or the infinite. 
"Rocky Face" is therefore the proper image of art in 
an aristocratic and religious age, looking steadfastly at 
the fated destruction with his dispassionate gaze and 
transfiguring it with his terrible joy into tragedy. 
Clearly the whole depends on the determinism of the cycles, 
and, probably for that reason, they appear at the end and 
the beginning of the poem. But the conviction of the poem 
does not rest on them alone. The element of fatalism in 
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tragedy is commonly accepted and the anarchy of the age is 
strongly presented. The fatality of life and values is 
also shown. Nevertheless, the poem runs the danger of 
being accused of sheer inhumanity through the 
interpretation of the repeated "What matter?" not as an 
attempt to subdue feeling but as evidence of lack of 
feeling. To avoid this, the emotion must be seen to be 
controlled, and although this is achieved in the images 
which show the condition of the world, it is less certain 
in those which deal with the regret for lost culture. The 
image of "painted forms or boxes of make-up In ancient 
tombs" continues the linkage of the themes of man's image 
of himself and the resurrection of that image from the 
past, but it is clever rather than imaginatively 
convincing. The particular details are given no 
individual life and are not supported by the generalised 
statement of the themes in the first stanza. And although 
the generality of the whole poem is in accord with the 
nature of its vatic statement, it suffers from the 
incomplete realisation of the speaker's personality and 
the consequent uncertainty of his demonstration of its 
meaning in himself. 
The doubt and confusion surrounding this poem stems 
mainly from the enigmatic character of "Rocky Face" and 
the relation between the determinism of the gyres and the 
speaker's attitude discussed above. "Rocky Face" has been 
variously named as the sphinx, the Delphic oracle, the 
beast of "The Second Coming", Ben Bulben, Shelley's 
Ahasuerus, a stone head on Thoor Ballylee, and the moon. 
The more interesting interpretations are related to the 
second problem. Several critics do assume that "at the 
opening of the poem the poet is reborn as an invulnerable 
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stony face", giving him "liberation from the pressures of 
transitoriness".^ The acceptance of the determinism of 
the gyres then becomes dangerously like a mere withdrawal 
and an ambiguity appears between this and the hope at 
their implications in the final stanza.^ Perhaps the 
least understood element in the poem, the poet's assertion 
of tragic joy stands between the acceptance and the hope. 
None of the critics discovers any elements which associate 
the tragic joy with the hope in the last stanza. Instead, 
the poem is paraphrased? 
Tis well an old age is out 
And time to begin a n e w . 3 
Or else the joy is explained as "exultation in the 
destructive element", or as "the joy in the heart of 
4 
emptiness". "Tragic" seems to be conceived of in an 
almost Medieval sense as the confrontation of man with the 
mutability of life. 
Pointing out the similarities between this poem and 
"Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" and the second of "Two 
Songs From a Play", Rajan says that their strong 
involvement and imaginative richness complete the bare 
statement of "The Gyres" and without them its tragic joy 
"could legitimately be resisted as inhuman".^ Certainly 
1 
Mulryne, pp.126, 128| also Stock, p.22, Stauffer, p . , 
Rajan, pp.175=6, Henn, p.320. 
2 
As Graham Martin comments, "The Later Poetry of ¥.B. 
Yeats", Penguin Guide, vol. 7, p.l83. He includes "The 
Statues" in this comment also. 
3 Stauffer, p.'+5 • Henn also assumes this, p. 320. 
4 Rajan, p.177, Stock, p.223-
Rajan, p.175-
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these similarities encourage comparison with the earlier 
poems, and it is noticeable that each is a complex blend 
of positive and negative elements. In "Nineteen Hundred 
and Nineteen" one might point to the values which are 
mocked but not denied and to the beauty and interest which 
the poet manages to find in the final vision, and in the 
"Song" to the last two lines, just as an indication of the 
kinds of attitudes which might be anticipated by 
comparison in "The Gyres". Nevertheless these poems are 
not essential to the meaning of the later poem, even if 
they add flesh to some of its statements. There, the bare 
directness contributes both to the incantatory weight, as 
Rajan notes, and to the illustration of the nature of that 
tragic joy. 
Rajan is apparently diverted from this poem by its 
kinship to others. Vivienne Koch is influenced mainly by 
her knowledge of Yeats's prose. Miss Koch sees the poem 
as an internal dialogue between the poet's antithetical 
self and Rocky Face (his primary self), and also between 
his intellect and his intuition (the voice from the 
cavern). She suggests that "Rejoice.'" is the command of 
his intuition, to which the intellect, which has denied 
his emotion for the "painted forms or boxes of make-up", 
capitulates. Yeats is abandoning personal responsibility 
for making a reality of his conception of "a more gracious 
time" and relies instead on the gyres to do it for him. 
Miss Koch argues. In the last stanza he hails the coming 
of Unity of Being, and Miss Koch uses this to justify the 
poem because this concept can be made respectable by 
198 
comparing it with "integration of personality", "even if 
we do not admire the features which Yeats assigns to it".^ 
The unlikelihood that Unity of Being will result from 
a surrender to intuition and to necessity is clear to Miss 
Koch, yet she does not hesitate to attribute this 
suggestion to Yeats. In fact Unity of Being is neither 
mentioned in the poem nor alluded to. The last stanza 
says only that certain ideas will emerge from the discord 
of the age because men with the capacity to face the chaos 
will turn to ideas like those of a past age in their 
endeavours to understand their own condition. The 
introduction of the concept of Unity of Being is partly 
brought about by relating the poem to the prose and partly 
induced by the over-simplified application of the internal 
dialogue theory in the earlier stanzas. Undoubtedly the 
poet is seeking some answering condition within himself, 
but the association with art is equally obvious. Miss 
Koch notes the echo of "Ego Dominus Tuus" in "Rocky Face" 
but is more concerned to justify her introduction of the 
doctrine of the mask than to study the suggestions of the 
name and the ideas it is related to. 
This concentration on the opposing sides of a single 
personality causes the "dialogue" to appear purely 
internal, which Miss Koch translates as psychologically 
internal. Yet the poem is personal in tone only in the 
middle of the second stanza, and the following lines 
return to the deliberate impersonality that characterises 
the broader vision of the first and last stanzas. 
1 
Koch, p.llO. 
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Moreover, Miss Koch does not explain why the poet abandons 
himself to an intuitive response which is the opposite of 
his previous emotional response. It is not satisfactory 
to dub this "intuition" and therefore arbitrary. Even the 
gyres are not arbitrary in this sense, but exist because 
"Things thought too long can be no longer thought,..,". 
The calculated intransigence of the command and of the 
repeated "What matter?" are obviously linked with "Rocky 
Face"I yet he is called upon deliberately by the speaker. 
He is thus consciously attempting to overcome his 
emotional regression away from the present and into the 
past, and this in turn implies that "Rejoice!" is not 
arbitrary but willed, and is associated with facing the 
present, not abdicating from responsibility. 
The Statues 
In this poem the stanzas are linked by a series of 
statue-images and by a development in time. They fall 
into an uneven chronological sequence roughly as follows?-
(i) the time in which Pythagoras's theories came into 
public knowledge 5 
(ii) classical Greece, the time of the defeat of the 
Persians at Salamis^ 
(ill) spans the development of a new line of thought, 
opposed to Greek humanism, with Buddhism in the 
east and Christianity in Europe^ 
(iv) this century, the Irish uprising, set against 
England as representing the modern industrial age. 
The major conceptual relationship between the stanzas is 
clearly not based on either a temporal or a geographical 
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sequence. The key to the mode of development must 
therefore be sought through the function of the symbols in 
their contexts. 
In stanza one the statues are first referred to as 
"numbers", and it is only gradually and indirectly 
revealed that they are statues, gathering a sense of 
mystery about them for the reader as for the people to 
whom they are revealed. They are the result of a theory 
which has fused "number" and art and evidently this is to 
be thought of as a new development ("the people stare"). 
Pythagoras's philosophy, which might more appropriately be 
called a religion, sprang from a conviction that there was 
a fundamental unity in all life and that union or approach 
towards the Godhead was to be sought through a kind of 
intellectual mysticism. His statues, it is implied, were 
based on an intellectual contemplation and reconstruction 
of the human form, their measurements being representative 
of the mathematical unity underlying the natural universe 
and allying it to the divine. This new relationship of 
man to his world was given form as an abstraction of the 
natural man, a static representation of the temporal. 
These synthetic human beings are said to lack 
character, but the boys and girls seeking sexual, and 
perhaps self-, knowledge recognise in the perfection of 
outward appearance the coherence of matter and idea. They 
are instinctively aware that the statues do not need to 
possess "character" in themselves because they can act as 
a human ideal and the focus for undirected passionate 
energy. But although they have some essence of humanity 
in their outward appearance the statues remain non-human. 
The arrangement of the syntax in the last two lines of the 
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stanza stresses the conjunction of "live lips" and 
"plummet-measured face". This is surely the true 
realisation of Pythagoras«s plan - the acceptance of his 
abstraction from the living world as an archetype by the 
most fully alive of human beings. 
In stanza two the poet begins by contradicting 
himself forcefully, the effect being to give a sharp sense 
of the magnitude of the Greek sculptors' achievement. 
Once again he demonstrates the apparent contradictions 
that are reconciled within the statues, but now he adds 
the massive hardness implied by mallet and chisel and the 
softness of "casual flesh", contrasting also the effort 
which has gone into their making and the resulting casual 
appearance (where "casual" has the meaning "undesigned" 
and hence "natural", and also, perhaps, in conjunction with 
"flesh", "temporary"). They also are calculations, but 
they appear less abstract than the earlier statues. 
By their achievement the sculptors "put down All 
Asiatic vague immensities". "Put down" gives possible 
meanings of "express" or "give form to" (put down on 
paper) and "suppress". This suggests that they defeated 
by giving form to them "All Asiatic vague immensities". 
The latter phrase is broadly suggestive in this context of 
ideas in which man figures as a speck in the infinity of 
the universe. The "banks of oars" in the next line could 
refer either to the Greek or the Persian fleet. Either 
they, and not the Greek fleet, put down the Asians or else 
they defeated the Asiatic ideas and not their physical 
force, but the second has a negative aspect which is not 
strictly applicable. 
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"The many-headed foam" seems at first simply to 
describe the sea, but the next line suggests that it is 
associated in some way with the "Asiatic vague 
immensities". "Foam" gives the impression of a formless, 
restless, insubstantial mass. "Many-headed" may imply 
that it includes many different ideas, but in any case the 
effect is like a turbulent crowd without clear purpose or 
direction. "Put off" also yields several meanings: 
"reject", "avoid or postpone", and "take off" (as clothes). 
The last carries a strong hint of Venus rising naked from 
the foam that also associates with the establishment of 
ideal beauty in the statues. Phidias created statues that 
"Gave women dreams and dreams their looking-glass"s he 
gave the ideals fully human form that became the dreams of 
adult women and so were reflected in their lives. Thus, 
the idea of man's share in divinity reached maturity when 
man's passions could be fully realised in the human ideal. 
The ideal is not, as in the first stanza, something still 
abstract, whose imaginative reality must be supplied by 
human enthusiasm, but is an active part of human life. 
The statue-theme undergoes a change in the third 
stanza, a metamorphosis that seems to proceed freely, and 
even apparently contradictorily, in time and space. "One 
image crossed the many-headed, sat Under the tropic shade" 
gives as a first meaning that one statue-image travelled 
in some way from Greece to Asia - since it crossed the 
"many-headed foam" between them. But it is evident that 
the repetition of this phrase is not purely gratuitous, or 
merely geographicals it was not Asia and Europe simply as 
geographical units that contested with one another, but as 
representing certain ideas. Thus, "crossed" must also 
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refer to those ideas and may suggest some combination of 
the two in which the form given to man's aspirations and 
self-understanding by the Greek artists and philosphy is 
joined to the consciousness of "vague immensities" 
belittling man's actions and desires. 
This is described in the next lines. The statue's 
body matures into middle age, representing the development 
away from the physical and sexual ideal in man's 
conception of himself. It becomes a Buddha-like image 
which dissociates itself from the disturbances of active 
life and appears to dream of another, less ephemeral world. 
And since it expresses or creates the people's dreams, it 
implies that men's minds turned away from the world as 
happened in Europe in the Middle Ages, Hence the Middle 
Ages were also the middle age of man's self-understanding. 
This interpretation is supported by the lines 
...Empty eyeballs knew 
That knowledge increases unreality, that 
Mirror on mirror mirrored is all the show. 
The use of the mirror obviously refers back to the 
previous stanza; "Gave women dreams and dreams their 
looking-glass", and, less obviously, to the ending of the 
firsts "live lips upon a plummet-measured face". The first 
stanza shows the confrontation of idealistic youth and 
abstract perfection of human type; and the second the 
mature woman facing and reflecting her own idealised form. 
The third stanza says that increased knowledge of the 
world only reveals increased ignorance, and is finally 
cancelled by an ultimate ignorance. "Empty eyeballs" 
emphasise the realisation that man will then not see the 
mirror of his dreams focussed in action in this world. 
Instead, he "sees" that there are two mirrors placed 
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opposite one another, producing an apparent infinitude of 
images which are really all reflections back and forth of 
one object, making up the "spectacle" of this world. For 
the Buddhist, the appearances of this world are mere 
reflections of a reality which we cannot see on earth, and 
if we wish to symbolise it we must remove as far as 
possible the qualities of this worldscharacter. passion, 
sexuality, and all concepts of time and hence of action. 
The changed aspect of the statue reflects this new 
attitude. It is static, unworried, blind to the exigencies 
of human life, "No Hamlet thin from eating flies". The 
contrast is between the contemplative who has dismissed 
the troubles of this life to concentrate on another, and 
the man caught in the world's dilemma, dwelling on his own 
buzzing thoughts, never able to accept fully the 
implications of a life beyond the grave, and yet not 
wholeheartedly committed to this life and so unable to act 
in it. "I eat the air, promise-crammed" says Hamlet (ill, 
ii, 98). 
Linked with Hamlet by her ambiguous name (which can 
apply either to a cat or to an old woman, probably through 
their frequent association but perhaps because it derives 
originally from "Grey Matilda"), Grimalkin may also during 
her life have "eaten flies". Now, at the end of her life, 
she "crawls to Buddha's emptiness" of worldly 
characteristics because this has become the appropriate 
1 
Grimalkin represents an aspect of human life and a state 
of mind, but not the type of god worshipped, as F, Wilson 
suggests (see p.80 below). She is part of the pattern of 
the developing life-cycle as it reflects the development 
of the central concept of man in the universe. 
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religious view for her now that her body, and the life of 
this world, are of no consequence. For her the world Is 
no longer an arena for man's self-fulfilment but a place 
for self-effacement. Her position at the end of this 
stanza parallels that of the adolescents and the women In 
the earlier stanzas, reflecting as before a general 
development in roan's conception of his life. 
The phrase "the hour to bless" has at least two 
meanings. "Bless" can mean (i) to consecrate, (ii) to 
call holy or to adore, (ill) to invoke supernatural favour 
upon, (iv) to attribute good fortune to, (v) to make 
successful, happy or beatified. Of this selective list 
the first three all seem possible as applied to Grimalkin, 
the fourth is less likely, and the fifth may be appropriate 
to God or his representative. As often in Yeats, the 
phrase has a quality suggestive of a common saying without 
being identifiable as such, a subtle combination of the 
ordinary and the new. The strongest meaning which emerges 
from the context is, I think, that the time has arrived 
when the consecration of human life to a supernatural 
focus is to be recognised and celebrated. Thus, the hour 
has struck for Grimalkin to dedicate herself to some 
principle beyond this world, whether it is to another life 
or to a release from life. "Gong and conch" are 
instruments of call in Hindu and other Asian temples, but 
it seems likely that they were chosen mainly for their 
sound values. 
Stanza four implies that Pearse's belief in Cuchulaln 
and his hopeless fight for the Irish cause summoned up 
some thread of belief in the Irish people which was enough 
to persuade them to erect a statue of Cuchulain outside 
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the Dublin Post Office where the main battle was fought. 
Cuchulain is a particularly fitting figure, having once 
himself fought against the sea and having died fighting 
for his country. He is a half-legendary, half-
mythological figure, a hero, and hence a manifestation of 
the divine in man. The representation of this quality in 
the artistic form suggests a relationship with the earlier 
statues, which is then stated explicitly; "We Irish, born 
into that ancient sect". This can only refer to the kind 
of wisdom evinced by the Pythagoreans, the only ancient 
sect that has been alluded to« There is some justification 
for the association with the Pythagoreans since the Irish 
monasteries retained the Greek-Neoplatonist influence of 
their original Christian conversion. The further 
association with the modern Irish is more tenuous, but it 
is suggested that the statue demonstrates that they 
intuitively possess a unifying and essentially religious 
attitude towards the universe. 
Their innate understanding of the immanence of the 
divine in nature is opposed, as before, to the sea, 
representing the differentiating, rationalising attitude 
of the day. But now it is seen not merely as formless, 
but also as immediately threatening, in its rapid and 
haphazard self-reproduction; and this time it is 
victorious. The words "by its formless spawning fury 
wrecked" image the action of the sea, and are contrasted 
with the "intellect,...calculation, number, measurement" 
of the previous lines. "Thrown upon" is parallel to "put 
down" and "put off" in its position and ambiguity, but is 
noticeably passive in contrast. It can mean "at the mercy 
of", "hurled into", or "brought forth, dropped (as 
animals)". The last meaning provides the syntactical link 
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with "born into that ancient sect"5 the Irish belong by 
descent to the Pythagoreans, but they have been given 
birth to as an intellectual civilisation in the modern age. 
This double notion of descent, as both lineage and 
downward movement, reappears, by implication, in the 
phrase "Climb to our proper dark". The paradox of 
ascending into darkness, usually associated with earth as 
opposed to heaven, with descent and death, parallels the 
defeats of Cuchulain and Pearse. The latter achieved a 
legendary status and at the same time pointed the way the 
Irish were to go by his belief in Cuchulain. He 
prefigured a rebirth of such belief, it is suggested, and 
the Irish must resume the simplicity and ignorance of their 
beginnings, and their mystic consciousness, their "proper 
dark". They must "climb" because an attempt to re-link 
man with the divine must involve an ascent. This contrasts 
with the ending of the first stanza, where the young people 
could go directly to the statue in the dark. The Irish 
have yet to achieve or must re-achieve that state. 
The poem ends with a return to its beginning as it 
proposes man should do. The Irish must "trace The 
lineaments of a plummet-measured face"; they must follow 
or discover the immanent form in the universe which 
relates man and the products of his mind in a unified 
design and copy it as in the statues. They may not yet 
kiss the form, nor model their lives on earth or their 
conceptions of a spiritual life on it, but must reach and 
feel with groping hands over the figure looming in the 
darkness. The Irish have gone through a ritual death in 
order to be reborn into "that ancient sect". 
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The tone of this last stanza, particularly of "this 
filthy modern tide", is strident and comes dangerously 
near to sentimentality because there is only barely enough 
in the poem to connect the Irish with the tradition of 
religious unity. There seems little reason for the sudden 
violence of the fifth and sixth lines, partly because the 
defeat of Pearse cannot be made clear by the tone of the 
first three lines (since in one sense this was not a defeat 
but the portent of a new birth). But the most important 
factor is that the helplessness of the Irish is given no 
really adequate imaginative ground. It is not helped by 
the generality of the opposing force, but, as with 
"Asiatic vague immensities", formlessness is not easy to 
make real through verbal imagery. England's reprehensible 
conduct towards Ireland is rightly unspecified so that it 
is seen to be only an example of this tide of formlessness. 
Formlessness is opposed to the sense of form which both 
mirrors and induces man's religious insights at all stages 
of its cyclical, organic process of birth, development and 
decay. The tide floods back and forwards, and the life of 
the idea occurs between its floods. This explains the 
adjective "filthy" because, although death and defeat is 
inevitable, it is continuously opposed to life and must be 
combated. Nevertheless, it does not fully vindicate its 
use in the poem since, despite the warning of the 
splitting-apart of the unity of the idea in the third 
stanza, the necessity of the defeat in the final stanza is 
not completely realised. 
This poem has received a great deal of explication, 
some of which has already been dealt with in chapter two 
(PP*79-88). In connection with this, it may be noted that 
the discussion has not required any mention of Maud Gonne 
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(see note, p.84). Most of the comment begins from 
external material and thus returns this elaborately 
patterned poem to formlessness by ignoring the logic of 
the poem and imposing correlations made in different 
contexts. One passage which illustrates this particularly 
well is the comment in Yeats's Autobiographies (pp.l4l-2) 
on a portrait of William Morris; 
Its grave wide-open eyes, like the eyes of some 
dreaming beast, remind me of the open eyes of 
Titian's 'Ariosto', while the broad vigorous 
body suggests a mind that has no need of the 
intellect to remain sane, though it give itself 
to every fantasys the dreamer of the Middle Ages. 
It is the 'fool of faery...wide and wild as a 
hill', the resolute European image that yet half 
remembers Buddha's motionless meditation, and 
has no trait in common with the wavering, lean 
image of hungry speculation, that cannot but 
because of certain famous Hamlets of our stage 
fill the mind's eye. 
Because of the parallel description "dreamer of the Middle 
Ages" and the common quality of corpulence, Engelberg^ 
assumes that the single image that crosses the many-headed 
is that of Morris, dospito—tie—obvious—contrast——'^^i^o > 
open oyos"—s«i4—''Empty oyoballc". The multiple 
possibilities of the genitive link phrase "dreamer of the 
Middle Ages" must take some of the responsibility for this 
confusion, although the association with the woman of the 
second stanza dreaming her own ideal reflection and Buddha 
dreaming beyond this life clearly suggests the meaning 
"who dreamt the idea of the Middle Ages" as one reading. 
The meaning "a dreamer who lived in the Middle Ages" fits 
no appropriate statue-image and the possibility of some 
_ _ _ 
Engelberg, p.192. 
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fat Medieval, Buddha-like person would first have to be a 
statue and secondly is not put forward by the poem and 
would have no logical place in its development. Morris, 
as someone fond of dreaming about the Middle Ages, is 
nowhere suggested by the poem and bears even less 
relationship to its ideas. Taken in conjunction with the 
meaning "dreamer of the idea of the Middle Ages", the 
analogy between the development of the religious idea and 
the pattern of human life provides a far more satisfying 
meaning for this phrase in the poem than does anything in 
the quotation although this is not wholly dissimilar in 
general meaning to part of the third stanza. 
Commenting on the same passage, F.A.C. Vilson says 
that Hamlet and the fool of the Middle Ages are contrasted 
in the poem "with the objective Hamlet of the modern 
theatre, abstracted, unheroic and 'thin from eating flies'". 
Engelberg opposes this but he does so by adducing another 
passage, this time from Explorations (p.446), which 
discusses Hamlet as "a medieval man of action". He 
continues: 
Clearly Hamlet and his 'wavering, lean image' 
are not intended to serve as an entirely negative 
image juxtaposed to an entirely positive image 
of Morris. The 'action', 'visibility', 'energy' 
which Yeats praises so often are a part of the 
speculative man, at least at one point in his 
development. Morris ...stands before Hamlet in 
that development,...resolute for action but 
still contemplative,....^ 
While this is partly true, since Hamlet represents another 
aspect of man's thinking at this period of the idea's 
-
Engelberg, p.I93. 
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development, the central concern of the stanza is not with 
kinds of action and meditation but with acceptance and 
non-acceptance of a particular view of man in the universe, 
There is no suggestion that the "round and slow...Dreamer" 
is in any way "resolute for action" or that we are to 
think of Hamlet—Grimalkin as praiseworthy for their 
activeness of mind. 
Engelberg notes that he is "using aspects of the poem 
to serve my own development of the Yeatsian aesthetic", 
but he does give a reading of the poem and it is as often 
wrong as right, usually because of interpolations from 
elsewhere. He summarises the poem: 
'The Statues' celebrates the single, conscious, 
countable and measurable image of art as it 
climbs out of the vast design of history - the 
tide of the engulfing flood - which it conquers. 
...The re-integration of art and social life is 
the major theme of 'The Statues'.^ 
The first statement, like the rest of Engelberg's reading, 
largely ignores the final stanza, yet for the most part 
his explanation is accretive - the one image is said to 
embody all that he has discussed "from Pythagoras through 
Alexander, from Byzantium through the Renaissance", 
including all that is said in the many prose passages he 
quotes in connection with the poem. At the same time this 
huge and immensely complex panorama is said to be centred 
on the re-integration of art and social life. Although not 
an unworthy theme, it seems hardly equal to the philosophy 
of Pythagoras, the dreams of Buddha and the humanism of 
the Greeks. This explanation arises from an attempt to 
1 
Engelberg, p.204. 
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interpret the appearance of a relationship between the 
young people and the statues in a poem which is otherwise 
seen, in the light of the prose, as dealing largely with 
the evolution of history in terms of art and the nature of 
various kinds of art. It seems unlikely that Yeats's 
aesthetic would be served by this partial understanding of 
his verse, in which it appears as a mere extension of 
various scattered elements of his prose. 
So deeply encrusted with external quotations is the 
exegesis of this poem that even Rajan is unable to shake 
himself free and look squarely at the poem. He complains 
that the mythisising of the poem is not wholly successful. 
The imaginative logic of the poem does not 
permit it to define itself and the exterior 
connections needed for definition are personal 
rather than traditional. The Hamlet-Buddha-
Medieval dreamer-Grimalkin complex receives 
little substantiation in anything the verse does, 
while the rhyming of 'fat' and 'sat' and the 
emphasis on fly-eating are scarcely successful 
as wit and are (it is to be hoped) not meant to 
be anything more.^ 
I hope my discussion of the poem has shown that the first 
sentence is not true. The second objection has rather 
more substance but, since understanding of the poem 
depends largely on the perception of its imaginative logic 
in the series of similar structures which comment upon one 
another, Rajan's statement is unacceptable. Nevertheless, 
it is true that the quality of the verse in this stanza is 
thinner, almost certainly as a result of the increasing 
complexity, and the simplicity of the language is perhaps 
1 
Rajan, p.l85. 
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a part of this effect. But the simple, clear rhyme-words, 
especially "fat" and "sat", slow down the movement by 
their very clarity and by the breaklng-up of the clauses, 
Imitating the metamorphosis of the statue. The long vowel 
In "slow" Is also particularly effective. 
Rajan's general comment that "the System has now come 
to provide not metaphors for poetry but an apparatus for 
fabricating poems"^ Is not justified, but the systematic 
nature of the poem's construction may provide some grounds 
for calling It an "apparatus". Yet the great range of 
reference and the daring of the S3mibol lc design 
necessitate a firm and Intricate supporting structure of 
this kind. The cyclic pattern Is not connected with the 
"system" but Is given a connection with ordinary knowledge 
through the analogy with the human life-cycle, and It Is 
the determinism of this, rather than of the gyre-theory, 
2 
as Graham Martin suggests, against which the battle to 
create a relationship between man and the universe Is 
fought. On the other hand, there Is more justification 
for his complaint that there Is an ambiguity between the 
determinism of the cycle and the moral protest at Its 
Implications In this poem than In "The Gyres", I believe, 
because the Irish are not sufficiently established as 
fighting for the concept before they are whirled helplessly 
Into defeat, and the strong antagonism towards the formless 
sea also lacks previous support. 
1 
Rajan, p.174. 
2 
Penguin Guide, vol. 7, p.183. 
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Finally, Whitaker's introduction of the "system" into 
an otherwise sensitive, though not uniformly accurate, 
reading^ causes him to see the third stanza as the defeat 
because it presents the emergence of a spiritually primary 
civilisation. Although this is partly true, the stanza 
does not describe a defeat by formlessness. As Whitaker 
himself notes, there is an essential difference between 
formlessness and "Buddha's emptiness": chaos is not the 
same as nothing. The "one image" is blind but it sees or 
reflects a clear vision of man in relationship with 
divinity. The old woman is dehumanised, as ¥hitaker says, 
but not by her cat-name or by her religion but by her age, 
when the physical ideal, the anthropocentric view, no 
longer has relevance. This is the end of the cycle before 
formlessness returns. The major theme of the poem is not 
the development of the view of man as fully representative 
of the divine, although this is the highest point for 
wholeness of life on earth, the point at which formlessness 
reaches it lowest ebb, but the development through the 
concept of representative form of a view of man in some 
relationship to the universe and the divine. 
1 
Whitaker, pp.235-245. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The argument of this thesis has been that a poem can 
yield a whole of meaning only if its unity be considered 
to lie in the work itself and not in any external context, 
and that under these conditions Yeats's later poetry does 
not require the support of an elaborate framework of 
background knowledge. 
Poetry presents the perception of form or meaning in 
experience, reproducing the relationship of subjective and 
objective worlds that occurs in the act of S)Tnbol-
formulation. To do so it exploits the multiple 
associations and connotations of words, in contrast to 
analytical discourse in which words are used with single, 
fixed references. In this way poetry depends on the 
experience of the community preserved in the complexity of 
the language, but it renews the acts of meaning evoked by 
the words by placing them in new, unique relationships. 
Through these relationships the poem creates its own 
meaning although depending on previously existing meanings. 
The reader is induced to re-enact in his mind the 
process of the formulation of meaning. To create a 
unified experience, therefore, references to meanings 
outside the poem must be accessible. Alternatively, such 
references must be reapplied to the context if they are to 
contribute to the poem's meaning as distinct from any 
broader pattern of thought. If external references are 
forced into the poem, its unity is destroyed and it appears 
fragmentary. This applies to everything outside the words 
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of the poem: the author's prose or other poems, pictures, 
doctrines or philosophies related to the poem or espoused 
by the poet, and traditional symbolisms. All add to the 
suggestion of the poem only insofar as they are 
assimilated into its meaning-process. 
Critics who assume that Yeats's poetry refers to a 
private system of ideas or language and apply this system 
to the poems do not allow the poems to produce their own 
meanings. Only if a close reading of the text taking note 
of all ambiguities, symbolic or metaphoric implications, 
and internal structural relationships does not yield a 
satisfactory meaning, should the poem be concluded to be 
dependent on an external structure. Similarly, the poems 
cannot be justified by placing them in a larger context, 
such as a book of poems, unless it can be clearly 
demonstrated that they are all relevant to and part of 
that context, and that the context itself acts as a 
satisfactory whole of meaning. 
The readings of the poems in chapter three indicate 
that the poems can stand alone provided they are taken as 
wholes. In these readings speculation is kept to a 
minimum to ensure that the poem's own statement does not 
become confused with extraneous matter. This is not to 
dispute that the poems may deserve readings that probe 
more deeply into the ideas that appear in the poems; but 
first these ideas must be determined, since all such 
discussion must both spring from and be referred back to 
the poem if the poem itself, as a work of art, is under 
consideration. 
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Yeats's style in the latest poems is declamatory and 
prophetic, but all the poems dealt with are concerned with 
the conditions of human life, and particularly with the 
contrast between man's spirituality and his physical 
existence, and his search for reconciliation or 
understanding of his situation through the medium of art 
as symbol. The conscious symbolism of style reflects this 
search for meaning, and there is therefore a unity 
throughout the poems from the details of style to the 
major units of thought. 
In keeping with the conscious symbolism there is a 
deliberate tautness of style. The image-symbols are 
organised with lucidity and precision into the complex 
patterns of ambiguities, contrasts and parallelisms of 
sound and syntax, image and rhythm, that repeat the 
reflexive process of symbolic interaction. The group-
poems reflect this on a larger scale, each section 
contributing to the whole, not, generally, in a steady 
progression but in a series of states which interact to 
produce an overall development of thought. 
Conscious symbolism reflects a personal search for 
understanding of man's relationship to the universe, but 
if the fusion of subject and object is achieved the 
resulting verse is not necessarily subjective and self-
isolating as some critics suggest. Nevertheless, there is 
a danger of its becoming merely subjective if the S3mibolic 
process is not made active in the reader's mind. Then the 
this poem becomes mere statement and is naturally attributed by 
A 
the reader not to the poem but to the author's person. 
There are some points in these later poems where this 
begins to happen. Yeats's attitude to the "Irishry" may 
218 
be accepted as referring to all who maintain a unified 
outlook on life, natural symbolists, but is established as 
such more by accretion in poems and essays than in 
individual poems, where it tends to appear idiosyncratic. 
In itself, however, this cannot destroy the unity of a 
poem such as "The Statues" because the major theme of the 
poem is not idiosyncratic but universal. 
Dual voices and polarities of all kinds in these 
poems reflect the internal dissidence intrinsic to man. 
Possibly the most important of these polarities is that of 
determinism and willed acceptance. The poems dramatise 
both the debate and the achievement of acceptance and 
understanding through the exertion of the will. If the 
poems had simply developed a symbolic image that resolved 
the antitheses, the element of will would be present only 
implicitly in the artistic achievement. But the poems 
repeatedly stress this willed acceptance because it is 
this that opposes the apparently meaningless, pre-
determined pattern of life and death. Only when it has 
been achieved can the liberation into joy occur. In "The 
Gyres" this element is directly represented by aesthetic 
distance in art which is the achievement of the artist's 
style, but it is implicit also in the integration of form 
and subject in the other poems. 
The subject of these poems is more than just the 
symbolic process: it is that process as constitutive of 
man's knowledge. Art stands between the spiritual and the 
physical as the symbolic process is the link between man 
and his environment, thus art is both method and example 
of the search for unity. Yeats's critics have tended to 
assume that his art is merely the expression of a unity 
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already found by the poet, but the integrity of meaning 
and form found in the readings of the poems testifies that 
Yeats was able to create an objective unity in the poems. 
Yeats's metaphysical and philosophical concepts do 
not make the poems unduly obscure or private because where 
they appear in the poetry they are derived from general 
knowledge and set in carefully controlled contexts. They 
lose their connection with ordinary thought, however, when 
they are extracted from the poems and referred to less 
restrained contexts such as A Vision or Yeats's other 
prose. A Vision in particular should be taken as Yeats 
said he took it, as a "stylistic arrangement of 
experience". Its symbols, like those of any other system 
or context, are active only within their particular 
context and must be re-activated if they are introduced 
into new artistic contexts. Yeats was aware of the nature 
of symbol in poetry and the same condition applies to his 
verse as to poetry in general: no importation of external 
materials can irradiate the poems with the artist's 
intention if they do not enact their own meaning. And if 
the poems have this integrity, they will themselves 
determine the relevance of external ideas. 
The poems by Yeats studied here reveal this quality. 
Yeats does not rely on the reader to know the symbolic 
meanings of words he uses literally, rather, he relies on 
the reader to know the commonly accepted meanings of the 
words and creates symbolic suggestion by their relation to 
their contexts. These poems are fully self-consistent. 
Their occasional weakness arises from the maintenance of a 
consistently high level of thought, whose universality, 
springing from a single mind, falters at times. This may 
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be partly the result of his isolation from much of the 
thought of his period, but certainly his esoteric 
interests do not destroy the ability of his verse to reach 
other minds, providing they are prepared to give it the 
attention it demands as poetry, and deserves as great 
poetry. Often brilliantly intense, the poems dramatise 
and objectify into universal experience the artist's 
search for an assurance of mind that can rest in his own 
being and in the world as it presents itself to him, and 
can yet go beyond this to uphold those standards of life 
that most enhance the embattled life of men: vigour of 
mind and body, delight in life, fear of what is greater 
than man and the concept of honour to set against the fear. 
Comfort and escape are foreign to him. His constant 
argument is, that because there is no absolute progress 
but a determined, cyclic pattern ending in defeat for 
civilisations as for each individual life, man must use 
his will to live as finely as possible. Art, for Yeats, 
is emblem, symbol and mode of expression, celebrating in 
all these aspects the possibilities of life and drawing 
into a meaningful form the disparate elements of man's 
conscious being. 
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